Acting	on	a	Ground Reasons,	Rational	Motivation,	and	Explanation Magnus	Frei Dissertation	zur	Erlangung	der	Doktorwürde	an	der	Philosophischen	Fakultät der	Universität	Freiburg	in	der	Schweiz. Genehmigt	von	der	Philosophischen	Fakultät	auf	Antrag	der	Professoren	Fabian Dorsch,	Gianfranco	Soldati	und	Constantine	Sandis. Freiburg,	den	28.	Oktober	2016 Prof.	Bernadette	Charlier	Pasquier,	Dekanin 2 IN	MEMORIAM FABIAN	DORSCH (1974-2017) 3 Contents Introduction	.......................................................................................................................................	6 A	Brief	Guide	to	the	Main	Distinctions	.................................................................................	13 Part	I:	Reasons	................................................................................................................................	17 1.	The	Notion	of	a	Normative	Reason	..............................................................................	18 1.1	Facts	...................................................................................................................................	22 2.	Conditions	on	Facts'	Being	Reasons	............................................................................	27 2.1	Conative	Conditions	....................................................................................................	28 2.2	Cognitive	Conditions	..................................................................................................	31 3.	The	Source	of	Reasons	......................................................................................................	33 4.	Reasons	as	Evaluative	Facts	...........................................................................................	35 5.	Psychologism	about	Normative	Reasons	..................................................................	40 6.	Summary	.................................................................................................................................	46 Part	II.	Rational	Motivation	......................................................................................................	49 1.	The	Principle	of	Rational	Motivation	..........................................................................	49 1.1	Neutrality	With	Regard	to	Some	Contentious	Issues	...................................	52 1.2	Grounds	............................................................................................................................	54 1.3	What	Plays	the	Role	of	a	Ground?	.........................................................................	55 1.4	Two	Kinds	of	Propositionalism	About	Grounds	.............................................	59 1.5	Psychologized	Ways	of	Talking	About	Non-Psychologistic	Grounds	....	63 1.5	Reduction	and	Explanation	.....................................................................................	67 2.	The	Psychologism-Debate	...............................................................................................	71 2.1	Varieties	of	Motivating	Reasons	............................................................................	73 2.2	Defusing	the	Psychologism-Debate	.....................................................................	80 2.3	A	Debate	After	All	........................................................................................................	84 4 3.	Summary	.................................................................................................................................	87 Part	III:	Explanation	.....................................................................................................................	89 1.	Non-Psychologism	and	the	Problem	Posed	by	Error-Cases	.............................	90 1.1	The	Non-Psychologist's	Problem	..........................................................................	90 1.2	The	Propositionalist's	Problem	.............................................................................	95 2.	Dancy	on	Denying	Veridicalism	About	Explanantia	.............................................	96 3.	A	Separate	Account	for	Error-Cases	............................................................................	99 3.1	Disjunctivism	About	Grounds	..............................................................................	102 3.2	Disjunctivism	about	Ground-Taking	.................................................................	105 4.	Giving	up	Explanatorism	About	Grounds	...............................................................	109 4.1	Three	Accounts	...........................................................................................................	113 4.2	Problems	for	Psychologism	About	Explanantia	...........................................	120 4.3	Moving	Beyond	Psychologism	About	Explanantia	......................................	125 4.4	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	About	Explanantia	.........................................	127 4.5	Replies	to	Some	Objections	...................................................................................	130 5.	Summary	...............................................................................................................................	139 Summary	.........................................................................................................................................	140 Acknowledgements	....................................................................................................................	146 Bibliography	..................................................................................................................................	148 5 "[E]veryone	will always have the liberty to speak, as	he	pleases,	and	to	apply	what	articulate	sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often	as	he	pleases.	But	yet	when	we	will inquire, what makes the same spirit, man, or person, we must fix the ideas of spirit,	man, or	person, in our minds; and having resolved with ourselves what we	mean	by	them,	it	will	not	be	hard	to	determine, in either	of them,	or the like,	when it is the same, and	when	not." John	Locke,	An	Essay Concerning	Human	Understanding 6 Introduction Imagine that this	morning, I picked	up	my	umbrella on	my	way	out. It	might simply	be	that	I	am	in	the	habit	of	doing	so:	come	sun,	come	rain,	I	pick	up	my umbrella on my way out. However, it might be that I did so because I was motivated	to	do	so.	If	that	was	the	case,	we	can	ask	what	it	was	that	motivated me	to	do	so.	As	it	is	often	put:	we	can	ask	what	my	motivating	reason	was.	In	the literature,	one	finds	two	quite	different	answers	to	that	question.	According	to the long-time orthodoxy, call it 'Psychologism', motivating reasons are our believing	something	(and	maybe	also	our	desiring	something).	According to	a view that recently has become popular, call it 'Non-Psychologism', when we specify the	reasons for	which	someone	acted,	or their	motivating	reasons,	we specify	something	that	she	believed.	So,	according	to	the	Non-Psychologist,	my motivating reason for picking up an umbrella will have been something I believe, say, that it is raining. According to the Psychologist, however, my motivating	reason	will	have	been	my	believing	something	(and	maybe	also	my desiring	something),	say,	my	believing	that	that	it	is	raining	(and	my	desire	to stay	dry). Non-Psychologism	has	a	lot	going	for	it.	For	what	I	believe	can	be	a	fact, and facts can speak in favor of actions, i.e. they can be so-called normative reasons. So, the Non-Psychologistic view allows us to conceptualize me as acting for	a	normative	reason,	as it	allows	that	my	motivating	reason	can	be	a normative	reason.	But	Non-Psychologism	is	generally	taken	to	be	faced	with	a problem, at least in cases in which what the agent relevantly believes is mistaken.	For	it	is	only	natural	to	think	that	when	someone	does	something	for a	reason,	what	explains	her	action	is	the	reason	for	which	she	did	it.	However, 7 as	what	we	believe	can	be	false,	the	view	that	motivating	reasons	are	what	we believe	then	seems	to	imply	that	in	error-cases,	falsehoods	explain	actions,	and falsehoods	do	not	seem	to	be	able	to	explain	anything,	let	alone	actions.	That	is, even if Non-Psychologism, the view that motivating reasons are what we believe,	initially	might	have	something	going	for	it,	it	is	incompatible	with	two seeming truisms, namely, that motivating reasons explain actions, and that falsehoods	cannot	explain	actions. If it	was	not	raining this	morning, it seems misleading to say that I picked up	my umbrella because it was raining. For, saying that I	picked	up	my	umbrella	because it	was	raining	seems like	saying that	what	explains	why	I	picked	up	my	umbrella	was	that	it	was	raining.	But	if	it is	not	true	that	it	was	raining,	how	can	it	be	that	what	explains	why	I	picked	up an	umbrella	is	that	it	was	raining? I am going to argue that on a certain understanding of the term 'motivating	reason',	Non-Psychologism	is	correct	and	insightful.	Moreover,	I	am going	to	argue	that	on	the	understanding	of	the	term	'motivating	reason'	under which	Non-Psychologism	is	correct,	Non-Psychologists	do	not	have	the	problem that they are generally taken to have, for on that understanding, motivating reasons	do	not	explain	actions.	Positively,	I	will	argue	that	when	someone	does something for a motivating reason, in the sense at issue, what explains her action	is	the	fact	or	truth	that	she	did	what	she	did	for	that	motivating	reason, which itself can be a falsehood. However, I am also going to argue that we should be wary of contrasting Non-Psychologistic views with Psychologistic views,	in	the	manner	in	which	they	usually	are	contrasted. My	main	device	is	the	concept	of	acting	on	a	ground.	Someone	acts	on	a ground,	I	will	say,	just	in	case	she	is	motivated	to	act	by	something	she	takes	to 8 speak in favor of so acting, and because she takes it to speak in favor of so acting.	That	is,	something	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	just	in	case	it	is (a) taken	by the	agent to speak in favor	of	performing	a certain course	of action,	and (b) motivates	her	to	perform	that	action, where	(a)	and	(b)	are	related	in	that (c) what	motivates the agent to do	what she does	motivates her because she	takes	it	to	speak	in	favor	of	so	acting. A	few	words	on	terminological	matters.	As	many	things	can	be	said	to	motivate agents, I	will	call	the	sense	of	motivation	at issue	when	someone	is	motivated by	something	she	takes	to	be	a	reason,	and	because	she	takes	it	to	be	a	reason, i.e. the	sense	of	motivation	at issue	when	someone	acts	on	a	ground, 'rational motivation'. I will reserve the term 'reason' for things that speak in favor of actions, i.e. for	what	are	sometimes	called	'normative	reasons'.	As	we	will	see, grounds	can	be	reasons,	but	it	is	not	essential	to	something	being	a	ground	that it	is	a	reason. I	divide	the	thesis	into	three	parts.	In	the	first	part,	I	focus	on	the	notion of	a	reason.	Reasons,	as	I	use	the	term,	are	what	we	seek	to	take	into	account	in deliberation	and	advice. I argue that as	what	we seek to take into account in deliberation	and	advice	are	facts	that	favor	actions,	reasons	are	facts	that	favor actions.	I	give	the	idea	that	reasons	are	facts	that	favor	actions	so	much	space because the definition of the concept of a ground employs the concept of a reason. Also, as what plays the role of a ground is taken to be a normative reason,	getting	clear	on	what	reasons	are	helps	to	get	clear	on	what	plays	the role	of	a	ground. I	will	argue that	what	plays the	role	of	a	ground is	what	we believe. And that argument stands and falls with the idea that normative 9 reasons	are	facts	that	favor	actions.	So,	in	the	first	part,	I	show	that	the	idea	of	a fact that favors	an	action is	highly	ecumenical, in that talking	about facts that favor	actions	(i)	leaves	it	open	whether	more	can	be	said	about	what	it	is	for	a fact to favor	an	action, and	whether	more can	be said	about	what it is for an action	to	be	favored	by	a	fact,	(ii)	leaves	it	open	why,	or	in	virtue	of	what,	some particular fact	speak in favor	of	some	particular	action,	or	what the	source	of the	normative	or	favoring	force	of	facts	is,	and	(iii)	leaves	it	open	whether	some particular fact's being a reason for some particular agent to perform some particular action depends, in some way or another, on that agents cognitive and/or	conative	condition. In	the	second	part,	I	introduce	the	notion	of	acting	on	a	ground,	and	seek to	show	that	it	is	neutral	with	regard	to	a	host	of	contentious	issues.	With	the help	of	the	concept	of	acting	on	a	ground,	and	drawing	on	what	was	done	in	the foregoing	part,	I	argue	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	what	we	believe, that Non-Psychologists are talking about grounds when they use the term 'motivating reason', and, thus, that Non-Psychologism about motivating reasons,	understood	as	Non-Psychologism	about	grounds,	is	correct.	Moreover, I	argue	that	while	Non-Psychologists	are	talking	about	grounds	when	they	use the term 'motivating reasons', Psychologists, when they use that term, are talking	about	explanantia.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	debate	rests	on an	equivocation.	For	Non-Psychologists	often	assume	that	what	plays	the	role of a ground is also what plays the role of an explanans, and as long as that assumption	is	in	play,	the	debate	between	Psychologists	and	Non-Psychologists has substance. However, as I will argue in part III, we should give up that assumption. 10 In	part	II,	I	also	briefly	address	the	issue	of	reductive	accounts	of	acting on a ground, or of being rationally	motivated. A large body of	work done in contemporary theory of action is concerned with the question	what it is for someone	to	act,	or	to	act	on	a	ground,	or	for	a	reason	–	where	to	give	such	an account is to give an account in at least allegedly	more	basic or fundamental terms,	like	causation	by	mental	states,	or	whatever	it	is	that	realizes	them	in	a naturalistically understood world. But what I am engaged in here is neutral with regard to the feasibility and necessity of giving such an account. It is important to point this out for two reasons. First, distinguishing what I am engaged	in	from	this	other	project	that	a	large	body	of	work	is	engaged	in	helps to clarify the project I am engaged in. Secondly, there is also a notion of 'motivating	reason'	that	figures	in	such	accounts;	a	'motivating	reason',	on	that usage	of	the	term,	is	a	psychological	state	(or	a	pair	of	psychological	states)	that figures	in	a	reductive	account	of	what	it	is	to	act,	or	to	act	on	a	ground,	or	for	a reason. In the third	and final	part, I	will address	what is	generally taken to	be the	main challenge for	Non-Psychologism	about	motivating reasons.	As I said above: Motivating reasons are often taken to be what explain actions, but surely,	falsehoods	cannot	explain	actions.	However,	if,	as	the	Non-Psychologist holds,	motivating	reasons	are	what	we	believe,	say,	that	P,	and	what	we	believe can	be false, then	P	can	be	a	motivating reason	despite	being false.	Replacing the ambiguous 'motivating reason'	with 'ground', we can put the problem in terms	of	the	following	inconsistent	triad: (i) What	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	can	be	a	falsehood. (ii) Falsehoods	cannot	play	the	role	of	explanantia. 11 (iii) What plays the role of a ground is also what plays the role of an explanantia. Now, as part II showed that (i) is correct, and as I take it that we cannot reasonably	challenge	(ii),	what	I	think	we	can	learn	from	this	is	that	(iii)	must be	mistaken.	However, that (iii) is	mistaken	does	not	mean	that	grounds	play no role whatsoever in explanations. Grounds can figure or feature in explanations, without playing the role of an explanans. And on pain of not showing the action to be done on a ground, they	must figure or feature in explanations. But	what, then, does play the role of an explanans, in a case in which S Φ's on grounds of P? I will argue that explanantia are what I call motivation-facts,	i.e.	facts	to	the	effect	that	some	consideration	played	the	role of the agent's ground. Further, I will argue that there are two kinds of motivation-facts. If in	Φing	on	grounds	of	P,	S is	Φing	for	a	normative	reason, then	the	fact	that	she	Φed	on	grounds	of	that	reason	is	the	motivation-fact	that explains	her	Φing.	If,	however,	in	Φing	on	grounds	of	P,	S	merely	takes	herself to	be	Φing	for	a	normative	reason	(i.e.	if	the	ground	on	which	she	Φ's	is	not	a reason, but is	merely taken by her to be one), then the fact that she	Φed on grounds of the believed proposition P is the	motivation-fact that explains her Φing. For	one,	my	thesis	casts	new	light	on	the	debate	between	Psychologists and Non-Psychologists. An examination of the various senses of the term 'motivating	reason'	is	much	needed,	as	it	helps	to	see	what	is	and	what	is	not	at issue. Besides that, however,	my thesis offers an independent clarification of the	relation	between	favorers,	motivators,	and	explanantia,	and,	thereby	(to	be bold)	of	rational	agency.	What	motivates	is	often	conflated	with	what	explains. 12 Distinguishing those two things allows one to understand how favorers and motivators	are	related. 13 A	Brief	Guide	to	the	Main	Distinctions Certain	distinctions,	theoretical	options,	and	labels	will	keep	coming	up.	And	in due	course, I	will	have	a lot to say	about them.	But to	prepare the reader for what is	coming, it seems	helpful to	start	with	a	brief	overview	of	some	of the main	distinctions,	options,	and	labels. I	will	distinguish	the	following	three	roles: (1) Speaking	in	favor	of	some	course	of	action. (2) Motivating	someone	to	perform	some	course	of	action. (3) Explaining	why	someone	performed	some	course	of	action. I will use the term 'reason' to talk about what plays the first role, the term 'ground' to	talk	about	what	plays	the	second	role,	and	the	term 'explanans' to talk	about	what	plays	the	third	role. I	will be talking in detail about all of those three roles. But especially with	regard	to	the	notion	of	explanation,	it	might	be	helpful	to	distinguish	two senses	of 'explaining'	right	at	the	outset.	As	philosophers,	we	give	accounts	or theories	of	things	like	action,	or	normativity,	or	values.	And	another	way	to	put that	is	to	say	that	as	philosophers,	we	explain	action,	or	normativity,	or	values. But this sense of 'explaining' (which one	might call the philosopher's sense) should	be	held apart from	what	we	do	when	we, as agents,	explain	why, say, Elisabeth	is	operating	the	pump,	or	why	Donald	flipped	the	switch,	or,	for	that matter,	why	the	bridge	collapsed,	or	the	car	did	not	start.	When	we,	as	agents, explain	why	Elisabeth	is	operating	the	pump,	we	do	not	seek	to	give	a	theory	of her	operating the	pump.	Rather,	we	seek to	render	intelligible	her	doing	what she	did	by	way	of	bringing to light	on	what	grounds	she	did	so,	or	by	way	of showing in response to what reason, or with what end in view, she did so. 14 When	I	talk	about	'explaining	why	someone	performed	some	course	of	action',	I will	be	talking	about	explaining	in	this	second	sense	(which	one	might	call	the agent's	sense),	albeit,	of	course, in	my	capacity	as	philosopher.	For,	of	course, one can also hope to explain (in the philosopher's sense) explanation (in the agent's	sense),	that	is,	give	a	theory	or	an	account	thereof	(cf.	II.5,	III.4). As	we	will	see,	(2)	and	(3)	are	often	run	together.	That	is,	talking	about something that	motivates someone to	perform	some	course	of action is	often taken to be tantamount to talking about	what explains	why she so acted (cf. II.2.3, III.1). One main result of this thesis is that that is a mistake. Distinguishing	the	motivational	and	the	explanatory	role	at	the	outset	does	not amount to begging the question	with regard to that	matter. Rather, it allows one to raise the question whether things that motivate are distinct from or identical	with things that explain. So it does not beg the question – it avoids doing	so. I	will	also	talk	about	Psychologistic	and	Non-Psychologistic	accounts.	It is important to make clear that there are actually two Psychologism/NonPsychologism-distinctions.	When it is	asked	what	plays the	role	of	an	X (i.e.	a reason, or a ground, or an explanans), one answer to consider is that psychological states are what plays that role. The first type of Psychologistic account is an account that gives such an answer. When necessary, I will highlight	that	that	kind	of	Psychologistic	account	is	at	issue	by	terming	it	'StatePsychologism': (State-Psychologism	about	X)	What	plays	the	role	of	X	is	a	psychological state. The	according	Non-Psychologistic	answer	is	that	what	plays	the	role	of	an	X	is not	a	psychological	state,	but	rather,	a	fact,	or	a	proposition: 15 (Propositionalism	about	X)	What	plays	the	role	of	X	is	a	proposition. (Factualism	about	X)	What	plays	the	role	of	X	is	a	fact. Note, however, that as I will use the term, facts are true propositions. Thus, Factualism	about	X	is	a	subset	of	Propositionalism	about	X. But once a Non-Psychologistic answer of this first kind is given, the possibility	of a second type	of	Psychologism	arises. If, for instance, one	holds that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	a	proposition,	or	that	what	plays	the	role of	a	reason	is	a	fact,	one	can	then	raise	the	question	whether	the	relevant	kinds of facts, or propositions, respectively, are always facts or propositions about psychological	matters.	When necessary, I will signify that I am talking about that	second	kind	of	psychologistic	account	by	qualifying	the	view	accordingly: (Psychologistic	Propositionalism	about	X)	What	plays the	role	of	X is	a proposition	about	psychological	matters. (Psychologistic Factualism about X)	What plays the role of X is a fact about	psychological	matters. Note that I	will not understand the according	Non-Psychologistic view	as the view	that	propositions,	or	facts,	about	psychological	matters	can	never	play	the role at issue, but rather, as the view that when facts or propositions about psychological	matters	do	play	the	role	at	issue,	their	being	facts	or	propositions about	psychological	matters is	not	essential to their	playing the role that they play	(cf.	I.5,	II.4). Finally, in part III, I will talk about Disjunctivist accounts. As I understand	it,	a	Disjunctive	account	of	X	is	an	account	that	holds	that	instances of X come in two forms. For instance, one might think that we need a disjunctive account of perceptual states, according to which being in a perceptual	state	either	puts	one	in	a	position	to	acquire	knowledge	of	the	facts, 16 or does not put one in such a position,	where being in a position to acquire knowledge	of the facts	does	not	simply	amount to	being in	a	perceptual	state that is such that given that some non-circular condition holds, being in that state amounts to being in a position to acquire knowledge of the facts. The according	conjunctive	account	holds	that	being	in	a	perceptual	state	is	the	same all along, but that sometimes, a certain non-circular condition is satisfied, so that being in a perceptual state amounts to being in a position to acquire knowledge	of	the	facts.	One	can	apply	this	idea	also	to	our	topic,	and	one	can	do so	in	diverse	ways.	That	is,	one	can	give	a	disjunctive	account	of	reasons,	or	of grounds, or of explanantia; but also, say, of actions done on grounds or for reasons. With these distinctions in hand, one could generate an unmanageable amount of theoretical options. But that is not the only reason	why I	will not discuss all the possible theoretical options. I take it that not all of those theoretical	options	are	worth	discussing.	And	thus,	I	will	confine	my	discussion to	those	that	(i)	seem	like	at	least	initially	plausible	alternatives	to	the	option	I take to be true and for which I will argue, and to those that (ii) have some prominence	in	the	literature. In	the	introduction,	I	have	already	stated	what	I	am	going	to	argue	for.	In the light of the distinctions I have introduced, I can now say	more precisely what	I	am	going	to	argue	for,	namely,	that	reasons	are	(for	the	most	part)	nonpsychological facts, that grounds are (for the most part) non-psychological propositions, and that explanantia are a special kind of facts, namely,	what I will	call	motivation-facts, i.e. facts	about	what	proposition	played	the	role	of	a ground.	Moreover, I	will argue that	motivation-facts come in two kinds, i.e. I will	give	a	disjunctive	account	of	explanantia. 17 Part	I:	Reasons I will employ the term 'normative reason' (or 'reason', for short) to signify whatever	it is	that	we	seek	to	take	into	account	(i)	when	deciding	what	to	do, and (ii) when advising others on what they are to do.1	One can, of course, employ	the	term	differently.	Doing	so,	however,	would	amount	to	changing	the topic.	I	will	come	back	to	that	below. Normative reasons, on the suggested usage of the term, are what we seek	to	take	into	account.	But	we	do	not	always	succeed	therein.	When	deciding on	what	to	do,	and	when	advising	others	on	what	they	are	to	do,	we	can	take things	into	account	that	are	not	reasons,	but	that	we	merely	take	to	be	reasons. Consequently, our decisions and our advice can be flawed in precisely that respect.	And	importantly,	if	they	are	flawed	in	that	respect,	they	are	flawed	by our own lights: if we retrospectively come to see that what we took into account	was	not	a	reason,	we	will	thereby	come	to	see	that	we	made	a	certain kind	of	mistake	(albeit	not	necessarily	a	mistake	for	which	we	are	culpable). Reasons,	in	the	sense	at	issue,	also	seem	to	play	a	role	in	(iii)	evaluating actions.	Moreover	–	or	so	I	will	argue	in	III.4	–	they	play	a	role	in	(iv)	explaining at	least	some	actions;	notably,	in	explaining	those	actions	that	are	such	that	the agent is (v)	motivated to perform them	by some reason to perform them (cf. II.1,	III.4).	However,	let	me	put	(iii)-(v)	aside	for	now	and	focus	on	(i)	and	(ii). 1	That reasons are in the focus in deliberation is common-fare, cf. e.g. Raz (1975, pp. 15–16) and	Wallace (2003, p. 432). The relation between reasons and	advice	is	stressed	e.g.	by	Scanlon	(1998,	p.	20)	and	Thomson	(2003,	p.	44). 18 In general, the aim of this chapter is to enable myself to talk about normative	reasons	without	venturing	too	far	into	debated	issues.	I	suggest	that I	can	do	that	by	following	the	standard	line	of	taking	reasons	to	be	facts	that,	at least	in	certain	circumstances,	speak	in	favor	of	actions	(I.1).	I	will	defend	this Factualist	account	of	reasons	by	way	of	showing	that	such	an	understanding	of reasons	is	neutral	in	many	crucial	respects:	it	is	neutral	with	regard	to	whether reasons	are	conditioned	on	the	conative	and	cognitive	situation	of	the	agent	for whom	they	are	reasons	(I.2),	and	it	is	neutral	with	regard	to	what	the	source	of reasons is (I.3).	What kinds of facts are reasons? I	will suggest that ordinary empirical facts can be reasons, and discuss the view that they are evaluative facts	(I.4),	and	the	view	that	they	are	psychological	facts	(I.5). 1.	The	Notion	of	a	Normative	Reason In the practical domain, normative reasons – understood in the	manner just expounded,	i.e.	understood	as	what	we	seek	to	take	into	account	in	deliberation and	advice	–	are	standardly	taken	to	be facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	actions,	or facts	that	make	a	case	(or	at	least	part	of	a	case)	for	performing	a	certain	action (cf. e.g. Dancy, 2004a; Parfit, 2011; Raz, 1975, 1999, 2011b; Scanlon, 1998, 2014). At	least	in	normal	cases,	these	facts	are	facts	about	the	world	around	us, and not facts about our own mind. Consider, for instance, the fact that you promised	to	Φ.	By	way	of	that	fact,	a	case	can	be	made	for	you	to	Φ.	Or	take	the fact that it is your	mother's birthday today. In the light of that fact, there is something	to	be	said	for	giving	her	a	call,	or	paying	her	a	visit;	and	in	that	sense, that	fact	can	be	said	to	speak	in	favor	of	your	giving	her	a	call,	or	paying	her	a 19 visit.	Or,	finally,	take	the	fact	that	the	building	we	are	in	is	on	fire.	By	way	of	that fact,	a	case	can	be	made	for	leaving	the	building	as	fast	as	possible.2	As	we	will see,	there	can	also	be	cases	in	which,	say,	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	there	are pink	rats	living	in	my	shoes	is	a	reason	for	me	to	do	something,	namely,	to	go and	seek	out	a	psychiatrist.	But	standardly,	reasons	are	not	such	psychological facts	(cf.	I.5).	However,	as	we	will	also	see,	that	does	not	rule	out	that	the	mind of the agent	whose reasons	we	are concerned	with	plays	no role	whatsoever (I.2). Understood	very	generally, to	say	of	a fact that it	speaks in favor	of	an action, or that a case can be	made for performing a certain action by	way of pointing	out that	certain fact	obtains, is just to	say that that fact	bears	on	the normative status of the action that it is a reason for. What is the relevant normative status? Is it simply the status of being supported or favored by reasons? Or can it be spelled out in terms of, say, the action being	what one ought	to	do,	or	in	terms	of	it	being	good	in	some	sense,	or	in	terms	of	it	having some	value?	Or,	more sophisticated	maybe, is it the status of being	what any well-informed rational agent, or any well-informed and fully virtuous agent, would	do in	such	a	situation?	And	what	exactly is it for	a fact to	bear	on that status?	Is	it	just	for	that	fact	to	speak	in	favor	of	performing	that	action,	where the	concept	of speaking-in-favor is	a	primitive	concept (Parfit,	2011;	Scanlon, 1998,	2014)?	Or	is	it	for	it	to	be	evidence	for	believing	that	that	action	has	that 2	Of	course,	these	examples	take	a	stand	on	first-order	normative	issues.	But	it is not for no reason that the examples chosen are not examples about controversial issues,	such	as,	say,	euthanasia	or	abortion.	The	point	of	making those	examples	is	not	to	push	any	particular	first-order	normative	view,	but	to illustrate	a	structure,	assuming	hopefully	uncontroversial	first-order	normative views. 20 status	(Kearns	&	Star,	2009)?	Or	is it for	it	to	explain,	at least	partially,	why	it has that status (Broome, 2004)? These are interesting and important issues. But	for	my	present	concerns,	they	can	be	left	open. Let me further clarify the relevant notion of a normative reason by discussing two quite simple objections. First, someone might object to examples	like	the	ones	given	by	concocting	a	story	in	which,	say,	someone	is	in a	burning	house,	but	in	which	that	fact	does	not	seem	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to jump out of the window into the canal: Maybe she cannot swim and would surely	drown,	were	she	to	jump	out	of	the	window	into	the	canal;	or	maybe	she is on the 55th floor and would certainly die, were she to jump out of the window.	The	same,	it	would	seem,	could	be	done	for	any	other	example. That	would	only	be	an	objection	if	the	claim	were	that	the	fact	that	the house	is	on	fire	is	a	reason	to	jump	out	of	the	window	no	matter	what,	or	in	all possible circumstances. So, it would seem that in order to avoid that simple objection,	we	should	say	that	reason-claims	do	not	merely	relate	an	agent,	an action,	and	a	fact	in	a	manner	that	reveals	the	fact	to	be	a	reason	for	the	agent to perform the action. Rather, we should say that they do so only in certain circumstances,	or	only	given	certain	conditions	(which	need	not imply that	we can exhaustively state those conditions or circumstances). In	many domains, we	can	distinguish	between	something's	being	or counting	as something, and the conditions under which it is or counts as that thing. For instance, my kicking	the	ball into	the	net	counts	as	scoring	a	goal	only if I	am	engaged	in	a game	of	football;	if	I	am	engaged	in	a	game	of	handball,	my	kicking	the	ball	into the	net	does	not	count	as	scoring	a	goal.	But	that	is	not	to	say	that	part	of	my scoring	a	goal	is	my	being	engaged	in	a	game	of	football.	My	being	engaged	in	a game of football is a condition for my kicking a ball into the net being or 21 counting	as	scoring	a	goal,	and	not	part	of	my	scoring	a	goal.3	In	this	spirit,	one can	distinguish	between, on the	one	hand, facts that are reasons, and, on the other	hand,	the	conditions	under	which	they	are	reasons. Based on considerations such as these, it has been suggested that	we should	take	reason-claims	to	be	four-place	relations.	That	is,	that	reason-claims have	the	following	form: R(P,	C,	S,	Φ), where	P	is	a	fact	that,	in	circumstances	C,	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	(Cuneo,	2007, pp. 62–70; Scanlon, 2014, p. 32; Skorupski, 2010, pp. 35–37).4	Accordingly, a reason-claim can be undercut – or a reason shown to be a	mere prima facie reason	–	by	showing	that	the	relevant	circumstances	do	not	obtain.5 Secondly, one	might object that even if the relevant circumstances do obtain, and the fact thus does speak in favor of the action, performing that action	is	not	what	the	agent	ought	to	do.	Understood	in	the	most	natural	way, that possibility is not actually an objection: It	merely serves to highlight that reasons,	in	the	sense	at	issue,	merely	have	a	pro	tanto	force.	That	is	to	say,	they do	not	say that	some	course	of	action is	what	we	have	most	reason to	do,	but merely,	that	it	is	what	we	have	reason	to	do	to	a	certain	extent,	namely,	only	to 3	For	a	discussion	of	background	(or	enabling)	conditions,	cf.	Dancy	(2004, chap.	3)	and	Schroeder	(2007,	chap.	2). 4	Skorupski	actually	takes	it	that	we	can	helpfully	understand	reason-claims	to be six-place relations,	where the two further relata, in	his view, are time and strength. 5	We might also call prima facie reasons 'apparent reasons', as they merely appear	to	be	reasons.	But	we	should	note	that	there	is	something	else	that	one might	with	equal	justice	call	'apparent	reasons'.	In	the	example	given,	a	reasonclaim was undercut by bringing in more of the relevant background story. However, there is	also	another	sense in	which	something that is	presented	to be	a	reason	can	be	shown	to	merely	apparently	be	a	reason,	namely,	by	way	of showing the fact that is presented as a reason does not obtain. This is how Alvarez	(2010,	p.	140)	employs	the	term	'apparent	reason'. 22 the extent that there are no other weightier reasons that speak against that course	of	action,	or	in	favor	of	some	other	incompatible	course	of	action.	Thus, when	we	say that some fact is	a reason for	S to	Φ,	we leave it	open	whether there	might	be	other	reasons	against	Φing,	or	in	favor	of	Ψing	(where	Ψing	is incompatible	with	Φing).6 1.1	Facts I	have	just	said	that	normative	reasons	are	facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	actions. But	what	do	I	mean	by	'fact'?	As	I	will	use	the	term,	when	S	believes	that	P,	and P	is	true,	then	what	S	believes	is	a	fact.	That	is,	as	I	will	use	the	term,	facts	are true thoughts, or true propositions (Frege, 2003;	McDowell, 1994; Strawson, 1949).	And	thus,	by	saying	that	reasons	are	facts,	I	am	saying	that	reasons	are true	propositions	(cf.	e.g.	Alvarez,	2010,	pp.	40–44;	Darwall,	1983,	p.	31;	Lord, 6	I	will	not	attempt	to	say	how	we	get	from	a	view	about	what	speaks	in	favor	of what	to	a	view	about	what	we	have	most	reason	to	do.	However,	it	seems	safe to	say	that	'most	reason'	does	not	mean	'most	reasons',	that	is,	that	it	is	not	the case	that	we	have	most	reason	to	do	what	there	are	most	reasons	for	us	to	do. For	surely,	there	can	be	many	minor	reasons	in	favor	of	Φing	(it	would	please A, and it would please B, and it would please C) which are trumped by one major	reason	against	it	(it	would	severely	injure	D).	In	fact,	it	is	not	even	clear at	the	outset	whether,	on	a	conceptual	level,	the	question	really	is	the	question how	we	get	from	a	view	about	what	is	a	reason	for	what	to	a	view	about	what we	have	most	reason	to	do.	It	might	be	that	we	have	to	start	with	a	view	about what	we	have	most	reason	to	do,	and	understand	what	we	have	a	reason	to	do in terms of what we would have most reason to do, were things slightly different than they are. For an extensive – but partial – discussion of such issues,	cf.	Dancy	(2004a). 23 2008;	Scanlon,	1998,	p.	57;	Setiya,	2014;	contrast	Bittner,	2001,	p.	109;	Dancy, 2002,	pp.	116–118).7 What	is	the	appeal	of	taking	reasons	to	be	propositional?	There	seems	to be	a	close	connection	between	reasons	and	reasoning.	That is, if	P is	a	reason for	S	to	Φ,	then	it	seems	possible	that	S	can	conclude	from	P	that	she	ought	to Φ,	or	that	were	she	to	Φ,	she	would	be	acting	well,	or	doing	the	right	thing.	If we	take	reasons	to	be	propositional,	we	can	make	good	sense	of	that	idea.	For	if reasons	are	propositional,	it	is	immediately	clear	that	they	are	such	that	we	can draw	conclusions	from	them	(cf.	Alvarez,	2010,	p.	42).	But	it	might	seem	clearly wrong that reasons	are true	propositions. Let	me	discuss a forceful objection and	show	how	one	can	counter	it.	Let	us	say	that	Peter	is	the	only	man	in	the vicinity	wearing	red	shorts.	Now,	the	propositions (1) Peter	is	drowning, and (2) The	only	man	in	the	vicinity	wearing	red	shorts	is	drowning are	clearly	distinct.	For	one	can	believe	(1)	but	not	believe	(2),	and	vice	versa. But	it	would	seem	that	if	by	embedding	(1)	into (3) That	___	is	a	reason	to	immediately	notify	the	lifeguard generates	a truth, then	so	does	embedding (2) into (3).	After	all, if you	know that	Peter	is	the	only	man	in	the	vicinity	wearing	red	shorts,	it	seems	that	you cannot	consistently	hold 7	Some	authors	want	to	remain	neutral	on	the	issue,	cf.	Raz	(2011d,	pp.	14–16). And Scanlon, while explicitly holding that reasons are propositions, also maintains	that	"[w]hat	is	special	about	reasons	is	not	the	ontological	category of	things	that	can	be	reasons,	but	rather	the	status	of	being	a	reason,	that	is	to say,	of	counting	in	favor	of	some	judgment-sensitive	attitude."	Scanlon	(1998,	p. 56)	For	illuminating	discussions	of	the	issue	that	go	far	beyond	what	I	will	say here,	cf.	Everson	(2009)	and	Mantel	(2015). 24 (4) That	Peter	is	drowning	is	a	reason	to	immediately	notify	the	lifeguard, but	deny (5) That the only	man in the vicinity	wearing red shorts is drowning is a reason	to	immediately	notify	the	lifeguard. And the same	holds	vice	versa: If you	know that	Peter is the	only	man in the vicinity	wearing	red	shorts, it	seems	that	you	cannot	consistently	hold	(5)	but deny	(4). Moreover, it seems that (4) and (5) do not concern two different reasons,	but	one	and	the	same	reason.	It	is	absurd	to	think	that	(4)	identifies	a reason,	and	that	over	and	above	the	reason	that	(4) identifies, (5) identifies	a further reason. There clearly is just one reason to immediately notify the lifeguard,	one	that	I	can	impress	on	you	either	by	(4)	or	by	(5). But if (4) and (5) are both true, and (1) and (2) are different propositions,	and	reasons	are	true	propositions,	that	would	seem	to	lead	to	the absurd result that (4) and (5) do not concern one and the same reason, but different reasons. And thus, it might seem that reasons are not true propositions	(cf.	Mantel,	2015,	pp.	10–11). But	that	follows	only	if	the	proposition	that	(4)	identifies	as	a	reason	to immediately	notify	the	lifeguard	is	(1),	and	the	proposition	that	(5)	identifies	as a	reason	is	(2).	And	there	are	good	reasons	to	doubt	that.	After	all,	that	the	man who is	drowning	goes	by the	name 'Peter', and that	he is	wearing	red	shorts, does not seem to be normatively significant with regard to the action of immediately notifying the lifeguard. After all, nothing would change with regard to immediately notifying the lifeguard being favored, if the man drowning would not go by the name 'Peter', but by some other name, and likewise, nothing would change if the man drowning were not wearing red 25 shorts, but	blue shorts, or	no shorts at all, for that	matter.	What seems to	be normatively significant, in the case at hand,	would seem	merely to be that a human being is drowning.8	And thus, it seems that the proposition that (4) identifies	as	a	reason	to	immediately	notify	the	lifeguard	is	not	(1),	despite	the overt	structure	of	(4),	but	rather:9 (6) A	human	being	is	drowning. Furthermore, it seems that (6) is also the proposition that (5) identifies as a reason to immediately	notify the lifeguard, despite the	overt structure	of (5). So,	I	submit	that	(4)	is	not	a	straightforward	instance	of (7) P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ, but	rather,	that	the	underlying	structure	of	(4)	is	a	conjunction	of	the	following form: (8) (Q	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ)	and	R, where	'Q'	stands	for	(6)	and	'R'	stands	for (9) The	man	who	is	drowning	goes	by	the	name	'Peter'. The	same	holds,	I	submit,	for	(5),	mutatis	mutandis.	This	is	a	good	result.	For	if the	proposition	that	(4)	and	(5)	identify	as	reason	is	not	(1)	or	(2),	respectively, but (6), then there is	nothing	absurd	about	holding that (4) and (5) are	both 8	Compare:	from	Sue	owns	a	red	sports	car,	Peter	does	not	own	a	car,	and	People who	own	cars	do	not	use	public	transport	as	frequently	as	people	who	do	not	own cars, we can conclude that Sue does not use public transport as frequently as Peter does. But that the car that Sue owns is a red sports car is inferentially speaking irrelevant.	What is inferentially	speaking	relevant is	merely	that	Sue owns	a	car. 9	Alternatively,	one	could	say that the reason that	both (4)	and (5) identify is something	like	the	value	of	saving	a	drowning	man's	life.	However,	for	reasons	I will	come	to	(cf.	I.4),	I	would	prefer	to	say	that	the	value	of	saving	a	drowning man's	life	is	a	candidate	for	what	makes	(6),	i.e.	the	fact	that	a	man	is	drowning, a	reason	to	save	his	life, as	opposed	to	being	the	reason	to	save	his	life	(cf.	I.3). 26 true, that (1) and (2) are different propositions, and that reasons are propositions.	Thus,	the	objection	is	refuted. Note,	however,	that	that	does	not	mean	that	always	when	a	fact	that	is	a reason	is	a	fact	about	a	person,	the	way	in	which	the	reason-statement	singles out that	person	has	no	normative	significance.	Consider	the following	reasonstatement: (10) That	my	friend	is	in	financial	trouble	is	a	reason	for	me	to	help	him	out. Here,	that	the	person	who	is	in	trouble	is	my	friend	is	normatively	significant.10 Given, at least, that it is not a moral requirement to support all people in financial trouble (at least not for people of	moderate	means) the	proposition that	(10)	identifies	as	a	reason	is (11) that	my	friend	is	in	financial	trouble, and	not (12) that	someone	is	in	financial	trouble. We	could	of	course	also	construct	a	reason-statement	that	expresses	what	(10) expresses, but that has the structure that I claimed that (4) and (5) exhibit, namely,	the	structure	of	a	conjunction.	Consider,	for	instance: (13) That	my	friend	Jonas is in financial trouble is	a	reason	for	me	to	help him	out. While Jonas'	being	my	friend is	normatively	significant,	his	going	by the	name 'Jonas'	is	not.	And	thus,	what	(13)	identifies	as	reason	is	(11),	and	not 10	The	reason	that	(10)	identifies	is	what	is	sometimes	described	as	an	'agentrelative' reason, i.e. a reason that "include[s] an essential reference to the person	who	has	it",	as	Nagel	puts	it	in	a	classical	discussion.	The	reason	that	(4) and	(5) identify,	however, is	an 'agent-neutral'	reason, i.e.	a	reason	that	"does not include	an	essential reference to the	person	who	has it" (Nagel,	1986,	pp. 152–153). 27 (14) My	friend	Jonas	is	in	financial	trouble, despite	the	overt	appearance	of	(13). I conclude that there is nothing wrong about saying that reasons are true	propositions,	but	that	we	have	to	decide	on	a	case-to-case	basis	what	the reason	is	that	a	given	reason-statement	identifies.	Of	course,	much	more	would have	to	be	said in	order	to	give	a fully	satisfying	account	of the	pragmatics	of reason-statements.11	But	for	my	purposes,	this	is	not	necessary. 2.	Conditions	on	Facts'	Being	Reasons It is important	to	note	that in	saying	that	reasons	are	facts,	one	is	not	already saying that the mind of the agent for whom they are reasons plays no role whatsoever.	The	notion	of	a	normative reason, as I	have just introduced it, is compatible with their being conative and/or cognitive conditions on some fact's being a reason; but it is also compatible with their being no such conditions. 11	Consider: On the face of it, if I tell you that the fact that something is happening to Peter that Sue is telling Clarissa about is a reason for you to immediately	notify	Jim,	what	I	say	is	unintelligible.	But	if	it	is	clear	to	both	of	us that what Sue is telling Clarissa is that Peter is drowning, and that Jim is a lifeguard,	our	statement	does	manage	to	bring	to	light	that	the	fact	that	a	man (who incidentally goes by the name of 'Peter', and	whose fate is incidentally being	communicated	to	Clarissa)	is	drowning	is	a	reason	for	you	to	immediately notify	a	lifeguard. 28 2.1	Conative	Conditions Some	have	thought	that	some	fact's	being	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	is	conditioned,	in some sense, on her conative situation, i.e. on her desires, on	what she cares about or subjectively values, or on her interests. That is, some have thought that	all	reasons	are	internal	in	Bernard	Williams'	(1980)	influential	sense.	What is meant when it is said that all reasons are internal? The internal/external contrast	is	not	a	contrast	between	reasons	being	facts	about	the	world	around us and them	being	psychological states, or	psychological facts.	Both externalreason theorists and internal-reason theorists can (and should) agree that reasons	are,	at	least	for	the	most	part,	facts	about	the	world	around	us	(i.e.	that they are 'external' in some	other sense). The idea is also	not that	P's being a reason	for	S	to	Φ	is	straightforwardly	dependent	on	her	having	a	present	desire to	Φ,	or	to	bring	about	what	Φ	will	bring	about.	That	is	to	say,	the	idea	is	not	the very	implausible	idea	that	when,	say,	Susanne	hits	someone	while	driving,	she has	a	reason	to	stop,	give	first	aid,	and	call	the	ambulance	only	if	she	presently desires	to	help	injured	people,	or	does	not	want	the	person	she	hit	to	die.	The idea	that	a	fact's	being	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	depends	on	S's	conative	situation	is subjectivist, in that the	agent's	or subject's conative	situation is relevant	with regard to whether some particular fact is a reason for her to perform some particular	action,	but	it	is	not	the	bold	(and	very	implausible)	claim	that	P	is	a reason	for	you	to	Φ	only	if	you	presently	desire	to	Φ. To see what the idea is, let us look at the standard argument to the conclusion that all reasons are internal. It rests on two premises. The first premise	is	the	claim	that	if	there	are	no	rational	means	by	way	of	which	S	could 29 be	brought	to	be	motivated	by	P	to	Φ,	then	P	cannot	be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ.	12 Rational	means,	here,	can	be	understood	in	an	open	fashion.	A	rational	means by	way	of	which	I	can	bring	you	to	be	motivated	to	do	what	you	initially	were not	motivated to	do is, say, informing	you	about your factual errors.	Another such rational means is pointing out inconsistencies in your principles, or commitments.	Contrast	rational	means	with	various	forms	of	manipulation,	like moving rhetoric, that can	also	effect change.	The second	premise is the claim that	whether S can be brought by rational	means to be	motivated by P to	Φ depends on her current state of mind, that is to say, that whether S can be brought	by	rational	means	to	be	motivated	by	P	to	Φ	depends	on	where	S	starts out. From these two	premises, it follows that	P's	being	a reason for	S to	Φ is conditioned on her current state of	mind, but not in the straightforward and rather implausible	manner	mentioned above. Rather, if the two	premises are true and the argument valid, it follows that P's being a reason for S to Φ is conditioned	on	her	current	state	of	mind in the	sense	that if	she	could	not	be brought	by	rational	means from	her	current	state	of	mind	to	being	motivated by	P	to	Φ,	then	P	is	not	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ	(cf.	Williams,	1980).13 I just	said that the	conclusion follows if the two	premises	are true	and the	argument	valid.	McDowell (1995)	has	doubted the first	premise.	He	asks: what is	wrong	with	moving rhetoric?	Why should the fact that you can only bring	the	man	who	beats	his	wife to	stop	doing	so	by	way	of	moving	rhetoric 12	Williams does not talk about 'rational means' by way of which S can be 'brought	to	be	motivated',	but	rather,	about	a	'sound	deliberative	route'	by	way of which the agent could arrive at a state of mind sufficient for her to be motivated	by	P. I	move from	his first-personal rendering to	a	more	dialogical rendering	because	I	take	that	way	of	putting	things	to	more	perspicuous. 13	For	a	collection	of	the	main	contributions	(with	an	illuminating	introduction) cf.	Setiya	&	Paakkunainen	(2012). 30 show	that	he	does	not	have	a	reason	to	stop	doing	so?	That	is,	he	questions	the need	for	the	change	required	to	be	a	rational	one;	after	all,	he	urges,	it	is	not	by way	of rational	means that	we	are initiated into the 'realm	of reasons' in the first	place, so	why	not think that someone	might	only	be	able to come to see what she	all along	had reason to	do	only	after something like	a conversion.14 Korsgaard	(1986)	and	Smith	(2000,	pp.	164–174),	in	rather	different	fashions, have	doubted	the	second	premise.	They	argue	that	at	least	in	principle,	one	can get	to	the	state	of	mind	required	to	be	motivated	by	the	reasons	there	are	from any starting point.15	It is not part of this project to determine whether all reasons are internal, i.e. psychologically conditioned. My point, here, is that whatever the truth is about this issue: both sides can agree that reasons are facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	some	agent	performing	some	action.	For	facts	that are	reasons,	I	said	above,	are	reasons	not	in	all	possible	circumstances,	but	only in certain circumstances. The disagreement can, thus, be understood as the disagreement whether facts about the agent's conative condition are always part	of	the	relevant	circumstances	or	not	(cf.	Scanlon,	2014,	p.	32).	If	all	reasons 14	One might think that it is obvious that the man who beats his wife has a reason	to	stop	doing	so,	as	his	beating	his	wife	is	cruel	and	insensitive,	and	as	it would	be	a	good,	were	he to	stop	doing	so.	But	Williams is	happy to	concede that the	man	who beats is	wife is cruel and insensitive, and that it	would	be good,	were	he	to	stop	doing	so.	In	an	unorthodox	contribution,	Stephen	Finlay suggests	that	the	disagreement	might	at	heart	actually	be	one	about	the	term	of a	normative	reason:	that	for	Williams,	the	term	does	not	signify	favorers	(as	it does	for	most	authors),	but	rather,	possible	"explanation[s]	of	an	agent's	action under	the	condition	of	the	absence	of	false	belief	or	ignorance" (Finlay,	2009,	p. 14;	his	emphasis). 15	In	her	article,	Korsgaard	turns	the	tables	on	Williams.	Williams	argues	that	as reasons	must	be	able	to	motivate,	if	S	cannot	be	got	(by	rational	means)	to	be motivated	to	Φ	by	P,	P	cannot	be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ.	Korsgaard	argues	that	as reasons	must	be	able	to	motivate,	it	must	be	that	S	can	(by	rational	means)	be brought	to	be	motivated	to	Φ	by	P,	if	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ. 31 are internal, then the circumstances in	which	P is a reason for	S to	Φ	always include some fact about S's conative condition. If some or all reasons are external, then the circumstances in which P is a reason for S to Φ will not necessarily	include	some	fact	about	S's	conative	situation. 2.2	Cognitive	Conditions As	we	just	saw, it is	a	contentious issue	whether	some	fact's	being	the	reason that	it	is	depends	on	the	conative	condition	of	the	agent	for	whom	it	is	a	reason. It is also a contentious issue whether some fact's being a reason for S to Φ depends on the agent's cognitive condition; so that, for instance, some fact is ruled	out	as	being	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	by	S's	inability	to	come	to	know	that	P,	or on	the	general	inaccessibility	of	P.	Call	the	view	that	some	fact's	being	a	reason is in some sense so conditioned Perspectivism, and the view that it is not, Objectivism.16 To	see	what	Perspectivists	and	Objectivists	disagree	about,	consider	the following case:17 Fred is ill. Drug A will kill him. Drug B will cure him completely.	Drug	C	will	cure	him	partially,	and	in	a	way	that	will	preclude	that he	will	ever	be	able	to	be	completely	cured.	His	doctor	knows	that	C	will	cure him	partially,	but	in	a	way	that	will	preclude	him	ever	being	completely	cured. And she	knows that either	A	will kill him	and	B	will cure	him completely, or 16 For discussions, see e.g. Kiesewetter (forthcoming), Raz (2011a), Zimmerman	(2008).	The	two	options	I	mention	are	not	exhaustive.	Zimmerman presents	an	alternative	to	both	Objectivism	and	Perspectivism. 17	Adapted	from	Jackson	(1991).	A	structurally	similar	case	concerning	miners is discussed in Parfit (2011, pp. 150–164). Discussions of such cases often resolve	around	the	understanding	not	of	reasons,	but	of	oughts. 32 that B will kill him and A will cure him completely. But she does not know which	of	the	two	disjuncts	of	the	disjunctive	truth	that	she	knows	is	true.	And there	is	no	way	in	which	she	can	find	out. Everyone	agrees	that	if	his	doctor	is	a	conscientious	doctor,	she	will	give Fred drug B. After all, it is better to be safe than sorry. But according to Objectivists, it is nevertheless the case that the fact that A will cure Fred completely	is	a	reason	for	his	doctor	to	give	Fred	drug	A;	that	she	is	not	able	to learn	about	that	fact	is	neither	here	nor	there,	her	epistemic	situation	is	of	no import with regard to what is and what is not a reason. According to Perspectivists,	however,	the	fact	that	she	is	not	able	to	learn	about	the	fact	that A	will	cure	Fred	completely	effectively	excludes	that	fact	from	being	a	reason	for her	to	give	Fred	drug	A.	In	their	view,	when	Fred's	doctor	administers	drug	B, she	does	not	only	act	as	any	conscientious	doctor	with	her	level	of	information would	act,	her	action is	also fully in line	with	the	reasons	there	are for	her	to act.	By	contrast, for the	Objectivist,	what the	conscientious	doctor	does is	not fully	in	line	with	the	reasons	there	are	for	her	to	act. The	idea	that	reasons	are	facts	is	neutral	with	regard	to	this	issue.	Even if	Perspectivism	is	the	correct	theory,	reasons	are	still facts.	And	they	are	still facts	about	the	world	around	us,	at	least	for	the	most	part.	It	is	just	that	for	the Perspectivists,	some	facts	that	the	Objectivists	holds	to	be	reason	are	excluded from	being	reasons	by	the	agent's	cognitive	situation.	As	facts	are	the	reasons that they are only in certain circumstances, the issue between Perspectivists and	Objectivists,	similar	to	the	issue	between	Internalists	and	Externalists,	can be conceived	of	as the issue	whether	an	agent's cognitive condition is always part	of	the	circumstances	in	which	a	fact	is	a	reason	for	her	to	do	something. 33 3.	The	Source	of	Reasons I suggested that	we can	helpfully conceive of reasons as facts that stand in a four-place	relation,	where	the	other	three	relata	are	agents,	courses	of	actions, and circumstances. I also suggested that the question whether there are conative and/or cognitive conditions on facts being reasons is the question whether the circumstances in	which some fact is a reason for some agent to perform some action always include that agent's conative and/or cognitive condition	or not.	An Internalist about reasons, for instance, is a theorist	who holds	that	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	only	in	circumstances	in	which	S	has	it	in	her, in some sense or another, to be	motivated by P to	Φ. A Perspectivists about reasons is a theorist who holds that P is a reason for S to Φ only in circumstances	in	which	S	believes,	or	knows,	that	P,	or,	at	least,	is	in	a	position to come to believe, or know, that P. But it is one thing to ask whether the circumstances	C in	which	P is	a reason for	S to	Φ	always include	S's	conative and/or	cognitive	condition,	and it is	another thing	to	ask	whether	we	can	say anything	more	illuminating	about	why	it	is	true	(when	it	is	true)	that	P,	in	C,	is	a reason for S to Φ, than just that it is true. Whether, that is, we can give an account or an explanation of why P, in C, is a reason for S to Φ. I call the question	about	why,	or	in	virtue	of	what	(if	anything)	P,	in	C,	is	a	reason	for	S	to Φ	the	question	about	the	source	of	P's	normative	significance. However,	I	raise	this	question	not	in	order	to	answer	it,	but	in	order	to point	out	that	saying	that	reasons	are	facts	is	neutral	with	regard	to	how	(if	at all)	this	question	should	be	answered.	In	lieu	of	an	extensive	discussion,	which would	serve	no	purpose	given	the	overall	project,	let	me	just	give	a	brief	feel	of 34 the	possibilities	by	broadly	distinguishing	two	kinds	of	accounts	of	the	source of	reasons:	realist	accounts	and	response-dependent	accounts.18 Roughly,	realist	accounts	explain	why	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	by	appeal to some allegedly basic normative or evaluative fact. In the most straightforward	case,	the	idea	will	be	that	what	explains	why	P	is	a	reason	for	S to Φ is the simple normative fact that this is so, or the obtaining of the according	reason-relation.	As	Scanlon	writes: [C]laims	about	reasons	can	be	correct	or	incorrect,	and	such	claims	are fundamental	–	not	reducible	to	or	explainable	in	terms	of	claims	of	other kinds.	(Scanlon,	2014,	p.	15) But	realist	accounts	might	also	appeal	to	allegedly	basic	facts	about,	say,	what	is of	value	(Raz,	2011c,	pp.	75–9),	or	about	the	goodness	(Foot,	2001;	Thomson, 2003,	2008)	of S's	Φing,	or	her	S's	Φing in response to	P, in	order to	explain why	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ. In contrast to all such broadly realist accounts, response-dependent accounts seek to explain	why	P is a reason for S to	Φ	by appeal	not to some allegedly basic normative or evaluative fact (i.e. a fact about something just being	a	reason,	or	about	the	goodness	or	value	of	acting	in	a	certain	way),	but by appeal the counterfactual that S	would treat P as a reason for her to Φ (where	'treating'	can	be	spelled	out	in	various	ways),	were it	the	case	that	she were suitably different than she in fact is. Say, provided that she had all the relevant	true	beliefs	and	no	mistaken	beliefs	and	were	fully	rational	in	some	to be	specified	sense	(Smith,	2000),	or	provided	that	her	'faculty	of	desire'	were	to 18	That	is	not	meant	to	imply	that	this	is	an	exclusive	distinction;	there	may	be other	options	not	caught	up	in	such	a	typology.	Cf.	Finlay	(2010)	for	a	helpful overview. 35 accord	with	the	Categorical	Imperative	(Korsgaard,	1996).	Here,	appeal	is	made to	an	idealized	notion	of	reason	(understood	as	a	faculty	or	power),	or	rational agency,	and	the	reasons	that	apply	to	us	non-ideal	possessors	of	reason,	or	us rational agents, is determined by what our ideal counterparts treat as reasons.19 Note that independent of constitutive claims – i.e. claims about what constitutes	the	normativity	of	reasons	–	are	claims	about	the	relations	between normative	concepts	or	truths.	That	is,	for	instance,	given	that	P	is	a	reason	for	S to	Φ,	it	is	at	least	arguably	the	case	that	(i)	it	is	a	fact	that	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to Φ,	that	(ii)	were	S	to	Φ	in	response	to	P,	she	would	be	acting	well	or	be	doing something	of	value,	and	that	(iii)	were	S	fully	rational	or	virtuous,	and	were	she to	have	all	the	relevant	true	beliefs	and	no	false	beliefs,	she	would	treat	P	as	a reason	for	her	to	Φ	–	regardless	of	whether	P's	reason-giving	status	or	quality can	or	must	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	the	concepts	in	play	in	(i),	(ii),	or	(iii). 4.	Reasons	as	Evaluative	Facts So far, I have presupposed that the facts that are normative reasons are ordinary	empirical	facts,	like	the	fact	that	it	is	your	mother's	birthday	today,	or the	fact	that	it	is	raining.	This	is	the	view	that	e.g.	Scanlon	explicitly	takes.	In	an exemplary	passage,	he	writes: The things that can be reasons are not a special kind of entity but ordinary	facts,	in	many	cases	facts	about	the	natural	world.	For	example, 19	Or, in the twist that Smith (1995) gives the idea (in order to avoid the socalled	conditional	fallacy):	the	reasons	that	apply	to	us	non-ideal	possessors	of reason, or us rational agents, is determined by what our ideal counterparts would	advise	us	to	do. 36 the	fact	that	the	edge	of	a	piece	of	metal	is	sharp	is	a	reason	for	me,	now, not	to	press	my	hand	against	it.	(Scanlon,	2014,	p.	30) Later	on,	he	remarks: It should be noted that, although the facts that are reasons are often natural facts, normative facts can	also	be reasons. So, for example, the fact	that	the	law	would	be	unjust	may	be	a	reason	for	me	to	vote	against it	if	I	am	in	a	position	to	do	so.	(Scanlon,	2014,	p.	32) On his view, therefore, there is no restriction on what kinds of facts can be normative	reasons:	both	natural	and	normative	(or	evaluative)	facts.	I	call	this the	'Liberal	Interpretation'	of	Factualism. Not everyone is so liberal. The idea that reasons are facts is often understood	more	narrowly	as the idea that	only certain	kinds	of facts can	be reasons,	namely, that	only facts	about	Φing	having	some	evaluative	quality can be reasons to Φ. Call this the 'Narrow Interpretation'. The Narrow Interpretation has	many followers. Raz, for example,	writes that "reasons for action	consist	of	the	fact	that	the	action	has	some	value"	and	that	"reasons	for action are that the actions have some value" (Raz, 2011c, p. 75) And, in a different	context,	that [t]he	fact	that	options	have	a	certain	value	–	that	performing	them	is	a good thing to do because of the intrinsic	merit of the action or of its consequences – is the paradigmatic reason for actions. (Raz, 2001, p. 63)20 Similarly,	Wedgwood	maintains	that 20	Raz	(2001)	is	arguing	against	the	view	that	reasons	are	desires.	The	relevant passages	in	Raz	(2011a)	are	concerned	with	Scanlon's	buck-passing	thesis. 37 a reason in favour	of a course	of action is simply an intrinsically good feature	of	that	course	of	action.	(Wedgwood,	2009,	pp.	336–337) Thomson	offers	us	the	following	biconditional: A	fact	is	a	reason	for	a	person	to	do	a	thing	if	and	only	if	it	is	a	fact	to	the effect	that his	doing	it	would	be	good	in	a	way,	or his	not	doing	it	would	be	bad	in	a	way,	or his	doing	it	would	be	better	in	a	way	than	his	doing	anything	else, or someone	has	a	right	that	he	do	it,	or	...	[sic] Leaving room for	other evaluative facts to	be added.	...	But	only	other evaluative	facts.	(Thomson,	2003,	pp.	37–8) Leaving	aside	the	differences	in	these	formulations	(and	in	the	overall	views	of their respective authors), these are all clear expressions of the Narrow Interpretation. The	Narrow	Interpretation	has	something	to	go	for	it. It	does	not	seem all that controversial to say that the fact that the edge of a piece of	metal is sharp	is	a	reason	for	me	not	to	press	my	hand	against	it.	But	crucially,	it	is	not that fact	by	itself that favors	not	pressing	my	hand	against it.	The	fact	by	itself can favor anything and everything – or nothing at all. It is a reason only in suitable	circumstances	(where,	as	we	saw,	these	circumstances	might	or	might not include the conative and/or cognitive situation of the agent). As Scanlon emphasizes: Whether	a	certain	fact is	a	reason,	and	what	it is	a	reason	for,	depends on	an	agents	circumstances.	The	fact	that	this	piece	of	metal	is	sharp	is	a reason for me not to press my hand against it, but under different 38 circumstances it might be a reason to press my hand against it, and under	still	different	circumstances	a	reason to	do	something	else, such as	to	put	it	into	the	picnic	basket	if	I	will	later	have	reason	to	want	to	cut cheese.	(Scanlon,	2014,	pp.	30–31) By	contrast,	the	fact,	say,	that	making	tasteless	yokes	about	disappearing	planes to someone	whose	whole family	was on flight	MH 370 is cruel is something that, one might think, by itself speaks against making tasteless yokes about disappearing	planes	to	such	a	person.	(Of	course,	whether	it	is	cruel	depends	on the circumstances.	Making such yokes to someone	who is prone to a certain sort	of	grim	humor	might	not	be	cruel.	Thus,	depending	on	the	circumstances, the	relevant	fact	might	not	obtain.	But	if	it	does	obtain,	then	it	is	a	reason,	in	a way, all by itself.) Likewise (and	with according qualifications), the fact that eating	apples	is	healthy,	and	the	fact	that	pressing	my	hand	against	this	sharp piece	of	metal	will	be	painful,	would	seem	to	by themselves	speak in favor	of eating	apples,	or	to	speak	in	favor	of	refraining	from	pressing	my	hand	against this	sharp	piece	of	metal,	respectively.	Evaluative	facts	thus	seem	to	fare	better with regard to	making sense	of the favoring character	of reasons	–	provided, that	is,	that	one	takes	it	that	reasons	are,	or	need	to	be,	such	as	to	by	themselves speak	in	favor	of	actions.	As	Thomson	puts	it,	making	the	relevant	supposition explicit: If	we	suppose	that	a	reason	for	a	person	to	do	a	thing	is	itself	something that counts in favor of his doing it, then we should limit reasons for actions	to	evaluative	facts	....	It	is	their	being	evaluative	that	marks	these 39 facts	as	reasons	for	action	–	since	it	is	in	virtue	of	their	being	evaluative that	they	count	in	favor	of	an	action.	(Thomson,	2003,	p.	38)21 But why make that supposition? As long as a proponent of the Liberal Interpretation helps herself to the idea that facts are reasons only in certain circumstances, and has a view about the source of facts' normative significance22, she	need	not	be	worried	about the fact that facts that speak in favor	of	actions	do	not	do	so	by	themselves. Moreover,	there	is	one	respect	in	which	the	Liberal	Interpretation	seems preferable	over	the	Narrow	Interpretation:	The	Liberal	Interpretation	is	more ecumenical	than	the	Narrow	Interpretation.	Given	that	when	there	is	a	reason for S to	Φ,	Φing has some	positive evaluative quality (that is, say, that	when there	is	a	reason	for	you	to	save	Peter's	life,	saving	Peter's	life	is	good,	at	least	in some	respect),	the	Liberal	Interpretation	leaves	it	open	whether	what	explains why some fact	P is a reason for S to	Φ is that	Φing	has a	positive evaluative quality,	or,	conversely,	whether	P's	being	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	explains	why	Φing has	a	positive	evaluative	quality.	And,	thus, it leaves	it	open	whether	we	must account for the normative23	in terms of the evaluative, or vice versa.24	The Narrow Interpretation, however, starts out from the idea that Φing has a positive	evaluative	quality,	and	tells	us	that	that	fact	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ.	Thus, 21	Heuer (2006, 7) also emphasizes that ordinary facts do not by themselves speak	in	favor	of	actions. 22	Which	in	Scanlon's	case	is	just	the	view	that	we	should	call	off	the	search	for such	a	source,	cf.	I.3	above. 23	Understood	in	the	narrow	sense	in	which	it	contrasts	with	the	evaluative,	not in the	broad	sense in	which it	encompasses	the	evaluative	and	contrasts	with the	'natural'. 24	That	is	(to	use	the	metaphor	that	gives	the	contemporary	discussion	of	that issue	its	name),	whether	the	'buck'	of	explaining	is	passed	from	the	normative to	the	evaluative,	or	vice	versa.	The	term	is	introduced	in	Scanlon	(1998,	pp.	95– 100). 40 it is built into the Narrow Interpretation that the evaluative explains the normative. 5.	Psychologism	about	Normative	Reasons We have already seen that one can agree that reasons are facts that favor actions,	but	disagree	about	why,	i.e.	in	virtue	of	what,	facts	are	the	reasons	that they	are.	Thus,	one	can	say that reasons	are facts that favor	actions,	but	hold that	key	to	understanding	normativity	are	values,	or	principles	–	or	desires. Nevertheless,	it	is	still	sometimes	said	that	those	who	say	that	normative reasons are facts that speak in favor of actions are making a controversial claim. As for instance Whiting (2014) puts it, one the one hand, there is Factualism,	according	to	which	facts	are	reasons,	and	on	the	other	hand,	there is	Psychologism,	according	to	which	reasons	are	mental	states: Reasons	for	acting	are,	or	are	given	by,	facts.	Call	this	view	[F]actualism. According	to	it,	the	fact	that	it	is	snowing	might	be	a	reason	for	Holly	to put	on	winter	clothes,	while	the	fact	that	Maybelle	is	hungry	might	be	a reason	for	Todd	to feed	her.	...	Factualism	contrasts	with	the	view	that reasons	for	acting	are,	or	are	given	by,	one's	mental	states.	Call	this	view [Psychologism]25.	According to it,	Holly's	belief that it is snowing	might be a reason for her to put on warm clothes, while Todd's belief that Maybelle is hungry might be a reason for him to feed her. (Whiting, 2014,	pp.	1–2) 25	Whiting	actually	speaks	about	'Mentalism'.	In	keeping	with	my	terminology,	I have	replaced	that	with	'Psychologism'. 41 Note,	first,	that	there	are	two	contrasts	in	play	in	what	Whiting	says,	namely,	a mental/extra-mental	contrast,	and	a	fact/state	contrast.	And	the	latter	contrast –	between	facts	and	states	–	does	not	seem	to	be	particularly	relevant.	After	all, in	the	situation	at	hand,	it	is	not	only	a	fact	that	Maybelle	is	hungry,	it	is	also	a fact	that	Todd	believes	that	Maybelle is	hungry.	And	likewise,	not	only	Todd's believing	that	Maybelle	is	hungry	is	a	state,	but	also	Maybelle's	being	hungry	is a state. What is of theoretical interest, it would thus seem, is the question whether	the	reason	at issue 'comes	from'	Maybelle	or from	Todd,	and	not	the question	whether	it	is	a	state	or	a	fact. However,	even	with	that	clarification,	it is	not	clear	what	Psychologism exactly	comes	down	to.	Here	are	three	possibilities: 1. It	is	a	view	about	the	conditions	under	which	something	is	a	reason. 2. It is	a	view	about	what	kinds	of	facts speak in favor	of	actions,	namely, exclusively	facts	about	the	mind	of	the	agent	for	whom	they	are	reasons (for	such	an	understanding	of	Psychologism,	cf.	e.g.	Thomson,	2003,	pp. 26–32). 3. It is the	view that reasons	are	not things that speak	in	favor	of	actions, but things that do something else, say, things that render actions reasonable	(cf.	e.g.	Gibbons,	2010).26 But if (1), then	Psychologism is	no	contester to	Factualism,	but	a claim	about how	to	complement	it	(see	I.2).	For	maybe,	the	fact	that	Maybelle	is	hungry	is	a 26 Actually, Gibbons' view oscillates between (a) the view that normative reasons	are	mental	states	that	render	actions	reasonable,	and	(b)	the	view	that what normative reasons there are for someone depends on her epistemic perspective,	i.e.	on	her	mental	states	(cf.	I.3	above).	These	two	views	are	clearly independent	from	one	another	(indeed,	it is	not	even	quite	clear	that	they	are compatible	with	one	another).	Note	that	(b)	is	a	claim	that	readily	goes	together with	Factualism,	cf.	I.2	above. 42 reason	for	Todd	to	give	her	some	food	only	if	Todd	believes	or	knows	that	she is	hungry,	or	is	in	a	position	to	come	to	know	that	she	is	hungry.	And	if	(2),	then Psychologism is actually but a species of Factualism, albeit (as I	will argue) a very implausible one. And if (3), then it is not clear in which sense Psychologism	is	in	conflict	with	Factualism,	other	than	verbally.	Thus,	I	believe that	by	saying	that	what	we	seek	to	take	into	account	when	deciding	what	to	do, and	when	advising	others	on	what	they	are	to	do,	are	facts	that	speak	in	favor of actions, one is not so much making a claim about how to conceive of something	that	we	have	an	independent	understanding	of,	but	rather,	that	one	is thereby	introducing	a	topic	about	which	one	can	then	make	claims:	for	instance, as	we	saw,	about	whether	what	facts	are	reasons	for	some	agent	is	conditioned on her motivational propensities, or about what constitutes facts' favoring status or quality or role (or, say, about how the reasons that there are for someone	to	do	something	are	related	to	whether	she	is	justified in	doing	what she	does,	and	so	on). As I have	already talked	about (1) above, let	me say	a few	words first about	(3),	and	then	about	(2). Some	authors	say	that	we	should	not	conceive	of	normative	reasons	as facts that speak in favor of actions, but rather, as mental states that render actions reasonable. Gibbons (2010), for instance, explains that reasons are things that make actions reasonable, that what makes things reasonable are mental	states,	and,	thus,	that	normative	reasons	are	mental	states.	As	he	puts	it: My basic idea of a reason is relatively straightforward. Reasons are supposed to make things reasonable. Good reasons do what they're supposed	to	do.	(Gibbons,	2010,	p.	344) 43 The	way he frames things, that view is	opposed to the view that reasons are facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	actions.	But	it	is	hard	to	see	that	there	indeed	is	such an	opposition.	After	all, there is	no	problem	in	saying	both	that facts	speak in favor	of	actions,	and	that	mental	states	render	actions	reasonable.	For	instance, given	that	I	want	to	be	on	the	other	side	of	the	road,	the	fact	that	right	now	no cars are coming speaks in favor of crossing right now, and	my	believing that right now no cars are coming would render crossing the street right now reasonable (or	would at least be among the things that render crossing right now	reasonable).	Note that a course	of action that is rendered reasonable	by your	mental	states	need	not	be	a	course	of	action	that is favored	by	the facts, and	vice	versa.	For	instance, if	you	–	albeit	mistakenly	–	believe that	right	now no	traffic	is	coming,	then	crossing	right	now	is	a	reasonable	thing	to	do	(at	least in	one	sense	of the	term 'reasonable'),	but	as	traffic is	coming,	doing	so is	not what	is	favored	by	the	facts;	and	if	you	mistakenly	believe	that	traffic	is	coming, crossing would not be reasonable, but as no traffic is coming, crossing is rendered eligible by the facts as they are. And so, it would seem as if the apparently	substantial issue	about	what	reasons	are	boils	down	to	the	merely terminological	issue	about	how	to	use	the	word	'normative	reason':	for	things that favor actions, or for things that are capable of rendering actions reasonable. Of	course,	we	might	have	an	independent	notion	of	a	normative	reason	in mind,	and	about	that	notion,	we	might	ask:	are	normative	reasons	better	to	be conceived	of	as	facts	that	favor	or	as	mental	states	that	render	reasonable?	In fact,	we	do	have	such	a	notion.	Normative	reasons, in	the	sense	in	which	I	am interested	in,	are	what	we	seek	to	take	into	account	when	deciding	what	to	do, and	in	advising	others	on	what	they	are	to	do.	But	given	that	normative	reasons 44 are	things	that	play	that	role,	it	is	highly	implausible	to	think	that	mental	states that	render	reasonable	are	serious	contesters. Let me first focus on advice. Consider: If you could choose to go for advice	either	to	someone	who	would	focus	on	what	courses	of	action	would	be rendered reasonable	by your	mental states and advise you accordingly, or to someone	who	would focus	on	what	courses	of	action	are favored	by the facts and advise you accordingly, you would – given the possibility that what is reasonable and	what is favored can come apart – surely choose to go to the latter.	The	former	would	just	not	be	giving	you	very	good	advice. Or	look	at	it	like	this:	Imagine	yourself	advising	me	on	when	to	cross	the road. Your advice	would	be very bad advice,	were you to focus on	my	beliefs about	the	traffic,	as	opposed	to	the	facts	about	the	traffic.	For	in	order	to	ensure that	I	get	safely	over	the	street,	what	you	have	to	do	is	focus	on	the	traffic,	and not	on	my	beliefs	about the	traffic.	Given	the	possibility that	my	beliefs	about the	traffic	are	mistaken,	focusing	on	them,	as	opposed	to	focusing	on	the	facts about	the	traffic,	might	very	well	fail	to	safely	get	me	over	the	road. Of course, if your advice is good and successful, it	will effect, in some sense	anyway,	that	my	beliefs	about	the	traffic	line	up	with	the	facts	about	the traffic.	For	presumably, I	will	advise	you to	go	now	by impressing	on	you the fact that now, no cars are coming, i.e. by drawing your attention to the facts about the traffic, thereby	bringing	your	beliefs in line	with those facts. If that were	not	so, the	case	would	be	more like	a	case in	which I issue	an	order for you	to	blindly	follow.	But	if	anything,	that	strengthens	the	point. And think about	what it is like to try to figure out	what to do; say, to figure	out	when	to	cross	the	road.	What	you	want	to	do	is	to	get	over	the	road safely. Clearly,	what bears on	when to go are facts about the traffic, and not 45 your	beliefs	about	the	traffic.	So	clearly,	when	seeking	to	figure	out	when	to	go, you'll	focus	on	facts	about	the	traffic,	and	not	on	facts	about	your	beliefs	about the	traffic.	As	Simon	Blackburn	nicely	puts	it: The last thing	you	want to	do	when	you	are	wondering	when to	make your	dash	through	the	traffic	...	is	to	take	your	mind	off	the	traffic	....	In fact,	this	may	be	the	last	thing	you	ever	want	to	do	(Blackburn,	1998,	p. 254). Now, there are cases in	which	what you	question are	not the facts about the world	around	you,	but facts about	your	mental states.	Consider the following case:	You	are	in	a	meeting	and	the	chairman	bids	all	those	who	believe	that	P	to raise their hands (cf. Hacker, 2009, p. 88). What you will take to bear on whether	to	raise	your	hand,	in	the	case	at	issue,	will	not	be	what	you	believe,	i.e. P,	but	your	believing	that	P.	For,	as	you	see	it,	your	reason	will	vary	not	with	the facts,	but	with	your	beliefs	about	the	facts.	You	will	understand	that	if it	were the	case	that the facts	were	different,	but	your	beliefs the	same,	your	reasons would be the same;27	but that were your beliefs different, and the facts the same, your reason would be different (cf. also Alvarez, 2010, pp. 131–132; Dancy,	2002,	pp.	124–125;	Hyman,	1999,	p.	444;	Thomson,	2003,	pp.	24–25). But	note	that	also	in	such	cases,	you	question	your	beliefs	with	regard	to	what they favor that you do, not	with regard to	what course of action they	would render	reasonable. I	believe	that	we	can	conclude	that	if	by	'normative	reasons',	we	mean: things	that	play	the	role	of	being	what	we	seek	to	focus	on	in	deciding	what	to 27	Of	course,	you	will	also	understand	that	if	the	facts	were	different,	your beliefs	ought	to	be	different.	But	that	is	compatible	with	understanding	that given	that	your	beliefs	were	to	remain	as	they	are,	despite	the	facts	changing, your	reasons	would	not	change. 46 do, and in advising others on what they are to do, then normative reasons clearly	are	facts	that	favor,	and	not	states	that	render	reasonable.	Even	in	those cases	in	which	states	(or	facts	about	states)	are	what	we	focus	on,	we	focus	on them	with	regard	to	their	role	as	favorers,	and	not	with	regard	to	their	role	as things	that	render	reasonable. 6.	Summary In	the	next	part, I	will	be	relying	on	the idea	that	normative	reasons	are facts that	speak	in	favor	of	actions,	and	that	the	facts	that	are	normative	reasons	are, at	least	for	the	most	part,	non-psychological	facts.	In	this	section,	I	have	sought to render that idea	plausible.	By	way	of	a	conclusion, let	me	recount	why the idea	that	normative	reasons	are	psychological	states,	or	facts	about	such	states, is	implausible. As I explained above, the idea that normative reasons are always psychological	facts	seems	wrong,	on	grounds	of	the	fact	that	normative	reasons, as	we	have	been	using	the	term	here,	are	what	are	in	play	in	advice	and	firstpersonal deliberation. For in normal circumstances, no sane advisor would advise	you	to	do	something	based	on	considering	your	mental	states,	or	those alone; and no sane agent would seek out the advice of someone whom she would know to do that. And likewise, in normal circumstances, no sane deliberator	would	seek	to	figure	out	what	is	to	be	done	by	way	of	considering her mental states, or those alone. The argument, note, is not an apriori argument, but an appeal to mundane examples like that when you advise others	on	when	to	cross	the	road,	you	are	focused	not	on	their	beliefs	about	the traffic,	but	on	the	facts	about	the	traffic	(at	least	as	you	understand	them	to	be). 47 If it is effective, it is effective not in that it shows us that we cannot even conceive	of	a	rational	being	for	whom	all	reasons	are	facts	about	her	own	mind, but	merely	in	that	it	shows	us	that	that	is	not	how	it	is	with	us. Given what I have said, we can distinguish the idea that normative reasons	are	psychological	facts	from	some	more	plausible	ideas.	The	view	that normative	reasons	are	always	psychological	facts	is	not	the	view	that	a	fact	is	a reason	for	you	to	do	something	only	if	you	believe	that	fact,	or	know	that	fact, or if you are in a position to come to believe of know it, i.e. it is not Perspectivism, the view that there are cognitive conditions on facts being reasons.	It	is	one	thing	to	say	that	the	fact	that,	say,	your	child	is	ill	is	a	reason for	you	to	do	something	about	it	only	if	you	know	or	believe	that	she	is	ill,	or	if you are in a position to be able to know or believe that she is ill. It is quite another thing to say that it is	not the fact that your child is ill that speaks in favor	of	doing	something	about it,	but	your	believing that	she is ill.	While the former	may	or	may	not	be	correct, the	latter is	surely	false.	Likewise, it is	not the idea that all reasons are internal, i.e. dependent your being able to be brought	(by	rational	means)	from	your	present	'motivational	set'	to	one	that	is such	that	you	can	become	motivated	by	that	reason.	The	claim	that	P	is	a	reason for	S	to	Φ	only	if	S	has	a	certain	desire	is	not	the	claim	that	that	desire,	or	her having that desire, is the reason. Also, the idea that normative reasons are always	psychological	facts	is	not the	view	that	your	believing	as	you	do	opens you	up	to	charges	of	irrationality,	or	submits	you	to	requirements	of	rationality. To	take	up	our	example:	It	is	one	thing	to	say	that	if	you	believe	that	your	child is	ill,	it	is	irrational	for	you	(at	least	in	normal	circumstances)	not	do	something about	it,	regardless	of	whether	she	is	in	fact	ill	or	not.	It	is	another	thing	to	say that	it	is	that	fact	about	yourself,	i.e.	that	you	believe	that	your	child	is	ill,	that 48 speaks in favor of doing something about the illness of your child.	While the former	may or	may not be correct, the latter is surely false. The noted three views are views that are rightly controversial and	up to debate. But the idea that normative reasons are always psychological facts, when it is suitably distinguished	from	those	other	three	views,	can	be	put	aside. 49 Part	II.	Rational	Motivation This	part	consists	of	two	main	chapters.	In	the	first	chapter,	I	will	introduce	the notion	of	a	ground	(II.1.2).	A	ground,	as I	will	use the	term, is	something	that motivates someone to	do something	because she takes it to speak in favor	of doing	what she	does (II.1.1). I	will argue that propositions are	what play the role of a ground (II.1.3), and, for the most part, not propositions about psychological matters (II.1.4). I will briefly address what the function of psychological vocabulary in ground-statements might be (II.1.5), and I will contrast the project I am engaged in to the reductivist project (II.1.6). In the second	chapter,	I	will	address	the	debate	on	whether	motivating	reasons	are	to be conceived of Psychologistically or	Non-Psychologistically (II.2). I	will start out	by	examining	the	various	notions	of	a	motivating	reason	that	can	be	found in the literature (II.2.1). Some authors use the term to signify grounds, or a certain class of grounds. Others, however, use it to signify explanantia, or employ the term in the course of giving a reductive account of acting on a ground.	I	will	examine	whether	that	means	that	the	contemporary	debate	about Psychologism	might	simply	rest	on	an	equivocation	(II.2.2	and	II.2.3). 1.	The	Principle	of	Rational	Motivation We	often	take	it	that	there	is	a	reason	for	us	to	do	something.	We	sometimes	do what	we take there to be a reason for us to do. Those two things can come together	by	accident.	It	is,	however,	not	a	plausible	thought	that	they	could	only ever	come	together	accidentally.	As	Michael	Smith	puts	it	at	one	point: 50 [S]upposing	that the	connection	between	what	we	decide	to	do,	on	the basis of rational deliberation, and what we do do, is altogether contingent	and	fortuitous	...	is	patently	absurd.	When	we	deliberate,	and decide what we have a rational justification for doing, that very fact sometimes	makes	a	difference	to	what	we	do.	(Smith,	2000,	p.	132) Also, consider	what	our	predicament	would	be, if	our taking it that there is	a reason	for	us	to	do	something	and	our	doing	what	we	take	there	is	a	reason	for us to do could only ever come together accidentally. It seems that our predicament	would	be	that	of	the	'favored	creature'	that	Kant	describes	in	the Groundwork:	If	such	a	creature	could	form	views	about	facts	being	reasons	for her	to	act,	this	would	serve	it only to contemplate the fortunate constitution	of its nature, to admire this,	to	delight	in	it,	and	to	be	grateful	for	it	to	the	beneficent	cause,	but not	to	submit	its	faculty	of	desire	to	...	guidance	(Kant,	1998,	4:395) But	this	is	clearly	not	our	predicament.	When	we	do	what	we	take	there	to	be reason for us to do, our stance towards our action is not like the stance	we might have towards our body when we delight in its being able to run a marathon, or like the stance we	might have towards our liver when we are grateful	that	it	can	process	the	vast	amounts	of	alcohol	we	consume. So,	our	taking	there	to	be	a	reason	for	us	to	do	something	and	our	acting accordingly can be non-accidentally related. When are they non-accidentally related	in	the	right	way?	I	suggest	that	they	are	non-accidentally	related	in	the right	way	just	in	case	we	are	motivated	by	the	reason	we	take	there	to	be.	Call the	principle	that	actions	can	be	motivated	by	reasons	we	take	there	to	be	for us to so	act the 'Principle	of	Rational	Motivation', and	call actions that are so motivated	actions	that	are	'rationally	motivated': 51 (The	Principle	of	Rational	Motivation)	S	is	rationally	motivated	to	Φ	just in	case,	and	because,	S	takes	it	that	X	is	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ,	and	Φ's, and	is	motivated	to	Φ	by	X,	due	to	her	taking	X	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to Φ. Note that given what is surely plausible, namely, that S's take on X can be correct, so that X really is a reason for S to Φ, this entails that reasons themselves can rationally motivate. Or, as we can also put it, it entails that when	S	is	rationally	motivated	to	Φ,	it	is	possible	that	what	rationally	motivates her	to	Φ	is	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ.	But	as	S's take	can	also	be incorrect,	not	all cases	of	rational	motivation	are	cases	of	motivation	by	reasons.	Note	also	that the	term	'motivation'	is	ambiguous,	in	that	many	different	things	can	be	said	to 'motivate' in	very	different	ways. I	will	say	a	bit	more	about	both issue in the next	section. I take it that the Principle of Rational Motivation is, as such, not particularly	contentious.	For to	say that	S	can	be	motivated	to	Φ	by	what	she takes	to	favor	that	she	Φ's	is,	in	a	sense,	just	like	saying	that	S	can	infer	P	from something	she	takes	to	entail	that	P.	And,	as	the	possibility	of	inferring	P	from something	we	take	to	entail	that	P	is	surely	a	datum,	it	also	seems	to	be	a	datum that	we	can	be	motivated	to	Φ	by	something	we	take	to	favor	that	we	Φ.	What	is contentious,	however,	is	the	question	whether	we	can,	or	must,	spell	out	what	it is	for	an	action	to	be	rationally	motivated	(or	what	it	is	for	someone	to	infer	P from	Q)	in	other,	allegedly	more	basic	terms,	i.e.	whether	we	can,	or	must,	give a	reductive	account	of	being	rationally	motivated	(or	of	inferring).	I	will	come back to that matter below (II.1.5). First, however, I would like to say more about	rational	motivation.	Specifically,	I	would	like	to	note	that	the	Principle	of Rational Motivation is neutral with regard to a host of (other) contentious 52 issues, introduce the notion of a ground, and argue that grounds are to be conceived	of	in	a	Non-Psychologistic	fashion. 1.1	Neutrality	With	Regard	to	Some	Contentious	Issues (i)	Above,	I	said	that	it	is	possible	that	cases	in	which	S	is	rationally	motivated to	Φ	are	cases	in	which	she	is	rationally	motivated	by	a	reason,	but	that	a	case of	being	rationally	motivated	is	not	as	such	a	case	of	being	rationally	motivated by	a	reason.	Saying	so	much	leaves	it	open	what	conditions	or	factors	render	a case	in	which	someone	is	rationally	motivated	by	what	she	takes	to	be	a	reason	a case in which she is rationally motivated by a reason (a plausible necessary condition	is	that	the	agent	has	knowledge	of	the	relevant	fact,	cf.	Hornsby,	2008; Littlejohn, 2012, Chapter 4.5; McDowell, 2013). Moreover, it leaves it open whether one can or cannot give a non-circular account of those factors or conditions,	i.e.	an	account	that	does	not	already,	at	least	implicitly,	presuppose the	notion	of	being	rationally	motivated	by	a	reason	(for	skepticism	that	some such	account	is	forthcoming,	cf.	e.g.	Hornsby,	2008;	McDowell,	2013;	Roessler, 2014). (ii) According to the Principle of Rational Motivation, we can be motivated	to	Φ	by	what	we	take	to	be	a	reason	for	us	to	Φ.	This	leaves	it	open whether motivation is, or can be, a matter of supposed normative reasons alone,	or	whether	other	factors	also	play	a	crucial	role	in	motivation;	that	is,	it leaves it open whether taking there to be a normative reason for one to Φ suffices	for	one	to	be	motivated	to	Φ,	or	whether	there	are	other	factors	that	are necessary (say, pre-existing desires, dispositions, etc.). Thus, the Principle of 53 Rational	Motivation remains	neutral	with regard to	what has been called the issue	of	judgment	internalism/externalism	(e.g.	Darwall,	1983,	p.	52). (iii)	Let	me	note,	at	this	point,	that	given	that	there	are	other	necessary factors,	those	other	factors	might	with	equal	right	be	called 'motivators',	or	be described as 'what motivates us'. Let us say that Sam realizes that there is something in her possession that belongs to Paul, and gives it back to him, motivated	(as	I	would	say)	by	what	she	realized,	namely,	that	it	belongs	to	Paul. And	let	us	say	that	what	Sam	realizes,	namely,	that	it	belongs	to	Paul,	motivates her	to	give it	back	to	him	only	because	she	has	a	certain	desire	or	disposition, say,	the	desire	to	be	just,	or	the	disposition	of	justice.	We	can,	with	equal	right, say that Sam	was	motivated by her desire to be just, or by justice. Also, we might	say	that	Sam	was	motivated	by	her	taking	there	to	be	a	reason	to	give	it back	to	Paul.	So,	many	things	can	be	called	'motivators'.	That	I	reserve	the	term for supposed	normative reasons is	a terminological	point,	not	a	philosophical claim.	That	is	to	say,	being	rationally	motivated	to	Φ	by	what	one	takes	to	be	a reason	for	one	to	Φ	does	not,	as	such,	exclude	that	other	things	can	also	be	said to	motivate	one	to	Φ	(cf.	also	II.1.4	below	for	a	distinction	between	two	senses of	'motivate'). (iv) Accordingly, the Principle of Rational Motivation leaves it open whether taking there to be a normative reason for one to	Φ is	necessary for motivation, or whether motivation can be in place without views about normative reasons.	What it states is just that taking there to be a normative reason for	one to	Φ is	necessary for	rational	motivating, in the	defined	sense. Thus,	it	remains	neutral	on	the	contentious	question	whether	all	intentional	or motivated actions are performed, as it is said, 'under the guise of the good'; specifically, here, under the guise of an (at least apparent) normative reason 54 (e.g. Boyle & Lavin, 2010; Gregory, 2013; Raz, 2011; Setiya, 2010; Velleman, 1992). If it is	not true that	all intentional	or	motivated	actions	are	performed under	the	guise	of	normative	reasons, then	what I	have	to	say is	restricted	to cases	in	which	they	are	so-performed;	if	it	is	true,	then	what	I	have	to	say	is	not restricted	in	such	a	manner. (v) According to the Principle of Rational Motivation, we can be motivated	to	Φ	by	the	reason	we	take	there	to	be	for	us	to	Φ.	This	leaves	it	open how	to	conceive	of	the	relevant	'taking	there	to	be	a	normative	reason'	that	is involved.	It	might	be	that	taking	there	to	be	a	reason	for	one	to	Φ	amounts	to having	a	belief	with the	content: such-and-such is	a reason for	me to	Φ.	Or it might be that it merely amounts to believing that such-and-such, and that taking	or treating such-and-such	as	a reason is	not	a	matter	of the	content of one's relevant belief (cf. Lavin, 2011; Raz, 2011d). The Principle of Rational Motivation	is	silent	on	those	matters. Given that the Principle of Rational Motivation is open enough to be innocuous	in	all	the	respects	just	indicated,	one	might	very	well	ask	if	it	is	not just	too	trivial	to	at	all	discuss.	Far	from	it:	given	that	the	Principle	of	Rational Motivation	is	open	enough	to	be	able	to	be	accepted	by	all	sides,	it	can	help	us understand	what the	many	controversies in the field	are	controversies	about, and	whether	they	at	all	are	controversies. 1.2	Grounds The Principle of Rational Motivation states that when we take it that X is a reason	for	us	to	Φ,	it	is	possible	that	we	can	Φ	because	we	are	motivated	to	Φ by	X,	and	because	we	take	X	to	be	a	reason	for	us	to	Φ.	In	order	to	facilitate	the 55 upcoming	discussions, I	would like to introduce the term 'ground'.	When	S is rationally	motivated	to	Φ	by	X,	then (a) X	is	taken	by	S	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ,	and (b) X	motivates	her	to	Φ, where	(a)	and	(b)	are	related	in	that (c) X	motivates	her	to	Φ	because	she	takes	it	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ. In	such	cases,	I	will	say	that	X	plays	the	role	of	a	ground;	or	for	short,	that	X	is	a ground.	And	I	will	say	that	S,	in	Φing,	is	acting	on	a	ground.28 What I suggest that we call a ground is sometimes also called an 'agential	reason'	(Hacker,	2009),	or	an	'operative	reason'	(Scanlon,	1998,	p.	19). Usually, however, it is called a 'motivating reason', or 'a reason for which someone	does	something'	(see	also	II.2.1).	But	as	we	will	see	below,	employing the	term	'reason'	(and	especially	the	term	'motivating	reason')	in	such	contexts is misleading in various respects. That is why I will avoid such and other reason-employing	terms	and	phrases	when	I	talk	about	grounds.29 1.3	What	Plays	the	Role	of	a	Ground? As	I	have	just	defined	the	term,	'ground'	is	the	name	for	something	that	plays	a certain	role.	So,	to	specify	a	ground	on	which	S	Φ's	is	to	specify	what	motivates her to	Φ, due to her taking it to speak in favor of	Φing. That is, grounds are 28	For similar	usages	of the term 'ground', cf. such	divers authors like	Hyman (2015,	chap.	6)	and	Pettit	&	Smith	(1997,	pp.	72–78). 29	Many	of	the	quotes	I	will	give,	however,	employ	the	phrase	'acting	for	a reason',	and	often	in	order	to	talk	about	grounds	(sometimes,	however,	in	order to	talk	only	about	grounds	that	are	also	normative	reasons,	cf.	II.2.1).	When necessary,	I	will	explicitly	state	that	we	should	understand	that	phrase	as meaning	'acting	for	a	ground'. 56 supposedly	normative	motivators,	as	one	could	put	it.	The	question	I	now	want to	raise	is	the	question:	what	plays	such	a	role? Here	are	some	options: (State-Psychologism	About	Grounds)	To	specify	the	ground	on	which	S	Φs	is to	specify	a	mental	state	of	S's (Factualism About Grounds) To specify the ground on which S Φs is to specify	a	fact	S	has	in	mind30 (Propositionalism	About	Grounds)	To	specify	the	ground	on	which	S	Φs	is to	specify	what	S	believes31 I	hope	to	have	established	in	part	I	that	what	we	take	to	favor	actions	are	facts. This immediately rules out State-Psychologism	About	Grounds. For (as part I showed) if	what	we take to favor actions are facts, and (as follows from the definition	given	above)	a	necessary	condition	for	something	being	a	ground	is that	it	is	taken,	by	the	agent,	to	favor	what	she	is	doing,	then	grounds	cannot	be mental	states.	For	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	must	be	able	to	be	taken	to be	a fact,	and	mental	states	are	not	taken	to	be facts.	For future	reference, let me	label	that	argument	the	Argument	from	the	Wrong	Kind,	as	the	argument	is that	mental	states	are	of	the	wrong	ontological	kind	to	play	the	role	of	grounds 30	Factualists	about	Grounds	can	disagree	about	whether	'having	a	fact	in	mind' amounts	to	having	a	true	belief,	or	whether	it	amounts	to	having	knowledge	of that	fact. 31	I	omit	one	option,	namely, that	what	plays the	role	of	a	ground is	a	state	of affairs (i.e. not a true proposition, but what makes a true proposition true), where	a state	of affairs can	play the role	of a ground	also if it	does	not exist. This	surprising	view	is	the	view	of	Jonathan	Dancy,	one	of	the	most	influential Non-Psychologists	(Dancy,	2002,	pp.	112–120).	In	what	follows,	however,	I	will treat	Dancy	as	a	Propositionalist	about	Grounds.	Exegetically	speaking,	this	is	of course	not	quite	fair.	But	as	far	as	I	see, it	makes	no	difference,	systematically speaking,	at	least	for	my	purposes.	That	is	my	justification	for	doing	so. 57 (cf.	Dancy,	2002,	pp.	102-112;	Darwall,	1983,	p.	32;	Hyman,	1999,	p.	443;	Stout, 2009,	pp.	55–56). This leaves us with Factualism about Grounds and Propositionalism about	Grounds.	Above,	I	said	that	when	S	Φ's	on	a	ground,	what	plays	the	role of her ground is something that motivates her to Φ because she takes it to speak	in	favor	of	Φing.	Given	that	what	S	takes	to	speak	in	favor	of	Φing	can	be what	in	fact	does	speak	in	favor	of	Φing,	and	that	things	that	speak	in	favor	of actions	are	facts	(cf.	part	I),	it	follows	that	it	is	possible	that	what	plays	the	role of	a	ground	is	a	fact	(a	fact	that	is	a	reason).	But	from	the	possibility	that	what plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	a	fact	(that	is	a	reason),	it	does	of	course	not	follow that	being	a	fact	(and	thus,	a	fortiori,	being	a	reason)	is	essential	to	being	able	to play	the	role	of	a	ground.	What	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	something	that	the agent	takes	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	act.	And	while	understood	de	dicto,	what we	take	to	be	reasons	for	us	to	act	are	facts	that	are	reasons,	what	is	taken	by us	to	be	a	reason	(i.e.	what	we	take	to	be	a	reason,	understood	de	re),	when	we take it that some particular fact is a reason for us to act, need neither be a reason,	nor	need	it	even	be	a	fact.	Knowing	that	P,	I	can	take	P	to	be	a	reason	for me	to	Φ,	even	if	P	is	not	a	reason	for	me	to	Φ.	For	I	can	be	mistaken	about	the normative	significance	of	P.	In	such	a	case,	what	is	taken	by	me	to	be	a	reason	is a	fact,	but	not	a	reason.	And	believing	that	P,	I	can	take	P	to	be	a	reason	for	me to	Φ,	even	if	my	belief	is	mistaken,	that	is,	even	if	P	is	not	a	fact.	In	such	a	case, what	is	taken	by	me	to	be	a	reason	is	not	even	a	fact,	and,	thus,	a	fortiori,	also not a reason. In such a case, what is taken by me to be a reason is merely something	that	I	believe,	i.e.	a	proposition	(or	a	consideration,	as	I	will	also	put it,	following	established	practice).	And	thus,	for	something	to	be	able	to	play	the role	of	a	ground,	it	suffices	that	it	is	a	proposition;	it	is	not	necessary	that	that 58 proposition is true, let	alone that it is	a reason.	This shows	us, in	one	breath, that Factualism about Grounds is false, and that Propositionalism about Grounds	is	true. In	part	I,	I	said	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	reason	are	true	propositions, or	facts.	I	have	just	said	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	are	propositions. This	difference	also comes	out	when	we	consider retrospective reactions.	Let us	say	that	at	t1,	S	believes	that	P,	takes	it	that	P is	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ,	and Φ's,	where	what	motivates	her	to	Φ	is	P,	due	to	her	taking	it	to	be	a	reason	for her	to	Φ.	Now	let	us	say	that	P	is	false,	and	that	at	t2,	S	comes	to	see	that	P	is false.	Looking	back,	S	would	retreat	from	any	claims	to	the	effect	that	there	was a reason for her to	Φ. She	might say that at the time, she took there to be a reason	for	her	to	Φ,	but	that	(as	she	now	sees)	she	was	mistaken	therein.	But she	would	not	say	that	what	motivated	her	at	t1	was	not	what	she	at	the	time took	to	be	what	motivated	her;	although	she	would	of	course	concede	that	she had been mistaken about the status of what motivated her. Also, she	might come	to	realize	that	at	the	time,	she	had	been	mistaken	about	what	motivated her,	but	what	could	show	her	that	could	not	be	the	mere	fact	that	at	the	time, she	was	mistaken	about	the	facts. I	believe	that	any	lingering	resistance	to	the	idea	that	considerations	are what	play	the	role	of	grounds,	in	the	sense	defined	above,	is	due	to	the	idea	that grounds are	what explain actions and that	what explains actions can only be truths.	For if	grounds	are	what	explain	actions,	and	what	explains	actions	can only be truths, then it would seem that considerations are unsuited to be grounds,	as	considerations	need	not	be	truths.	In	the	next	and	final	part,	I	will address	that	issue,	and	argue	that	it	is	a	mistake	to	think	that	grounds	are	what 59 explain	actions.	As I	will	argue,	grounds figure	or feature in	explanations,	but are	not	explanantia. 1.4	Two	Kinds	of	Propositionalism	About	Grounds One might think that my dismissal of Psychologism About Grounds was too cursory.	For	maybe	saying	that	mental	states	are	grounds	is	just	a	loose	way	of saying that propositions about	mental states are grounds. That is to say, the distinction	between	Psychologism	About	Grounds	and	Propositionalism	About Grounds might be understood not so much as a distinction of category, but rather,	as	a	distinction	of	content.	This	would	give	us	the	following	two	options: (Psychologistic	Propositionalism	About	Grounds)	To	specify	the	ground on	which	S	Φs	is	to	specify	a	proposition	about	S's	mind	that	S	believes. (Non-Psychologistic Propositionalism About Grounds) To specify the ground on	which S	Φs is to specify a proposition of	whatever content that	S	believes. Now, I am not aware of anyone actually defending Psychologistic Propositionalism About Grounds. And that does not seem particularly astonishing. For grounds are considerations that motivate an agent to do something because she takes them to be reasons for her to so act. Hence, Psychologistic Propositionalism About Grounds is the view that we can be motivated	only	by (apparent) facts about	our	own	mind.	And that seems just wrong.	As	Michael	Smith	puts	it,	such	a	view fl[ies] in the face of the facts. The considerations that	motivate us are only rarely, if ever, considerations about our own psychology. (Smith, 2003,	p.	151) 60 It	is	often	argued	that	there	are	cases	in	which	the	considerations	that	motivate us are considerations about our own mind. However, that if we consider examples of such cases, we see that that cannot be how it normally is. For future	reference,	let	me	term	that	argument	the	Argument	from	Unusual	Cases. Consider	someone	who	wants	to	kill	his	parents.	Such	a	person	may	reflect	on that fact about his own psychology, conclude that he better seek out professional	help,	and	consequentially	go	ahead	and	seek	out	such	help.	About such a person, we can say that what played the role of his ground was a consideration about his own mind. If, however, he goes ahead and kills his parents,	then	the	considerations	that	played	the	role	of	his	ground	(if	indeed	his action	was	an	action	done	on	a	ground)	will	have	been	a	considerations	about parents, not a consideration about his desires vis-à-vis them (cf. Anscombe, 1989,	p.	381).	Or	consider	someone	who	believes	that	there	are	pink	rats	living in	her	shoes.	Such	a	person	may	call	a	psychiatrist.	If	that	is	what	she	does,	then (among)	the	considerations	that	motivated	her	will	have	been	a	fact	about	her psychology:	that	she	has	this	persistent	belief	that just	will	not	go	away.32	But she might call an exterminator, and in such a case, there will be no considerations	about	her	psychology	among	the	considerations	that	motivated her.	For	what,	in	her	view,	will	have	spoken	in	favor	of	calling	an	exterminator will	not	have	been	that	she	believes that	there	are	rats	living	in	her	shoes,	but that	(as	she	believes)	there	are	rats	living	in	her	shoes	(cf.	Dancy,	2002,	p.	125; Hyman,	1999,	p.	444). Some remarks about the Argument from Unusual Cases are in order. First,	while	it	is	most	often	given	in	terms	of	what	one	might	call	psychiatrist- 32	We	can	debate	about	to	what	extent	we	still	want	to	call	the	state	of	mind	she is	in	a	belief.	But	that	is	incidental	to	the	example. 61 cases	(cf.	also	Alvarez,	2016),	there	are	also	other	cases	that	do	not	depend	on the	agent's	not 'really'	believing	or	desiring, i.e.	not	holding	what	she	believes true, and not taking to be desirable what she desires. Dancy (2002, p. 124) discusses the case of someone who believes that the cliff in front of him is crumbly,	and	imagines	that	she	may	keep	away	from	it	on	grounds	of	what	she believes,	namely,	that	it	is	crumbly,	and	also	on	grounds	of	her	believing	that	it is crumbly. For it may be that she suspects that, believing as she does, she would	become	very	nervous,	were	she	to	go	near	the	cliff,	and,	thus,	would	be likely	to	misstep.	Therefore,	she	may	be	motivated	to	keep	away	from	the	cliff not	only	by	a	consideration	about	the	cliff,	but	also	by	a	consideration	about	her own mind. 33 Also, there may be cases of what one might call indirect motivation:	Someone	might	be	motivated to	do	something	by	a consideration about	her	own	mind,	not	because	she	takes	it	that	her	being	in	some	particular state	of	mind speaks in favor	of	doing	what she is	motivated to	do (as in the cases discussed above), but rather, because she takes that particular state of mind to	be	an indication that the	world is in	a	certain	way,	a	way that favors doing	what	she	is	motivated	to	do.	Thomson	constructs	such	a	case: Suppose that	Charles	has loved	Dora for	years,	but	his	suit	had	always seemed	hopeless.	He is	now	suddenly struck	by the thought that	Dora loves	him too.	He concludes – from the	very fact that	he	now	believes she	does	–	that	there	must	have	been	some	evidence	of	her	love	for	him in	her	past	behavior,	evidence	that	was	unrecognized	by	him	at	the	time, and	is	still	unclear	to	him	now.	(Thomson,	2003,	pp.	24–5) 33	For	another	non-psychiatrist	case,	cf.	Hacker	(2009,	p.	88). 62 As	Thomson	observes,	cases	like	the	case	of	Charles	seem	possible,	but	they	are surely	unusual.	We	cannot	take	things	generally	to	be	like	that. Secondly, and	more important than those	other	kinds	of	examples just noted, is the prevention of possible	misunderstandings of the argument. One might	think	that	being	motivated	to	do	something	is	a	matter	of	being	in	certain mental states. Consequently, one might think that as being motivated is a matter	of	being	in	a	certain	mental	state,	only	mental	states	can	motivate	one	to act.	Recall	the	example	of	the	person	who	believes	that	there	are	rats	living	in her shoes. One might think that both in the case in which she seeks out professional help and in the case in which she calls an exterminator, what motivates her to perform those respective actions is a mental state: in the former	case,	the	second-order	state	of	believing	that	she	believes	that	there	are rats	in	her	shoes,	and	in	the	latter	case,	the	first-order	belief	that	there	are	rats living	in	her	shoes.	Now,	that	might	or	might	not	be	true.	However,	even	if	it	is true,	it	would	not	show	us	that	only	considerations	about	one's	own	mind	can play	the	role	of	grounds.	For	the	sense	in	which	considerations	can	be	said	to motivate	is	not	the	sense	in	which	mental	states	can	be	said	to	motivate.	Being motivated	by	a	consideration	might	amount	to	being	in	a	certain	mental	state, and	consequently,	that	mental	state	can	also	be	said	to	motivate	–	but	when	one says	that	mental	states	motivate,	one	evidentially	is	using	the	term	'motivate'	in a	different sense than	when	one says that	propositions	or considerations can motivate;	motivating	states	(as	we	might	call	them)	do	not	motivate	because	we take	them	to	favor	(cf.	Dancy,	2002,	p.	14;	Garrard	&	McNaughton,	1998,	p.	53; Parfit,	2011,	p.	37,	endnote).	That	is,	it	is	one	thing	to	say	that	being	motivated to	Φ	by	X	is	a	matter	of	being	in	certain	mental	states,	and	quite	another	thing to	say	that	X	can	only	be	(a	consideration	about)	a	mental	state. 63 Thirdly, let	me note that I have all along been relying on	what part I argued	for,	namely,	that	what	we	take	to	be	normative	reasons	are,	at least	in normal	cases,	not	facts	about	our	own	mind,	but	rather, facts	about	the	world around	us.	For if it	were the	case that	what	we take to	be	normative reasons were	only	facts	about	our	own	mind,	it	would	of	course	follow	that	what	plays the role of a ground could also only be considerations about our own	mind. That	is,	from	a	Psychologistic	conception	of	normative	reasons	one	can	arrive, via the Principle of Rational Motivation, at a Psychologistic conception of grounds.	But	part	I,	I	hope,	has	shown	that	normative	reasons	are	not	generally facts	about	our	own	mind. So,	of	the	two	options	distinguished	in	this	section,	we	should	clearly	opt for the latter: for what I called Non-Psychologistic Propositionalism about Grounds. Note, however, that a Non-Psychologistic Propositionalist about Grounds does not hold that the considerations that motivate can never be considerations about one's own mind, she merely holds that the relevant considerations	are	not	restricted	to	such	consideration. 1.5	Psychologized	Ways	of	Talking	About	Non-Psychologistic	Grounds It	is	one	thing	to	ask	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	It	is	another	to	ask	how	we talk	about	agents	acting	on	grounds.	We	have	just	seen	that	psychological	states do not play the role of a ground, and that considerations about one's own psychological states only rarely play the role of a ground. But that does not mean that psychological vocabulary need only rarely figure in our talk about agents acting on grounds. Importantly, forms of expression that employ psychological terms are not reserved for Psychologists about Grounds. The 64 psychological terms in such forms of expression can be interpreted as performing	other	functions	than	referring	to	whatever	it	is	that	plays	the	role	of a	ground. Given	that	S	Φed	on	grounds	of	P,	it	seems	fine	to	say	not	only: (1) "S	Φed	on	grounds	of	P", or,	with	equivalent	meaning	(at	least	with	regard	to	what	S's	ground	was): (2) "S	Φed	because	P", but	also	to	say	things	like (3) "S	Φed	because	she	believed	that	P". Let	me first say something about the relation between (1) and (2), and then something	about	the	relation	between	(1)/(2)	and	(3). (2)	is	a	very	general	form	of	expression,	instances	of	which	are,	say, (4) "Samantha	bit	a	policeman	because	she	was	drunk", and (5) "Samantha	took	out	an	umbrella	because	it	was	raining". It is	very	hard	to	hear	(4)	as	a	way	of	expressing	the	thought	that	Sam	took	it that	she	was	drunk,	took	that	supposed	fact	to	be	a	reason	to	bite	a	policeman, and	was	motivated	to	bite	a	policeman	by	the	supposed	fact	that	she	was	drunk, due	to	taking	it	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	bite	a	policeman,	i.e.	it	is	very	hard	to hear	(4)	as	a	manner	of	expressing	on	what	grounds	Sam	bit	a	policeman.	For	it would	be	very	odd for	someone	to take it that the	(supposed) fact that	she is drunk is a reason to bite a policeman. Most naturally, (4) is heard as a decisively	non-rational	explanation	of	why	Sam	bit	a	policeman.	She	was	drunk, and	people	do	all	sorts	of	stupid	things	when	they	are	drunk.	(Cf.	Hyman,	2015, chap.	6.3.)	Things	are	different,	however,	with	(5).	(5) is	most	naturally	taken as	equivalent	in	meaning,	at	least	with	regard	to	what	Sam's	ground	was,	with 65 (6) "Sam	took	out	an	umbrella	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	raining". Note	that it	may	be	that	with	employing	(5),	as	opposed	to	employing	(6),	we take	on	an	additional commitment,	namely, a commitment to the truth of the consideration	that	functions	as	Sam's	ground.	That	is,	maybe	it	is	paradoxical	to employ (5) in cases in	which one thinks that it is not raining, as	maybe, (5) conversationally	implicates,	or	even	implies,	that	it	is	raining	(for	claims	to	that effect, cf. e.g. Dancy, 2002, pp. 134–5; Sandis, 2013, para. 3; Smith, 1998, pp. 155–8). Let	me now turn to (3). (3) can be understood as a statement to the effect	that	S's	ground	was	a	consideration	about	her	own	mind,	but	it	need	not be so understood. Using brackets to indicate the part of the statement that specifies	the	ground	on	which	S	Φed,	we	can	distinguish	between	two	readings of	(3),	namely, (7) "S	Φed	because	(she	believed	that	P)", and (8) "S	Φed	because	she	believed	(that	P)". (7)	is	the	mold	into	which	the	special	cases	discussed	in	the	foregoing	section fit. Remember, for instance, the person who sought out a psychiatrist on grounds of believing that rats are living in her shoes. About her,	we can say (using the convention just introduced) that she sought out a psychiatrist "because	(she	believed	that	rats	are	living	in	her	shoes)".	But	let	us	say	that	she did	not	seek	out	a	psychiatrist,	but	called	Rentokill.	We	can	still	say	that	she	did what	she	did	"because	she	believed	that	rats	are	living	in	her	shoes",	but	what we thereby	will be saying is that she	did	what she	did "because she	believed (that	rats	are	living	in	her	shoes)". 66 When	is	it	apt	to	employ	(8),	as	opposed	to	(2),	i.e.	when	is	it	apt	to	use the psychologizing form? I suggested above that forms of expression like (2) might	commit	one	to	the	view	that	the	ground	at	issue	was	a	truth.	Accordingly, (8) can be understood as a form of expression that cancels any such commitment. If that is true, then it is	apt to	employ	(8) in	cases in	which	one takes it that S is	mistaken about P, or in	which one	wants to remain neutral with regard to whether P. Let us say that Sam	mistakenly believes that it is raining,	and	on	grounds	of	what	she	believes,	picks	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way out. What I have just suggested helps explain why Sam, when questioned, would	not	say	that	she	is	picking	up	an	umbrella	because	she	believes	that	it	is raining,	but	because it is raining.	For	Sam,	of	course,	stands firm in	her	belief that	it	is	raining;	otherwise	she	would	not	pick	up	her	umbrella	on	her	way	out. Now	let	us	say	that	as	soon	as	she	steps	out	onto	the	street,	she	realizes	that	it is not raining. What I have just suggested also helps explain why retrospectively,	Sam	would	not	say	that	she	picked	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way out because it was raining, but rather, that she would say that she did so because she believed (that it was raining). For now knowing that it is not raining, Sam	would no longer	want to take on any commitment to the effect that	was	is	raining.	It	also	helps	explain	why	an	onlooker	who	knows	all	along that	it	is	not	raining	would	say	that	Sam	is	picking	up	an	umbrella	because	she believes	that	it	is	raining,	and	not	because	it	is	raining.	Knowing	all	along	that Sam's belief is mistaken, the onlooker does not want to take on any commitment	to	the	effect	that	it	is	raining.	The	point	I	want	to	make,	however, does not concern the intricacies of conversational implicatures. The point I want to make is merely that the ubiquitousness of psychological vocabulary does	not	imply	the	ubiquitousness	of	psychological	grounds. 67 1.5	Reduction	and	Explanation Above, I argued that the Principle of Rational	Motivation,	which	we can now understand as the view that rational agents are such that they can act on considerations, is neutral with regard to a host of contested philosophical issues. I now want to note two further issues about which the Principle of Rational	Motivation	is	neutral,	namely,	it	is	neutral	with	regard	to	the	necessity and	feasibility	of	a	reductive	account	of	acting	on	a	ground,	and it is	silent	on the question what explains someone's action when she acts on a ground. Having	these	issues	on	the	table	will	be	relevant	in	what	I	go	on	to	say	below. Let	me	begin	with	the	question	about	reduction.	We	can	give	an	account of	acting	on	a	ground,	in	the	manner	in	which	I	did	it	above.	But	once	we	have clarified the notion of acting on a ground, we can also raise the question whether	we	can	(or	need	to)	say	what	it	is	to	act	on	a	ground	in	other,	allegedly more basic, terms. That is,	we can raise the question	whether a non-circular account	of	the	form What	it	is	for	S	to	Φ	on	grounds	of	P	is	___ is forthcoming. Reductivists (e.g. Davis, 2005; Setiya, 2007; Smith, 2000; Velleman, 2000) hold that such an account is forthcoming, and are working towards	providing	such	an	account.	Davis,	for	instance,	tells	us	that [o]nce we have accepted the fact that people act for reasons, we can raise	the	following	question:	What	is	it	to	act	for	a	reason?	In	particular, what is it for	Mary	to	act for	the	reason	that	there is	not	enough	light? She	could	have	had	any	number	of reasons,	or	none	at	all.	What	made that her reason? What made that her reason for flipping the switch rather	than	some	of	the	other	things	she	was	doing?	My	answer	in	brief 68 is	that	what	it	is	to	act	for	a	reason	is	for	the	action	to	result	in	a	certain way	from	a	belief	and	a	(volitive)	desire.	(Davis,	2005,	pp.	68–9)34 That	is,	Davis	suggests	(following	Davidson,	1980)	that	we	can	say	what	it	is	for someone	to	act	on	grounds	of	some	consideration	in	terms	of	her	representing that	consideration in	a	manner	that is	efficacious	with	regard	to	her	acting	as she	is	acting.	Note,	importantly,	that	a	Reductivist	account	of	acting	on	a	ground that	holds	that,	say,	what	it	is	to	act	on	a	ground	is	"for	the	action	to	result	in	a certain	way from a belief and a (volitive) desire", is, as such, silent on	what plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	Notably,	it	is	compatible	with	what	I	above	showed to be correct, namely, Non-Psychologistic Propositionalism about Grounds. Here	is	Setiya: [T]he best way to think about the belief-desire model of acting for reasons	is	not	as	the	claim	that	our	reasons	for	acting	are	really	beliefs and	desires,	but	as	an	attempt	to	say	what	it	is	to	act	for	a	reason	(where the	reason	is	a	putative	fact)	in	causal-psychological	terms.	It	is,	in	effect, a	reductive	metaphysical	account	of	"acting	because	p"	or	"acting	for	the reason that p" – not a rejection of that common-sense idiom. (Setiya, 2007,	p.	30)35 Non-Reductivists	(e.g.	Dancy	2002;	Hacker	2009)	hold	that	no	such	account	is forthcoming, and the	work they	do	amounts to clarifying the idea	of	Φing	on grounds of P by relating it to other concepts (like, say, the concept of knowledge, or the concept of a normative reason, and so on), as opposed to reducing	it	to	other	concepts.	Here,	for	instance,	is	Dancy: 34	Here,	'acting	for	a	reason'	is	to	be	understood	as	acting	on	a	ground. 35	See	the	foregoing	note. 69 [T]he	difference	between those	reasons for	which the	agent	did in fact act and those for which he might have acted but did not is not a difference in causal role .... It is just the difference between the considerations in the light of	which	he acted and	other considerations which	he	took	to	favour	acting	as	he	did	but	which	were	not	in	fact	the ones	in	the	light	of	which	he	decided	to	do	it.	This	is	admittedly	not	very informative,	since	we	have	to	allow	that	we	have	offered	no	analysis	or philosophical	account	of	the	'in	the	light	of'	relation.	I	suspect,	however, that no such analysis or account is available to be given, without therefore	supposing	that	this	has	any	tendency	to	show	that	the	relation concerned	does	not	exist.	It	is	what	it	is,	and	not	another	thing;	and	if	it cannot	be	analyzed,	so	much	the	worse	for	the	more	global	pretensions of	analysis.	(Dancy,	2002,	p.	163) The	Principle	of	Rational	Motivation,	as	such,	is	neutral	with	regard	to	the	issue of	reduction.	I	will	not	attempt	to	take	a	stand	on	that	issue.	I	take	it	that	if	what I	say	is	acceptable,	it	is	acceptable	to	both	Reductivists	and	to	Non-Reductivists, for	also	a	Reductivist	has	to	get	clear	on	what	she	wants	to	reduce	before	she can	attempt	to	do	so. Let	me	now	turn	to	explaining.	Giving	an	account,	or	a	theory,	of	acting on	a ground	–	whether it is a reductive	or a	non-reductive	one	– amounts to explaining	acting	on	a	ground,	in	one	sense	of	'explaining'.	But	explaining	acting on	a	ground,	in	the	sense	of	giving	a	theory	or	account	of	acting	on	a	ground,	is not the same thing	as explaining	why some	particular agent	performed some particular	action.	Giving	a	theory	or	account	of	acting	on	a	ground	(or	of	values, or normativity, or perception, or whatever) is something that we do in our capacity as philosophers. Accordingly, one might call such explanations 70 Philosopher's Explanations, or the sense of 'explanation' the philosophical sense. But explaining why some particular agent performed some particular action	is	something	that	we	do	as	agents	when	confronted	with	the	actions	of other	agents.	Elisabeth	is	operating	the	pump.	Donald	is	flipping	the	switch.	You may	wonder	why	Elisabeth	and	Donald	are	doing	what	they	are	doing.	That	is, you	might	want	an	explanation	of	their	respective	actions.	But	when	you	want an explanation of their respective behaviors, you will not want a theory of action,	you	will	want	to learn	something	that	renders	their	actions intelligible in	some	respect,	say,	as	done	with	a	certain	end	in	view,	or	as	done	on	a	certain ground.	As	these	are	the	kinds	of	explanations	that	we,	as	agents,	seek	of	one another,	one	might	call	such	explanations	Agent's	Explanations,	and	the	sense of	'explanation'	the	agential	sense.	Now,	of	course,	as	philosophers,	we	can	also give	an	account	or	a	theory	of	Agent's	Explanations.	But	such	account	or	theory (which	we	might	call	a	theory	of	action-explanation)	is	something	other	than	an account or theory of acting on a ground (which we might call a theory of action).36 Above, I introduced the notion of rational motivation, or acting on a ground,	in	a	way	that	is	independent	of	any	theory	of	action-explanation.	That is,	given	just	what	I	say	about	rational	motivation, it	might	turn	out	that	what rationally motivates us is also what explains our actions, or does so under certain	conditions,	but	it	might	turn	out	that	what	rationally	motivates	us	and 36	That is not to say that those two things might not be intimately related. Anscombe	(2000),	for	instance,	seems	to	have	held	that	we	can	give	a	theory	of intentional	action	by	way	of	giving	a	theory	of	action-explanation.	Conversely, one	might	hold that	a theory	of	action-explanation	needs to	be informed	by	a theory	of	what	it	is	to	act	intentionally.	See	also	my	remarks	on	Smith	in	II.2.1 below. 71 what explains our actions are two quite different things. I will come to that issue	in	the	next	part.	I	will	argue	that	what	rationally	motivates	us	is	not	what explains	our	actions.	But	that	is	a	substantial	result.	It	is	important	to	point	out that no account of action-explanation is built into the notion of rational motivation. As	we	will see, that is one of the	merits of the notion of rational motivation	that	I	have	introduced. 2.	The	Psychologism-Debate So	far,	I	have	introduced	the	concept	of	a	normative	reason,	and	the	concept	of a	ground.	Now,	in	the	literature,	talk	about	'motivating	reasons'	(or	'reasons	for which')	abounds.	A	casual	reader	gets	the	impression	that	there	is	grand-scale disagreement about the nature of motivating reasons: disagreement about whether	they	are	mental	states,	or	maybe	facts	about	mental	states,	or	whether they are propositions (that are not restricted to propositions about mental states),	or	maybe facts (that	are	not restricted to facts	about	mental states)	– proponents of the former view being called Psychologists and proponents of the	latter	view	being	called	Non-Psychologists	(or	Anti-Psychologists).	Call	this the Psychologism-Debate about Motivating Reasons (or the PsychologismDebate, for short).	Here are two examples of the	way in	which	Psychologism and	Non-Psychologism	are	contrasted:	In	a	typical	passage	(that	is,	in	a	passage typical	to	contemporary	theorizing	about	reasons),	Maria	Alvarez	tells	us	that [o]n the one hand, we have the psychological conception, which says that someone's reason for acting is her believing something. On the other hand,	we have the non-psychological view,	which holds that the reason	is	what	the	agent	believes,	not	her	believing	it.	For	instance, if I 72 buy	a	magazine	because	I	believe	it	contains	the	TV	listings	for	the	week, according to the psychological conception my reason for buying the magazine is that I believe (or my believing) that it contains the TV listings;	while	according	to	the	non-psychological	conception	it	is	that	it contains	the	TV	listings.	(Alvarez,	2010,	pp.	129–30) Similarly,	James	Pryor	takes	it	that	we	can	sensibly	ask: [I]f	you're	aware	that	your	secretary	plans	to	expose	you,	and	you	resign to	avoid	a	scandal,	what is	your	reason	for	resigning?	...	Is	your	reason the	fact	that	your	secretary	plans	to	expose	you?	...	Or	are	reasons	rather attitudes?	Are	your	reasons	for	resigning	your	belief	that	your	secretary plans	to	expose	you,	and	your	desire	to	avoid	a	scandal?	...	Or	are	reasons propositions?	(Pryor,	2007,	p.	217) The stage is set in like	manner	by	many	other authors (cf. e.g. Bittner, 2001; Dancy	2002;	Gibbons,	2010;	Hacker,	2009;	Mayr,	2011;	Miller,	2008;	O'Brien, 2015;	Stout,	2009;	Stoutland,	2007;	Turri,	2009;	Wiland,	2012).	Who	is	right?	Is the	Psychologist	right,	or	is	the	Non-Psychologist	right?	The	problem,	as	I	see	it, is	that	it is	not	really	clear	what	the	controversy	is	supposed	to	be	about.	The obvious rejoinder is: it is a controversy	about	motivating reasons.	But	what I mean	is:	it	is	not	clear	what	motivating	reasons	are.	By	this,	I	do	not	mean:	it	is not clear what they are ontologically speaking. For that is just what the controversy seems to be about: whether they are mental states, or propositions, or	maybe facts. Rather,	what I	mean is: it is not clear	what the relevant	concept	of	a 'motivating	reason'	is.	Specifically, it is	not	clear	whether both (or all) sides are using the term 'motivating reason' to signify the selfsame concept. To	put it differently, it is not clear	whether both (or all) sides agree	on	what	role	the	things	that	they	call	'motivating	reasons'	play,	and	then 73 disagree about what is best suited to play that role, or whether seemingly contradictory claims	about	motivating reasons	are	actually compatible claims about	things	playing	quite	different	roles. I will start out by distinguish various sense of the term 'motivating reason'	that	we	find	in	the	literature,	and	then	show	why	one	might	think	that Psychologists	and	Non-Psychologists	are	talking	cross-purpose.	I	will	conclude by	suggesting	that	under	the	assumption	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground also	is	an	explanans,	we	can	conceive	of	the	debate	as	substantial	after	all. 2.1	Varieties	of	Motivating	Reasons In	part I, I talked	about facts that speak in favor	of	actions,	and I called them reasons. Specifically, I called them normative reasons. What the qualification 'normative'	signifies	is	that	facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	actions	are	in	focus	with regard	to	their	being	what	we	seek	to	get	at	when	thinking	about	what	we	and others	should	do. Now, some authors (e.g. Alvarez, 2010) hold that those same favoring facts	can	also	be	in	a	different	kind	of	focus,	namely,	that	they	can	be	in	focus when	we	are attempting to	explain	why someone	did	what she	did.	They say that	when	an	agent takes	a certain fact to	be	a reason for	a certain course	of action, and performs that action because she is motivated to do so by that reason, we can describe what motivates her as a 'motivating reason'. The qualification 'motivating', in that	usage,	signifies that that fact is in focus	with regard	to its	being	caught	up in the	right	kind	of	way	(i.e. in the	way	that the Principle of Rational	Motivation describes) in the agent's exercise of rational agency.	Alvarez	writes: 74 [M]otivating	reasons	are	true	beliefs, that is, the	things	that	we	believe that	are	true	–	and	since,	if	the	belief	that	p	is	true,	it	follows	that	it	is	the case	that	p	and	therefore	that	it	is	a	fact	that	p,	we	can	also	conclude	that the reasons that	motivate	us to act are truths or facts. (Alvarez, 2010, 163) It	follows	that	false	considerations,	when	they	play	the	role	of	a	ground,	are	not motivating	reasons,	although	they	are	motivating	considerations (or	grounds,	in our	terminology): [S]omeone	who	acts	on	a false	belief	acts for	no	reason	... for the false belief is not a motivating reason even though ... it is a motivating consideration.	(Alvarez,	2010,	p.	141) 'Motivating	reasons',	in	that	usage	of	the	term,	are	thus	a	subclass	of	what	I	call grounds. When S believes that P, takes it that P favors that she Φ, and is accordingly	motivated	to	Φ	by	what	she	believes,	i.e.	P,	then	P	is	what	plays	the role	of	a	ground.	And	if	the	ground	is	normative	reason,	then	–	according	to	the terminological convention at issue – we can call her ground a motivating reason. Put in a slogan: motivating reasons are normative reasons that motivate.37 37	Susanne	Mantel tells us that the view that "[b]eing a	motivating reason is being	a	normative	reason	that	motivates"	cannot	be	correct,	"because	an	agent can	act	for	a	motivating	reason	without	being	motivated	by	a	normative	reason ...	For example, I	may go to the station	because I	mistakenly believe that	my train is leaving although the station is closed. Surely I go to the station for a motivating	reason,	but this	motivating	reason	cannot	be	a	normative	reason." (Mantel,	2014,	p.	5;	my	emphasis)	But	why	is	it	'sure'	that	Susanne	"goes	to	the station	for	a	motivating	reason"?	It	all	depends	on	what	is	meant	by	'motivating reason'. If	by 'motivating	reason',	one	means 'ground', then	I	go	to the	station for	a	motivating	reason.	There	is	nothing	wrong	with	using	the	term	like	that. But there is also nothing wrong with emphasizing the 'reason'-part in 'motivating	reason'	and	reserving the term	for	cases in	which the	grounds	on 75 Other authors – e.g. Dancy (2002) – are happy to employ the term 'motivating reason' more broadly. For them, all grounds are motivating reasons.	'Motivating	reason',	on	that	usage,	is	just	another	term	for	ground: When someone does something, there will (normally) be some considerations	in	the	light	of	which	he	acted	–	the	reasons	for	which	he did	what	he	did.	...	[N]ormally	there	will	be,	for	each	action,	the	reasons in	the	light	of	which	the	agent	did	that	action,	which	we	can	think	of	as what	persuaded	him	to	do	it.	When	we	think	in	terms	of	reasons	in	this way,	we	think	of them	as	motivating.	The	consideration	that	motivated the	agent	was	his	reason	for	doing	what	he	did.	...	The	consideration	in the light	of	which	someone	acted	as	he	did	need	not	have	been	a	very good	reason;	what	he	did	may	have	been	a	pretty	silly	thing	to	do,	with little	or	nothing	actually to	be said in its favour. (Dancy, 2002, pp. 1–2; my	emphasis) 'Motivating reason', in this usage of the term, does not so much mean 'normative reason that motivates', but rather, 'motivator that motivates because	it	is	taken	to	be	a	normative	reason'.	For,	as	Dancy	says,	you	can	act	for a	motivating	reason	even	if	there	is	"nothing	actually	to	be	said	in	...	favour"	of doing	what	you	are	doing. Once	we are clear on the distinction between grounds and normative reasons, it does not really seem to	matter how	we use the term 'motivating reason':	whether	we	use	it	interchangeably	with	grounds,	or	whether	we	use	it only	for	grounds	that	are	what	they	purport	to	be,	namely,	normative	reasons. which	we	act	are reasons (and	not just	apparent reasons), and, thus,	denying that	Susanne	goes	to	the	station	for	a	motivating	reason. 76 However, the term 'motivating reason' is also used in (at least) two further	ways.	For	some	authors,	the	notion	of	a	'motivating	reason'	is	the	notion of	an	explanantia	that	is	such	as	to	explain	the	action	by	way	of	"making	sense" of	it.	According	to	Wallace,	for	instance, [t]he	motivating	reason	–	the	consideration	we	cite	in	the	perspective	of explanation,	to	make	sense	of	what	the	agent	has	already	done	–	is	the agent's seeing [a] normative consideration as counting in favor of the action	performed	(Wallace,	2003,	p.	435)38 'Motivating	reasons',	as	he	uses the term	here,	are	evidently	not	grounds.	For grounds,	according	to	how	I	defined	the	term,	are	what	Wallace	is	talking	about when he talks about the "normative considerations" that the agent sees as "counting in favor of the action performed". Wallace's 'motivating reasons', however, are not what the agent sees as counting in favor of the action performed.	They	are	her	seeing	a	normative	consideration	as	counting	in	favor of the action performed. And as her seeing a normative consideration as counting in favor of the action performed is what, according to	Wallace, we "cite	in	the	perspective	of	explanation,	to	make	sense	of	what	the	agent	has	... done", 'motivating	reasons',	as	he	uses	the	term,	are	explanantia	that	are	such as	to	"make	sense"	of	actions,	they	are	not	motivators. There	is	yet	another	sense	in	which	the	term	'motivating	reason'	is	used. Above,	I	quoted	Setiya,	who	suggests	that 38	Cf.	also:	"What	are	called	'motivating	reasons'	are	...	explanations	of	action	in terms of reasons in the normative sense – as I have put it, psychological explanations that render intelligible agents' normative understanding of the action	they	were	performing."	(Wallace,	2003,	p.	435) 77 the	best	way	to	think	about	the	belief-desire	model	of	acting	for	reasons is ... as an attempt to say what it is to act for a reason ... in causalpsychological	terms.	(Setiya,	2007,	p.	30) Some authors – notably,	Michael Smith – use the term 'motivating reason' to talk	about	the	causally	efficacious	belief/desire-pair	that	figure	in	their	account of	what	it	is	to	act	on	a	ground.	Let	me	explain.	Smith	considers	the	situation	in which	he	types	some	words.	He	writes: In	deciding	whether	or	not	to	type	these	words	I	reflect	on	certain	facts: that	it	would	be	desirable	to	write	a	book	and	that	I	can	do	so	by	typing these words. These are among the considerations I actually take into account	in	deciding	what	to	do	before	I	do	it;	they	give	my	reasons;	they constitute	my	rational	justification.	...	[T]hese	considerations	constitute my normative reasons for doing what I do, at least as these reasons appear	to	me.	(Smith,	2000,	p.	131) Smith here seems to be talking about grounds (or anyway, about something resembling grounds) when he talks about 'considerations one takes into account in deciding what to do', but he does not call those considerations 'motivating reasons'. Rather, he calls them 'the agent's normative reasons', presumably	because	they	are	taken	(albeit	maybe	mistakenly)	to	be	normative reasons.	What	then	about	his	notion	of	a	'motivating	reason'?	As	Smith	sees	it, what	it	is	for	S	to	Φ	on	grounds	of	P	is,	roughly,	that	the	following	happens: S takes P to speak in favor of	Φing	à S desires to	Φ (and has beliefs about	how	to	go	about	in	order	to	Φ)	à	S	Φ's, where the arrow signifies a causal relation (cf. Smith, 2000, chap 4–5). And what	he	calls	'motivating	reasons'	are	the	belief/desire-pairs	that	figure	in	the 78 second link of this causal chain leading from judgment to action. Thus, he writes	that [m]otivating reasons	would seem to	be	psychological	states that	play	a certain	explanatory	role	in	producing	action	(Smith,	2000,	p.	96). Contrast	this	notion	of	a	motivating	reasons	with	Wallace's	notion.	According	to Wallace, psychological facts explain actions, in that they are what we (allegedly) need to know in order to	make sense of the action. According to Smith, however, psychological states explain actions in that they	are (at least part of) what produce actions. While Wallace is giving an account of what explains	actions,	Smith	is	giving	an	account	of	what	actions	are.39 The view that motivating reasons are psychological states is often credited to	Davidson;40	and, thus, it seems in	order to	say	some	words	on	his view.	Notably,	Davidson	himself	does	not	use	the	term	'motivating	reason'.	But he	does talk	about	belief/desire-pairs	being reasons,	or 'primary reasons'.	He holds	that R is a	primary reason	why	an	agent	performed the	action	A under the description	d only if	R consists of a pro attitude of the agent towards 39	However,	it	is	a	small	step	from	an	account	to	the	effect	that	what	actions	are is:	events	caused	by	belief/desire-pairs,	to	an	account	to	the	effect	that	what explains	actions,	in	the	sense	of	making	them	intelligible,	are	such	belief/ desire-pairs. 40	Here	is	Alvarez:	"Following	Davidson,	most	philosophers	today	maintain	that a	person's	reason	for	acting	is	a	combination	of	a	belief	and	a	desire.	Belief	and desire, in turn, are thought of as mental states with contents that can be expressed	propositionally:	Tom	believes	that	apples	are	healthy;	Henry	desires that	there	are	eggs	for	breakfast.	So	reasons	are	states	of	belief	and	desire	with propositional contents.	Or so it is said.	... In recent	years,	however, there	has been growing dissatisfaction with this conception of reasons. The dissatisfaction	is,	I	think,	well	founded	and	it	calls	for	a	wholesale	rethinking	of the	nature	of	our	reasons	for	acting."	(Alvarez,	2010,	p.	2) 79 actions	with	a certain	property, and	a	belief	of the	agent that	A, under the	description	d,	has	that	property	(Davidson,	1980,	p.	5), and,	famously,	that [a]	primary	reason	for	an	action	is	its	cause.	(Davidson,	1980,	p.	12) But	thereby,	he	is	not	talking	about	grounds.	He	does	have	something	similar	to what	I	call	grounds	in	view.	He	writes	that [c]orresponding to the belief and attitude of a primary reason for an action,	we	can	always	construct	(with	a	little	ingenuity)	the	premises	of a	syllogism	from	which	it	follows	that	the	action	has	some	(as	Anscombe calls	it)	'desirability	characteristic'.	(Davidson,	1980,	p.	9) At	least	roughly,	those	premises,	and	not	the	belief/desire-pair,	are	the	agent's grounds.	Talking,	as	he	does,	about	belief-desire-pairs	causing	events,	thereby rendering	them	intentional	actions,	can	be	understood	as	an	attempt	to	give	a reductive	account	of	acting	on	premises,	or	grounds. The	upshot	of	this	little	excursion	is	that	there	are	(at	least)	three	things that,	in	the	literature,	the	term	'motivating	reason'	is	used	to	signify: A. Grounds a. All	grounds	(e.g.	Dancy,	2002) b. Those	grounds	that	are	normative	reasons	(e.g.	Alvarez,	2010) B. Explanantia	of	action-explanations	(e.g.	Wallace,	2003) C. Psychological	states	that	figure	in	a	reductive	account	of	what	it	is	to	act on	a	ground	(e.g.	Smith,	2000) With	this	disambiguation	at	hand,	let	me	return	to	the	Psychologism-Debate. 80 2.2	Defusing	the	Psychologism-Debate At	the	outset	of	this	chapter,	I	asked:	what	is	the	Psychologism-Debate	actually a	debate	about?	What,	that	is,	is	the	relevant	notion	of	a	'motivating	reason'	in terms	of	which	the	debate	should	be	framed? Remember the two arguments I presented above: the Argument from the	Wrong	Kind	that	is	directed	against	State-Psychologism	about	Grounds,	and the Argument from Unusual Cases that is directed against Psychologistic Propositionalism about Grounds. Note that both arguments are arguments against	a	certain	view	about	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground:	given	that	they	are successful	(and	I	believe	that	they	are),	they	show	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a ground is neither a psychological state, nor, at least not in general, a consideration about a psychological state. But they do not, or at least not directly,	address	a	view	to	the	effect	that	explanantia	are	psychological	states, or	facts	about	psychological	states.	Nor	do	they	address	a	view	to	the	effect	that a	reductive	account	of	acting	on	a	ground	in	terms	of	psychological	states	and their	causal	role	should	be	given.	Taking	either	one	of	those	two	arguments	to refute	either	one	of	those	two	views	would	seem	to	be	to	commit	an	ignoratio elenchi. Jonathan	Dancy	is	one	of	the	most	valiant	contemporary	proponents	of the Non-Psychologistic side of the Psychologism-Debate (indeed he	might be seen as responsible, at least in part, for there being such a debate). It is noteworthy that our two arguments are among the two	main arguments he gives against Psychologism. The Argument from the Wrong Kind figures in Dancy	(2002,	chap.	5),	and	the	Argument	from	Unusual	Cases	figures	in	Dancy (2002,	chap.	6).	This	shows	that,	at	least	as	he	understands	the	Psychologism- 81 Debate, it is	a	debate	about	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground, i.e.	about	what is such	as	to	be	able	to	motivate	an	agent	to	Φ	due	to	her	taking	it to	favor	that she	Φ's. Many	other	contributions to the	Psychologism-Debate	also	presuppose all	along	that	both	sides	are	talking	about	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	when they	are	talking	about	motivating	reasons.	Here	is,	for	instance,	Alvarez: In	general	...	what	seems	to	me	to	make	my	action	right	or	appropriate	is what	I	believe,	not	my	believing	it.	Consider	an	example.	Suppose	that	I give	my	cousin	some	money	because	I	believe	what	he	tells	me,	namely, that	he	needs	it	to	pay	his	rent.	It	would	seem	that	what	motivates	me	to give him the	money is that he needs it: it is that that seems to	me to make the action	of giving	him	money right or appropriate and	not	my believing that he needs it. ... So it seems that we can conclude that a motivating reason is, typically, what the agent believes and not his believing it. And this is what the non-psychological conception says motivating	reasons	are.	(Alvarez,	2010,	pp.	131–132) This	argument	presupposes	that	motivating	reasons	are	things	that	motivate	by virtue of their appearing, to the agent, to be facts that favor; it presupposes, that	is,	that	motivating	reasons	are	grounds.	The	Argument	from	Unusual	Cases faulted	Psychologism	for	treating	unusual	cases	as	the	only	kinds	of	cases	there are. Alvarez here appeals directly to usual cases, to	what kinds of things	we usual take to speak in favor of, say, giving our cousins some money. If her argument is effective, it is effective only against those that are talking about grounds,	but	are	denying	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	can	be	(and	for the	most	part is) a consideration that is	not a consideration	about	one's	own mind. 82 Or	consider	the	following	argument,	given	by	Stout: For	R	to	be	a	motivating	reason	for	S	to	Φ	R	must	be	S's	reason	for	Φ-ing. S must Φ in the light of R. R	must be a reason or consideration that motivates	S	to	Φ.	For	any	of	these	conditions	to	be	the	case	R	must	be	a consideration that is taken by S to favour Φ-ing. For R to be S's motivating reason for Φ-ing, R	must be taken by S to be a normative reason for Φ-ing. ... [But] [i]f motivating reasons must be potentially normative reasons, it cannot be the case that normative reasons are facts	about	the	world	and	motivating	reasons	are	only	ever	facts	about the	agent's	psychological	state.	(Stout,	2009,	pp.	55-56) Like Alvarez, Stout is talking about grounds and showing us why grounds should	not	be	conceived	of	Psychologistically.	Again,	his	argument is	effective only against those	who are talking about	grounds, but are denying that	what plays	the	role	of	a	ground	can	be	(and	for	the	most	part	is)	a	consideration	that is	not	a	consideration	about	one's	own	mind We	saw	above,	however,	that	when	Smith,	following	Davidson,	says	that motivating reasons are belief/desire-pairs, and that when Wallace says that motivating reasons are "the agent's seeing [a] normative consideration as counting	in	favor	of	the	action	performed",	i.e.	a	normative	belief,	they	are	not talking about grounds. They are talking about explanantia, or about the psychological states figuring in a reductive account of acting on a ground, respectively. What they respectively say is completely compatible with the upshot	of	the	Argument	from	the	Wrong	Kind	and	the	Argument	from	Unusual Cases, namely, that grounds are neither psychological states nor facts about psychological	states. 83 Consider, also, that when Wallace argues against Dancy's NonPsychologistic	view,	he	does	not	do	that	by	way	of	arguing	that,	say, it is true after	all	that	when	we	think	about	what	favors	what	in	an	efficacious	way,	i.e.	in a	way	that	leads	to	action,	our	thinking	is	directed	upon	our	own	mind,	and	not upon the	world around us (which is something that the Psychologists about Grounds	would	have	to	say).	Rather,	he	argues	that	we	need	an	account that allows psychological states or facts to play a role in reason explanations	across	the	board	(Wallace,	2003,	p.	430), that is, he seems to	be faulting	his	Non-Psychologistic opponent for	her view about	explanantia,	not	for	her	view	about	grounds. This does not prove that the Psychologism-Debate rests on an equivocation. Nevertheless, it does strongly suggest that while the NonPsychologists in the debate are talking about grounds, their alleged Psychologistic opponents are talking about something else, and that there seems	to	be	disagreement	only	because	unfortunately,	both	sides	use	the	same term, i.e. 'motivating reason' (cf. Darwall, 2003; Davis, 2005; Mantel, 2016; Sandis,	2012;	Setiya,	2011). Note	also	that	despite	all	the	ink	spilled	on	arguing	against	Psychologism about	Grounds	(in	its 'Statist' form,	or	in	its 'Propositionalist' form),	there	is	a lack	of	defenders	of	Psychologism	about	Grounds.41	And	that	is	no	surprise.	For 41	There are only two authors I know of who are self-avowed Psychologists about	grounds:	Gibbons	(2010)	and	Turri	(2009).	As	far	as	I	see,	Turri	holds	a reductive	account	of	acting	on	a	ground,	according	to	which	what	it	is	to	act	on a	ground	is	for	one's	mental	states	to	stand	in	appropriate	relations	(note	that Turri	is	talking	about	epistemic	grounds,	but	takes	what	he	says	to	carry	over also	to	practical	grounds,	i.e.	grounds	on	which	we	act,	and	discusses	views	on practical	grounds	like	Dancy's).	The	mistake	he	makes	seems	to	be	to	identify something that figures in the explanandum of the reduction (grounds) with 84 conceiving of grounds as either psychological states, or considerations about psychological states, seems so obviously wrong. We should not be mislead when someone like Smith says (as I already	quoted	him	saying in II.2.1) that "[m]otivating reasons	would seem to	be	psychological	states" (Smith,	2000,	p. 96).	For	notably,	the	very	same	author	is	happy	to	admit	that	(as	I	have	already quoted	him	saying	in	II.1.4) [the	view	that]	the	considerations	that	motivate	...	[are]	considerations about	our	beliefs	and	desires	...	or	considerations	about	our	beliefs	...,	as Dancy rightly points out, ... fl[ies] in the face of the facts. The considerations that	motivate	us are	only rarely, if ever, considerations about	our	own	psychology.	(Smith,	2003,	p.	151) 2.3	A	Debate	After	All But maybe that conclusion is too hasty. I have just said that the NonPsychologists about	Motivating	Reasons	are talking	about	grounds	when they use	the	term	'motivating	reason'	(the	kinds	of	arguments	they	give	show	that), but that the Psychologists, when they use the term, are talking about explanantia	of	action-explanations,	or	about	the	psychological	states	figuring	in a reductive account of acting on a ground, respectively. I suggested that that something that figures in the explanans of the reduction (mental states standing in appropriate relations). Gibbons, on the other hand, holds a psychologistic view of grounds because he holds a psychologistic view of normative	reasons. In	part I, I	discussed	why	I think	what	he	calls 'normative reasons' are not normative reasons in the sense at issue here throughout. In brief,	what	he	calls	'normative	reasons'	are	not	what	figure	in	deliberation	and advice,	rather, they	are	what	render	actions	reasonable	or	rational.	And, thus, they	are	not	(what	I	call)	normative	reasons. 85 shows	that	the	two	sides	of	the	debate	most	likely	are	talking	at	cross-purposes. However, that is true	only	if the	proponents	of the	debate	agree that	grounds are	not	explanantia. For if one takes it that grounds	are explanantia, and one takes it that explanantia	are,	say,	always	facts	about	psychological	states,	then	one	will	have a	real	issue	with	someone	who	holds	that	grounds	are	only	very	rarely	(only	in 'unusual	cases')	facts	about	psychological	states.	Conversely,	if	one	takes	it	that grounds	are	considerations,	and	one	assumes	that	grounds	are	explanantia,	one will have a real issue with someone who holds that explanantia are, say, psychological states. For while considerations can be about psychological states, they	are	not identical	with them.	So	perhaps, the	Psychologism-Debate does	not	just	come	down	to	equivocation	after	all.	Given	that	it	is	agreed	upon that	grounds	are	explanantia,	it	really	does	get	off	the	ground. I started this part by introducing rational	motivation in a way that is independent	from	any	account	of	explanation.	It	is	more	common,	however,	to start	with	the	notion	of	explanation,	and	to	introduce	rational	motivators	as	a special	kind	of	explanantia.	Darwall	(1983),	for	instance,	distinguishes	between (i) reasons	why	someone	did	something,	or	explanantia, (ii) a	'person's	reason	for	acting',	or	a	motivating	reason,	and (iii) a	reason	for	someone	to	do	something,	or	a	normative	(or,	as	he puts	it,	justificatory)	reason. He	then	suggests	that	we	can	understand	(ii)	with	the	help	of	(i)	and	(iii).	As	he puts it, a 'person's reason for acting' is a subset of explanantia of actions, namely,	it	is	an	explanantia	that	is	such	as	to	be	regarded	by	the	agent	to	be	a normative	(justificatory)	reason: 86 Having	said	something	about	justificatory	reasons	[i.e.	(iii)]	we	are	now in	a	position	to	distinguish	the	subset	of	reasons	of	the	first	kind	[i.e.	(i)], purely explanatory reasons, that is comprised of agents' reasons for having acted, reasons of the second kind [i.e. (ii)]. The notion of an agent's reason brings the idea of justificatory reasons essentially into play. Something may be somebody's reason for having acted without having	been	a	reason for	him	so to	have	acted	(a	reason	of the	second kind	without	being	a	reason	of	the	third	kind),	but it	must	nonetheless be a consideration that he regarded	... as a reason for him so to act. (Darwall,	1983,	p.	32) On this view, it is built into the	very	definition	of a rational	motivator that it explains.	And	if	this	is	how	the	term	is	introduced,	it	is	no	surprise	that	one	has the	Psychologism-Debate	on	one's	hands. In	a	similar	spirit,	Christian	Miller	tells	us	that Motivating	reasons	...	[are]	considerations	in	the	light	of	which	an	agent can	deliberate,	decide,	and	intentionally	act, and	suggests	that [a]	motivating	reason	is	...	supposed	to	play	at	least	two	functional	roles. First,	it	is	potentially	explanatory	of	an	action	performed	by	an	agent	... Similarly,	motivating	reasons	are	reasons	by	the	agent's	own	lights,	and thus	from	the	agent's	perspective	serve	to	implicitly	justify	the	action	as well as the formation of mental states which bring it about. (Miller, 2008) As	he	says that	what	he	calls 'motivating	reasons'	are "reasons	by the	agent's own	lights",	and	that	they	are	"considerations	in	the	light	of	which	an	agent	can ...	intentionally	act",	it	seems	safe	to	assume	that	he	is	talking	about	something 87 that plays the role of a ground. But right at the outset, he seems also to be assuming that what plays the role of a ground also plays the role of an explanans. As	we	will	see	in	the	next	part,	one	of	the	foremost	proponents	of	NonPsychologism – Jonathan Dancy – also takes it that grounds are explanantia. Dancy	holds	that	when	someone	acts	on	grounds	of	P,	what	explains	her	acting as	she	does is	P, the	consideration that	plays the	role	of	a	ground.	As	we	will also see, this further assumption is what	makes his Non-Psychologistic view vulnerable in	a	way	that	a	mere	Non-Psychologistic	view	of	grounds	is	not. In part	III,	I	will	show	that	it	is	a	mistake	to	assume	that	grounds	are	explanantia. The	upshot	is	that	it	would	be	better	not	to	say	that	the	PsychologismDebate	rests	on	an	equivocation,	but	rather,	that	it	rests	on	a	false	assumption, namely,	the	assumption	that	grounds	are	explanantia. 3.	Summary In this	part, I introduced	the	notion	of	acting	on	a	ground.	Someone	acts	on	a ground,	I	said,	just	in	case	she	is	motivated	to	do	what	she	does	by	something she	takes	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	so	act,	where	she	is	motivated	by	what	she takes	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	so	act	because	she	takes	it	to	be	a	reason	for	her to	so	act.	Further,	I	argued	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	are	propositions or	considerations. I then	turned	to	the	Psychologism-Debate	about	Motivating Reasons.	I	argued	that	as	long	as	Non-Psychologists	are	talking	about	grounds, they	are	quite right in	maintaining that (i)	what	plays the role	of a	ground is what	the	agent	believes,	and	that	(ii)	the	things	that	the	agent	believes	that	are such as to play the role of a ground are not restricted to things she believes 88 about	herself.	I	also	argued	that	the	Non-Psychologist	stands	in	conflict	with	the Psychologist	only	if	the	Non-Psychologist	assumes	that	what	the	agent	believes plays	not	only	the	role	of	a	ground,	but	also	the	role	of	an	explanans.	For	those that hold that what they call 'motivating reasons' are the agent's believing something, and not	what she believes, are best conceived as	making a claim about	explanantia,	and	not	as	making	a	claim	about	grounds.	In	the	next	part,	I will	show	that	at least	one	prominent	Non-Psychologist, Jonathan	Dancy,	does indeed	take	it	that	grounds	are	also	explanantia,	and	as	this	leads	to	problems, at	least	in	error-cases,	it	has	led	some	to	reject	Non-Psychologism	as	such. 89 Part	III:	Explanation According	to	Non-Psychologists,	when	someone	acts	on	a	ground,	her	ground	is something	she	believes,	and	not	her	believing	something,	or	that	she	believes	it. Now,	call	cases	in	which	the	relevant	belief	is	false	error-cases.	Error-cases	are generally	taken	to	pose	a	problem	for	Non-Psychologists	about	Grounds.	For	it is thought	that in	error-cases, the	Non-Psychologists	must	say	that falsehoods explain. In this part, I	will show that error-cases only pose a problem if one assumes	that	grounds	are	explanantia	(III.1).	I	will	also	show	that,	contrary	to what	is	usually	assumed,	the	problem	is	not	specifically	a	problem	for	the	NonPsychologist;	there	is	at	least	one	type	of	Psychologist	with	regard	to	whom	the self-same problem arises (III.1.2). I will argue that we should let go of the assumption	that	grounds	are	explanantia,	and	conclude	by	giving	an	alternative account	of	explanantia	(III.4).	Before	I	can	draw	that	conclusion,	however,	I	will have	to	rule	out	that	there	are	other	ways	out	of	the	conundrum.	I	will	discuss whether it	might	not	be so	bad	after all to say that falsehoods	explain (III.2), and	I	will	discuss	two	ways	in	which	one	might	think	that	giving	error-cases	a special	treatment	might	do	the	trick	(III.3). Let me note right at the outset that 'explanation' is throughout to be understood in	what I termed the	agential sense (cf. II.1.5).	That is to say, the view	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	also	plays	the	role	of	an	explanans	is the view that when S Φs on grounds of P, P itself is what renders S's Φing intelligible	(more	on	this	in	III.4). 90 1.	Non-Psychologism	and	the	Problem	Posed	by	Error-Cases Error-cases	are	generally	taken	to	pose	a	problem	for	Non-Psychologists	about Grounds.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	clarify	wherein	the	problem	lies.	In	a	first	step,	I will show that the problem is generated by adherence to three ideas: that grounds are what one believes, that grounds explain actions, and that only truths	can	explain.	With	regard	to	error-cases,	one	cannot	consistently	adhere to all those three claims. I	will call this the	Non-Psychologist's Problem. In a second	step, I	will	show	that	the	Non-Psychologist's	Problem	is	actually just	a species of a more general problem: what I will call the Propositionalist's Problem. It is, thus, a mistake to think that only Non-Psychologists about Grounds	should	worry	about	error-cases. 1.1	The	Non-Psychologist's	Problem Let	us	say	that	a	certain	bridge	collapsed,	and	that	someone	attempts	to	explain why it collapsed	by	saying that	what	explains	why it collapsed is that	a truck drove into one of its pillars. Even if we do not know why the bridge did collapse,	we	can	know	that	the	given	explanation	cannot	be	correct,	if	we	know that,	say,	at	that	point	of	time,	there	was	no	truck	on	the	road,	and	that,	thus,	it cannot	be	true	that	a	truck	drove	into	one	of	the	pillars	of	the	bridge.	Or	let	us say that someone takes out an umbrella on her way out, and someone else attempts	to	explain	why	that	person	took	out	an	umbrella	by	saying	that	what explains	why	she took	out	an	umbrella is that it is raining.	Even if	we	do	not know	why that	person	did take	out	an	umbrella,	we	can	know that the	given explanation	cannot	be	correct	if	we	know	that	it	is	not	raining.	And	so	on.	This 91 clearly	seems	to	show	that	we	take	it	that	falsehoods	cannot	explain	anything, neither	why	some	event	occurred	(like	that	a	certain	bridge	collapsed),	nor	why someone	performed	some	action	(like	taking	out	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out). Call the idea that a condition on explanantia is that they are truths or facts 'Veridicalism	about	Explanantia'	(with	regard	to	explanations	of	actions,	which is	our	topic	here,	cf.	for	this	e.g.	Alvarez,	2010;	Hieronymi,	2011;	Hyman,	2015, chap.	6;	Littlejohn,	2012,	chap.	4.5;	Sandis,	2013). Jonathan	Dancy	is	one	of	the	main	contemporary	proponents	of	a	NonPsychologistic	view	about	grounds.	His	view	is	often	criticized	by	pointing	out that	it	goes	against	common	sense	in	breaching	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia. Lenman,	for	instance,	writes	that [t]he biggest headache for anti-psychologists such as Dancy ... is furnished	by	cases	where the	agent's	belief is	false.	... [I]n	cases	where Angus	punches	his	boss,	believing	mistakenly that	he	has	been fired, it seems	quite	wrong	to	say	he	so	acts	because	he	has	been	fired.	In	such	a case	we	surely	must	retreat	to	a	psychologised	explanation	if	we	are	to have a credible motivating reason explanation at all. (Lenman, 2011, para.	6) And	Wallace	tells	us	that	Dancy's	view	leads	to	a strained understanding of cases in which people do not act for good normative	reasons,	because	(for	instance)	things	are	not	in	fact	as	they take	them	to	be.	If	Peter's	investment	decision	did	not	turn	out	to	lead	to an	increase	in	his	pension,	then	it	seems	to	me	strange	and	misleading	to explain his action [as Dancy suggests, mf.] by saying: "His reason for doing it is that it	would increase	his	pension, though	as it	happened it failed	to	do	so".	(Wallace,	2003,	p.	430) 92 Indeed, Dancy himself concedes that it (allegedly) is a consequence of NonPsychologism about Grounds that it forces one to deny Veridicalism about Explanantia.	As	he	writes: The	explanations	we	give	when	we	specify	the	agent's	reasons	for	acting [...] are unusual in being non-factive. What this means is that for the explanation	to	be	correct	as	an	explanation,	it	is	not	required	that	what is	offered	as	explanans	in	fact	be	the	case.	(Dancy,	2004b,	pp.	25–26) [A]	thing	believed	that	is	not	the	case	can	still	explain	an	action	(Dancy, 2002,	p.	134) One contentious aspect of the	picture that has been	developed	here is that	something	that	is	not	the	case	can	explain	an	action.	(Dancy,	2002, p.	137) Of	course	it	is	odd	to	suppose	that	on	occasion	a	nothing	(something	that is not the case) can explain a something (an action that was done). (Dancy,	2003a,	p.	427) But does Non-Psychologism about Grounds really commit one to denying Veridicalism	about	Explanantia? I	argued	above that	Non-Psychologism	about Grounds	is	the	correct	view.	But	if	it	had	the	consequence	that	Dancy,	Lenman and	Wallace	seem	to	take	it	to	have,	that	should	give	us	a	pause.	It	should	lead us	to	reconsider	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds,	despite	everything	that	was said	above. Luckily, however,	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds, just as such,	does not commit one to denying Veridicalism about Explanantia. According to the Non-Psychologist	about	Grounds,	when	Sam	mistakenly	believes	that,	say,	it	is raining,	the	false	consideration	that	it	is	raining	can	nevertheless	be	what	plays the	role	of	a	ground.	Even	if	it	is	not	raining,	she	can	still	act	on	grounds	of	the 93 consideration	that	it	is	raining;	she	may,	for	instance,	pick	up	her	umbrella	on her	way	out,	on	grounds	of	the	(false)	consideration	that	it	is	raining.	Accepting that commits one to implausibly holding that	what explains her action is the falsehood	that it is	raining	only	if	one	presupposes	that	the	grounds	on	which we act are what explain our actions. We saw above that some authors call grounds 'reasons'. And it is often said that it is something like a truism that reasons	explain	actions.	But	even	if it is	a	truism	that	reasons	explain	actions, on some interpretation of 'reason', it is far from clear that grounds explain actions, even if grounds can be called 'reasons'. However, it is precisely that view	–	that	grounds	explain	actions,	or	'Explanatorism	about	Grounds',	as	I	will call it – that commits a Non-Psychologist about Grounds to denying Veridicalism	about	Explanantia. Let us take stock. Dancy sees himself forced to give up Veridicalism about Explanantia because he adheres to both Non-Psychologism about Grounds and	Explanatorism about	Grounds. Lenman and	Wallace take it that giving	up	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia	is	quite	untenable,	and	this	appears	to lead them to question	Non-Psychologism about Grounds. Either	move	makes sense only if one assumes Explanatorism about Grounds. So there is a third option,	besides	biting	the	bullet	of	denying	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia,	or retreating	from	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds.	If	we	give	up	Explanatorism about	Grounds,	we	can	happily	hold	on	both	to	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia and	to	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds.	According	to	Alvarez,	for	instance, 94 the	reason	that	explains	why	someone	φ-ed	need	not	be	her	reason	for φ-ing,42 and,	thus,	according	to	her,	it	is	possible to embrace a non-psychological conception of	motivating reasons and yet to reject the view that a true explanation can ever have a false explanans.	(Alvarez,	2010,	p.	177-178)43 We	can	also	put	it	as	follows.	We	are	faced	with	an	inconsistent	triad	of	claims, namely, (1) Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds (2) Veridicialism	about	Explanantia (3) Explanatorism	about	Grounds and the question is:	which of those three claims should	we give up? Alvarez opts for	giving	up	(3),	Dancy	opts for	giving	up	(2),	and	Lenman	and	Wallace seem to opt for giving up (1). I will argue that we should follow Alvarez in giving up (3).44	I will argue that it is wrong to say that grounds themselves explain;	which,	note,	is	not	the	same	as	saying	that	grounds	do	not	play	a	role	in explanations.	I	will	not	discuss	the	option	of	giving	up	(1),	however,	as	I	take	it that	part	II	has	already	established	that	(1)	is	correct;	there	would,	thus,	be	no value	in	revisiting	that	claim	again.	I	will,	however,	briefly	discuss	the	option	of giving	up	(2).	Specifically,	I	will	assess	how	Dancy	seeks	to	make	giving	up	(2) less	untenable,	and	argue	that	he	does	not	deliver	what	he	promises	to	deliver. 42	We	can	read	'the	reason	that	explains'	as	'the	explanans',	and	'her	reason	for φ-ing'	as	'the	ground	on	which	she	φ's'. 43	Cf. also Davis (2005); Hieronymi (2011); Hyman (2015); Sandis (2013); Setiya	(2011). 44	There	are	various	things	that	giving	up	(3)	could	amount	to,	that	is,	various options	for	alternative	explanantia.	I	will	follow	Alvarez	in	giving	up	(3).	But	I will	not	follow	her	in	the	alternative	she	opts	for.	Cf.	III.4	below. 95 Note,	however,	that	there	are	of	course	ways	of	tinkering	with	any	one of	the	three	claims	that	fall	short	of	giving	any	one	of	them	up	outright.	As	we will see,	one	could, for instance,	hedge	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds	and argue	that	that	view	is	correct	only	under	the	condition	that	the	consideration that	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	a	fact,	and	that	we	need	a	different	account	of grounds	in	cases	in	which	that	condition	is	not	satisfied	(an	option	discussed	by Dancy,	2002).	Or	one	could	hold	that	grounds	do	explain,	but	only in	cases in which	the	consideration	that	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	a fact,	and	that it is only in other cases that ground and explanans come apart (cf. e.g. Alvarez, 2010;	Hyman,	2015).	That	is	to	say,	disjunctive	accounts	of	various	kinds	seem possible,	and	will	be	considered. But	first,	I	want	to	show	that	we	can	give	a	more	general	formulation	of the triad. Maybe somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that it is not NonPsychologism	about	Grounds	that	is	at	the	heart	of	the	problem.	Psychologists about	Grounds,	at	least	of	a	certain	kind,	are	faced	with	the	exact	same	problem. 1.2	The	Propositionalist's	Problem Take	the	example	mentioned	above:	Sam	mistakenly	believes	that	it	is	raining, and	on	grounds	of	what	she	mistakenly	believes,	namely,	that	it	is	raining,	she picks up an umbrella on her way out. This is problematic, in the light of Veridicalism	about	Explanantia	and	Explanatorism	about	Grounds,	not	because of	what	Sam	believes,	but	because	her	belief	is	mistaken;	it	is	problematic,	that is,	not	because	of	the	content	of	Sam's	belief,	but	because	of	its	truth-value.	And given	what is surely	correct,	namely, that	we	can	be	mistaken	not	only	about the facts around us, but also about facts about our own	mind, we would be 96 faced	with the exact same	problem, even if	what played the role of a ground were only always considerations about our own	mind (cf.	Wiland, 2003). So, what is inconsistent with Veridicalism about Explanantia and Explanatorism about	Grounds	is	not	so	much	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds,	but	rather,	the genus	which	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds is	a species	of,	namely,	what I called Propositionalism about Grounds. Thus, a more general formulation of our	triad	is	as	follows: (1) Propositionalism	about	Grounds (2) Veridicialism	about	Explanantia (3) Explanatorism	about	Grounds Of	course,	if	it	is	correct	what	I	argued	for	in	part	II,	namely,	that	the	only	sane option for a Propositionalist about Grounds is Non-Psychologism about Grounds, it is fine to put things as I put them above. However, the fact that psychologistic	renderings	of	Propositionalism	about	Grounds	are	faced	with	the exact same problem shows why one supposed way out of the NonPsychologist's	problem	is	of	no	help.	As	long	as	you	remain	a	Propositionalist, shedding	commitment	to	Non-Psychologism	and	embracing	Psychologism	will not	solve (or	avoid) the	Non-Psychologist's	problem, for	her	problem is	but	a guise	of	a	more	general	problem	that	has	to	do	with	Propositionalism. 2.	Dancy	on	Denying	Veridicalism	About	Explanantia One	way	out	of the	Non-Psychologist's	problem is to	deny	Veridicalism	about Explanantia. But few people are tempted by that, and for understandable reasons. For after all, it does just seem like a truism that falsehoods cannot explain.	Jonathan	Dancy,	however,	seems	prepared	to	accept,	as	a	consequence 97 of	his	views, that falsehoods (or	non-obtaining facts, as	he	seems to	prefer to put	it)	can	explain	actions.	Above,	I	quoted	him	saying	that [o]f course it is	odd to suppose that	on	occasion	a	nothing (something that	is	not	the	case)	can	explain	a	something	(an	action	that	was	done). But	I	cut	off	the	sentence	that	follows,	which	reads: But	I	maintain	that	we	can	live	with	this	oddity	–	or	rather	that	it	is	not as	odd	as	people	make	out.	(Dancy,	2003a,	p.	427;	my	emphasis) Here,	I	want	to	look	at	what	he	has	to	say	that	is	meant	to	show	us	that	giving up Veridicalism about Explanantia "is not as odd as people	make out". I	will argue	that	what	he	has	to	say	in	fact	merely	reinforces	Propositionalism	about Grounds,	but	does	nothing	to	show	that	falsehoods	can	explain. Above,	I	introduced	a	scenario	in	which	someone	takes	out	an	umbrella on	her	way	out,	and	someone	else	attempts	to	explain	why	that	person	took	out an	umbrella	by	saying	that	what	explains	why	she	took	out	an	umbrella	is	that it	is	raining.	I	said	that	even	if	we	do	not	know	why	that	person	did	take	out	an umbrella,	we	can	know	that	the	given	explanation	cannot	be	correct	if	we	know that it is	not	raining.	And	I	argued	that this	clearly	shows	that	we	take it that falsehoods	cannot	explain	why	someone	performed	some	action. Now,	Dancy	concedes	that (1) what	explains	why	P	is	that	Q can	only	be	true	if	Q;	or	that	(1)	is	factive, like	"S	knows	that	P",	but	unlike	"S believes	that	P".	But	he	argues,	first,	that	there	are	other	ways	of	saying	what	is said	in	(1)	that	are	non-factive.	He	considers	statements	of	the	forms: (2) The	ground	on	which	she	Φed	was	that	P. And	he	tells	us	that	as	his	ears	tell	him,	it	is	not	self-contradictory	to	continue statements	of	such	a	form	by	denying	the	embedded	proposition	they	state	to 98 be the ground. That is, to present his example, he thinks that the following statement	is	not	self-contradictory: The ground on which he acted was that she had lied to him, though actually	she	had	done	nothing	of	the	sort.	(Dancy,	2002,	p.	132) Secondly,	he	then	points	out	that	that	is	not	surprising.	As	he	puts	it: [T]here seems to be no reason why there should not be a way of revealing	the	light	in	which	the	agent	saw	things	as	a	way	of	explaining why	he	did	what	he	did,	without	asserting	that	he	was	right	to	see	things that	way.	(Dancy,	2002,	p.	133) That seems right. For	we surely can reveal "the light in	which the agent saw things",	and	thereby	explain	why	she	did	what	she	did,	without	asserting	that she "was right to see things that	way".	Even if I	myself	do	not think that it is raining,	or	even	if	I	myself	do	not	think	that	taking	out	an	umbrella	when	it	is raining is a sensible thing to	do, I can certainly	explain	why	Sam took	out	an umbrella	on	her	way	out	by	way	of	revealing	that,	as	Sam	saw	it, it is	raining, and	that,	as	she	saw	it,	doing	so	is	thus	a	sensible	thing	to	do;	by	revealing,	that is,	"the	light	in	which	the	agent	saw	things".	After	all,	if	that	were	not	possible, then	actions	of	agents	for	which,	as	we	(i.e.	those	attempting	to	explain)	see	it, there are no normative reasons would be incomprehensible for us. But of course,	the	mere	fact	that,	as	we	see	it,	there	is	no	normative	reason	for	Sam	to take out an umbrella on her way out does not render her doing so unintelligible. But	even	if	what	Dancy	says	is	correct	(and	I	believe	it	is),	all	it	shows	us is	that	knowing	that,	say,	it	is	not	raining	does	not	suffice	to	rule	out	that	Sam believed	that	it	is	raining,	and	that	she	took	out	an	umbrella	on	grounds	of	what she	believed.	It	does	not	render	the	idea	that	what	explains	why	Sam	took	out 99 an	umbrella	need	not	be	a truth	any	more tenable.	To	put it	differently,	what Dancy	shows	us 'not	to	be	too	odd' is	that	we	can	explain	on	grounds	of	what someone	did	something	even if	we	(i.e. those that	give the	explanation) think that the consideration that played the role of a ground is false. We already knew	that that is	not	particularly	odd,	however.	What	he	does	not	show	us is that	it	is	not	"as	odd	as	people	make	out"	to	hold	that	falsehoods	explain.	That is,	what	Dancy	says	strengthens the	case for	Propositionalism	about	Grounds, but	does	not show that	denying	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia is tenable, or less	untenable	then	the	consideration	given	at	the	outset	of	this	part	makes	it out	to	be. 3.	A	Separate	Account	for	Error-Cases Let	us	(once	again)	say	that	Sam	believes	that	it	is	raining,	that	her	belief	is	true, and that on her way out, she picks up an umbrella.45	According to a NonPsychologist, it is possible that Sam acts on grounds of what she believes, namely, that it is raining.	And	holding that that is	possible is	compatible	with joint adherence to Explanatorism about Grounds and Veridicalism about Explanantia.	But	now	consider	a	counterfactual	scenario,	in	which	Sam's	belief is	false,	but	in	which	all	else	is	equal.	It	would	seem	that	if	actual-Sam	(as	I	will call	her)	picks	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out	on	grounds	of	what	she	believes, namely,	that	it	is	raining,	then	counterfactual-Sam	(as	I	will	call	her)	does	that too, that is, that she too	picks	up	her	umbrella	on	her	way	out	on	grounds	of what she believes, namely, that it is raining. After all, the only difference 45	Please	apologize	for	all	the	rain. 100 between	the	two	scenarios	is	the	truth-value	of	the	relevant	belief,	and	we	have already	seen	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	need	not	be	true. Of course, if the counterfactual scenario under consideration were a different	one,	then	things	might	be	different.	If,	say,	in	the	actual	scenario,	Sam values	not	getting	wet,	but	in	the	counterfactual	scenario,	she	positively	enjoys getting	wet,	then	it	would	not	seem	as	if	we	could	say	that	counterfactual-Sam acts	on	the	same	ground	as	actual-Sam	acts.	Given,	at least, that	our	acting	on the	grounds	on	which	we	act	is	dependent,	in	some	way	or	another,	on	what	we value, there would be no basis for saying that counterfactual-Sam must be acting	on	the	same	grounds	as	actual-Sam	is	acting.	But	we	have	stipulated	that the	only	difference	between	the	two	scenarios	is	the	truth-value	of	Sam's	belief that	it	is	raining. Someone who jointly adheres to Explanatorism about Grounds and Veridicalism	about	Explanantia	cannot	accept that	counterfactual-Sam	acts	on the	same	grounds	as	does	actual-Sam.	For,	for	someone	who	jointly	adheres	to Explanatorism	about	Grounds	and	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia,	saying	that counterfactual-Sam acts on grounds of what she believes (namely, that it is raining)	is	problematic	in	a	way	that	saying	the	same	thing	about	actual-Sam	is not. For such a theorist, the truth-value	makes a difference. For if	what Sam believes	is	false,	then	what	she	believes	cannot	explain	her	action,	and,	thus,	it cannot be her ground. Now, as the problem arises only in error-cases, one might	think	that	we	need	a	special	treatment	for	error-cases,	and	that	what	the Non-Psychologist	says	about	veridical	cases	is	fine	as	standing. Such	an	approach	has	precedents	in	the	theory	perception.	Theorists	of perception	sometimes	argue that the	mere fact that in	error-cases,	we	cannot conceive of her who is in a perceptual state as standing in a relation to a 101 worldly object should not lead us to think that	we cannot so conceive of the subject in veridical cases. In veridical cases, such theorists hold, being in a perceptual	state	amounts	to	standing	in	a	relation	to	a	worldly	object.	It	is	just that	we	need	a	different	account	for	the	error-case.	In	short,	they	hold	that	we need	a	disjunctive	account	of	perception,	i.e.	that	we	need	one	kind	of	account	of being in	a	perceptual	state for	veridical	cases, and	a	different	kind	of	account for	error-cases.46 In	this	chapter,	I	will	consider	two	options	for	someone	who	thinks	that error-cases	need	special	treatment.	Here	are	the	two	options	I	will	consider: (1) Counterfactual-Sam	acts	on	a	different	ground	than	actual-Sam	acts on (2) In	contrast	to	actual-Sam,	counterfactual-Sam,	when	she	picks	up	an umbrella	on	her	way	out,	is	not	acting	on	a	ground The first option seems attractive, at least on first glance, because it	makes it possible that counterfactual-Sam's ground, just like actual-Sam's ground, is a truth, and, thus, that the noted problem no longer arises. The second option seems	attractive,	at	least	on	first	glance,	because	it	simply	locates	the	allegedly problematic	case	outside	of	the	parameters in	which	the	problem	can	arise: if counterfactual-Sam is	not acting	on	a ground, then there is	no falsehood that must	explain,	insofar	as	it	is	a	ground,	but	that	at	the	same	time,	and	insofar	as it	is	a	falsehood,	cannot	explain.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	show	that	neither	of	the two	options	makes	much	sense,	despite	their	prima	facie	attractions. 46	I am not saying that Disjunctivism in the theory of perception is a unified account.	Cf.	Haddock	&	Macpherson	(2008)	for	an	illuminating	overview	of	the various	variants	of	disjunctive	theories	of	perception	that	have	been	given. 102 3.1	Disjunctivism	About	Grounds Dancy considers whether we could fall back to a Psychologistic account of grounds in order to understand error-cases in a	way that is compatible	with joint adherence to Explanatorism about Grounds and Veridicalism about Explanantia. In the actual case, we said, Sam's ground is	what she believed, namely, that it is raining. Dancy considers whether we could say, about counterfactual-Sam, that her ground is that she believes that it is raining. He calls	such	an	account	a	disjunctive	theory.	And	as	it	is	grounds	that	a	disjunctive account is given of, we can term it 'Disjunctivism about Grounds' (cf. Dancy, 2002,	pp.	138–145,	2003,	p.	427,	2008,	pp.	267–271;	Littlejohn,	2012,	p.	154; Miller	2008,	p.	230;	Stout	2009,	pp.	58–59).47 Note that the move is actually a move away not so much from NonPsychologism	about	Grounds,	but rather,	a	move	away from	Propositionalism 47	Disjunctive views are of the form: X is either Y or Z; say, that having a perceptual	appearance	as	of	a	cat	is	either	such	as	to	put	us	in	a	position	to	gain knowledge	that	there	is	a	cat	in	front	of	us,	or	that	it	is	not	such	as	to	put	us	in such	a	position,	but	merely such	as to	not	make it irrational for	us to	believe that	there	is	a	cat	in	front	of	us.	(There	are	many	variants	of	disjunctive	views about perception. See the note above. Here, I am describing McDowell's 'epistemological'	variant,	cf.	McDowell,	1982,	1986,	2013)	Disjunctivism	about Grounds fits the 'X is either Y or Y'-mold, at least overtly. But the more interesting feature of disjunctive theories is the claim they make about the priority	of	the	'good'	case,	namely,	that	we	cannot	account	of	Y	in	terms	of	Z	and some	further	factor;	say,	that	we	cannot	account	for	our	being	in	a	position	to gain	knowledge	of	the	world	in	terms	of	its	not	being	irrational	for	us	to	form beliefs	about the	world	and	some further factor that is such	as to	secure that rational	beliefs	amount	to	knowledge.	It	is	unclear	whether	Disjunctivism	about Grounds	exhibits	this	further	feature.	That	is,	it	is	unclear	whether	according	to Disjunctivism	about	Grounds,	non-psychological	ground	are	prior	in	any	sense. Psychological	and	Non-Psychological	grounds	just	seem	to	be	different. 103 about Grounds (and towards Factualism about Grounds). 48 For what is problematic about error-cases is not the non-psychological content of the agent's relevant beliefs, but that the belief is false. It is just that in cases in which	S	mistakenly	believes that	P, i.e. in error-cases, the fact that S	believes that	P	is	a	ready	candidate	for	what	alternatively	might	be	her	ground,	if	(due	to the identification of grounds and explanantia, and the requirement that explanantia	are	truths)	one	thinks	that	in	such	a	case,	P	cannot	be	her	ground (cf.	III.1.2	above). On	first	glance	at	least,	Disjunctivism	about	Grounds	might	seem	helpful. For	if	counterfactual-Sam's	ground	is	not	the	falsehood	she	believes,	i.e.	that	it is	raining, but rather, the truth that	she	believes	that	it is	raining, then	we	can continue to maintain that grounds explain without breaching Veridicalism about Explanantia. But such a treatment of error-cases is highly implausible. For if Psychologism about Grounds is in general mistaken, then it is also mistaken	if	it	is	limited	to	error-cases.	As	Dancy	writes, [it	is]	impossible	...	having	argued	against	the	fully	psychologistic	theory, to fall back on the disjunctive conception as an adequate alternative. (Dancy,	2002,	p.	145) Recall what is wrong about Psychologism about Grounds (cf. II.1.3).	What is wrong about Psychologism about Grounds is not that considerations about one's	own	mind	cannot	be	what	play	the	role	of	a	ground.	What	is	wrong	about Psychologism	about	Grounds	is	that	considerations	about	one's	own	mind	play the	role	of	a	ground	only	in	special	cases.	For	grounds	are	considerations	that are	taken,	by	her	who	acts	on	them,	to	be	facts	that	are	reasons	to	so	act,	and 48	For	the	terms,	cf.	II.1.3	and	II.1.4	above. 104 only	in	special	cases	do	we	take	it	that	the	reasons	for	doing	what	we	are	doing are	facts	about	our	own	mind.	It	is	implausible	that	merely	changing	the	truthvalue of actual-Sam's relevant belief turns her case into a special case. Of course,	we	can	imagine	a	case	in	which	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	for	Sam is the	consideration	that	she	believes that it is	raining. Imagine,	say, that	Sam (call	her	'psychotic-Sam')	is	on	anti-psychotic	drugs,	and	that	she	knows	that	an indication of them	wearing off is that she begins to believe that it is raining. Given	all	that,	it	might	be	that	she	takes	a	pill,	and	that	her	ground	for	doing	so is	that	she	believes	that	it	is	raining.	Note	that	if	we	are	imaginative	enough,	we can	even	construct	a	case	in	which	psychotic-Sam	does	something	on	grounds of	the	consideration	that	she	believes	that	it is	raining,	and	in	which	what	she does	is	nothing	other	than	to	pick	up	umbrella	on	her	way	out.	Maybe,	say,	her doctor devised some special therapy that requires taking out an umbrella always when she believes that it is raining. But the point is that merely changing the truth-value of actual-Sam's belief does not turn counterfactualSam	into	psychotic-Sam	(or	some	figure	like	her). There is also	another	problem for	Disjunctivism	about	Grounds that is sometimes noted. Littlejohn (2012, p. 154) and Miller (2008, p. 230), for instance, complain that such an account implausibly portrays the agent as systematically	mistaken about	what her grounds are in cases in	which she is mistaken about how the	world is. For if we ask counterfactual-Sam on	what grounds	she	is	taking	out	her	umbrella,	she	will	tell	us	that	her	ground	for	doing so is that it is raining. But according to the Disjunctivist about Grounds, her ground is	not that it is raining,	but rather, that she	believes that it is raining. And	so,	when	she	tells	us	that	her	ground	for	taking	out	her	umbrella	is	that	it	is raining,	she	is	mistaken	about	what	her	ground	is.	Note	that	of	course	there	is	a 105 sense in which agents like counterfactual-Sam are systematically mistaken: they are systematically mistaken about the status of their grounds. For counterfactual-Sam	takes	her	grounds	to	be	a	fact	that	favors	doing	what	she	is doing.	But	she is	mistaken therein,	as it is	a	mere	consideration.	However, the problematic	systematic	mistake	that	Littlejohn	and	Miller	are	pointing	to	is	not a	mistake about the status, but a	mistake about	what	has the relevant status. Maybe there are cases in which the agent is mistaken about what has the relevant	status.	Maybe	someone	can	take	herself	to	be	acting	on	grounds	of	P, but actually, she is acting on grounds of Q; maybe, that is, self-deception is possible in cases in which agents act on a ground. But Disjunctivism about Grounds	seems	to	imply	that	cases	in	which	agents	have	false	beliefs	are	always cases of self-deception, and that is implausible. The mere fact that counterfactual-Sam	is	mistaken	about	the	world	should	not	lead	us	to	think	that she	is	mistaken	about	what	it	is	that	motivates	her. Thus, I conclude that the first of the two noted options, Disjunctivism about	Grounds,	is	not	a	genuine	option. 3.2	Disjunctivism	about	Ground-Taking I now	come to the second	option: that	other than	actual-Sam, counterfactualSam	is	not	acting	on	a	ground	when	she	picks	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out. The	idea	is	that	while	both	actual-Sam	and	counterfactual-Sam	take	themselves to	be	acting	on	a	ground	in	picking	up	an	umbrella,	only	the	former	is	thereby acting	on a ground.	The latter	will	merely	be taking	herself to	be acting	on	a 106 ground,	but	what	she	does	will	not	amount	to	acting	on	a	ground49	–	what	she does	will	not	amount	to	acting	on	a	ground,	but	merely	to	taking	herself	to	be doing	so,	simply	because	what	she	believes	is	false.	One	might	call	such	a	view 'Disjunctivism about Ground-Taking', as it holds that when someone takes herself to	be	acting	on	a	ground,	she	either	acts	on	a	ground,	or	she	does	not, despite	taking	herself	to	be	doing	so	–	where	one	thing	that	can	make	it	the	case that	her	taking	herself	to	be	acting	on	a	ground	does	not	amount	to	her	acting on	a	ground	is	the	mere	fact	that	what	she	takes	to	play	the	role	of	her	ground is	a	falsehood.50,	51 Let	me, for the time	being, cast the issue	under	discussion in terms	of motivating reasons, instead of in terms of grounds. Let us say, that is, that actual-Sam picks up an umbrella on her way out, and that her motivating reason for doing that is what she believes, namely, that it is raining. This is compatible with joint adherence to Explanatorism about Grounds and Veridicalism about Explanantia. But a version of our familiar problems arise when	we turn to counterfactual Sam, as counterfactual Sam's belief that it is raining	is	false. Recently, it	has	been	suggested	that the	solution	to	this	problem	about motivating	reasons	and	false	beliefs	is	simple.	All	we	have	to	do,	it	is	said,	is	to 49	The	former	will	also	be	taking	herself	to	be	acting	on	a	ground,	but	she	will not	merely	be	taking	herself	to	be	acting	on	a	ground	–	she	in	fact	will	be	acting on	a	ground. 50	This comes close	an	alternative to	Disjunctivism	about	Grounds that	Dancy (2002,	p.	145,	2008,	pp.	271)	discusses	and	dismisses. 51	To	make	the	view	disjunctivist	in	a	more	interesting	sense,	one	would	have	to include the claim that acting on a ground cannot be conceived of as taking oneself to be acting on a ground plus X,	where X can be spelled out	without already	presupposing	the	notion	of	acting	on	a	ground.	That	is,	the	idea	would have	to	be	that	the	'good'	disjunct	cannot	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	the	'bad' disjunct.	Given	my	purposes,	however,	I	will	not	discuss	this.	Cf.	note	47	above. 107 restrict the	scope	of	acting	for	a	reason to	cases in	which the	agent's relevant beliefs	are	true.	So,	the	idea	is	that	it	is	true	that	only	truths	can	explain	actions, and that	motivating reasons explain actions, and also that	when	we act for a reason,	the	reason	for	which	we	act	is	what	we	believe	–	that	it	is	just	that	when the	relevant	belief	is	false,	what	we	are	doing	is	not	acting	for	a	reason.	Clayton Littlejohn,	for	instance,	introduces	the	following	scenario: Cooper	and	Leo	are	running	down	two	very	similar	hallways	in	two	very similar	houses.	There	is	a	killer	chasing	Cooper	and	he	knows	it.	Leo	is Cooper's non-factive mental duplicate, so he believes there is a killer chasing	him	as	well.	Cooper is in the	epistemically	good	case.	Leo is in the bad case. His belief that there is a killer after him is mistaken. It seems	natural	to	say	that	Cooper's	reason	for	running	down	the	hall	was that	there	was	a	killer	chasing	him.	(Littlejohn,	2012,	p.	146) Littlejohn	asks:	What	should	we	say	about	Leo?	He	rejects	the	suggestion	that we	should	say	that	Leo's	reason	for	running	down	the	hall	was	also	that	there was a killer chasing him. As he sees it, that would commit us to saying that falsehoods	can	explain.	(As	he	puts	it:	it	would	commit	us	to	saying	that	'S	Φ's because P' is non-factive, i.e. does not imply that P, and he argues that the 'linguistic evidence' shows that that cannot be correct.) He also rejects the solution of saying that Leo's reason for running down the hall was that he believed	that	a	killer	was	chasing	him.	That	solution	is	the	one	discussed	above, and	we	saw	why it	makes	no	sense.	He	concludes that	what	we	should	do,	as theorists, is	"deny	...	that	Leo	acted	for	a	reason	and	that this	reason	explains Leo's	actions"	(Littlejohn,	2012,	p.	154). Littlejohn is not alone in holding that figures like Leo (who, as is stipulated,	is	identical	in	all	relevant	respects	to	Carl,	who	is	acting	for	a	reason, 108 save	that	Leo's	relevant	belief	is	false,	whereas	Carl's	relevant	belief	is	true)	are not	acting	for	reasons.	Similar	claims	(though	not	always	arrived	at	through	the same kinds of considerations) are made by Alvarez (2010, pp. 141–147), Bittner	(2001,	p.	114),	and	Mele	(2007,	p.	104). Now,	the	view	that	figures	like	Leo	are	not	acting	for	motivating	reasons sounds	a	lot	like	the	second	of	the	two	options	distinguished	above:	that	figures like counterfactual-Sam are not acting on grounds. However, in order to see why the view that figures like Leo are not acting for reasons is not just an elegant-seeming solution, but that it	makes sense as a solution, the relevant understanding	of	'motivating	reason'	cannot	be	as	ground.	And	so,	as	elegant	as the	solution	seems	(and	maybe	is),	it	is	of	no	help	for	our	problem.	It	will	seem like	a	solution to	our	problem	only for those	who	conflate	normative	reasons that motivate and grounds (something that is easily done if one uses the ambiguous term 'motivating reason').	Why can the relevant	understanding	of the	term	'motivating	reason'	not	be	as	ground?	Remember	what	grounds	are.	In part	II,	I	said	that	something	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	just	in	case	it	motivates an	agent	because	she	takes	it	to	be	a	reason.	And	I	argued	that	propositions	or considerations	are	what	are	best suited to	play that role.	Now, the	difference between	Carl	and	Leo	is	that	in	Carl's	case,	but	not	in	Leo's	case,	the	proposition he	has	in	mind	is	a	truth	or	fact.	But	with	regard	to	the	propositions	they	have in	mind,	there	is	no	difference	between	Carl	and	Leo.	Such	are	the	stipulations in	play.	And	so, there is	no	basis for	denying that if	Carl acts	on	a	ground, so does	Leo;	it	must	be	the	case	that	if	Carl	acts	on	grounds	of	P,	so	does	Leo. That	does	not	mean	that	the	idea	that	figures	like	Leo	are	not	acting	for reasons	does	not	make	any	sense.	To	the	contrary,	I	think	that	that	idea	is	quite correct – given, however, that	motivating reasons (or reasons for which she 109 acted)	are	not	understood	as	grounds,	but,	rather,	as	something	like	normative reasons that motivate (in fact, this seems to be presupposed by our four authors, cf. Alvarez, 2010, p. 144; Bittner, 2001, p. 114; Littlejohn, 2012, pp. 144–5; Mele, 2007, p. 117). For if motivating reasons are understood as normative reasons that	motivate, then it seems	not	much	more than trivially true	that	figures	like	Leo	are	not	acting	for	reasons,	that	is,	that	figures	like	Leo are not motivated to do what they do by normative reasons. For normative reasons	(as	part	I	argued)	are	facts	that	favor	actions.	But	other	than	Carl,	Leo does	not	have	a	fact	in	view,	for	his	relevant	belief	is	mistaken.	There	is	no	killer chasing	him.	So,	whatever	it	is	that	motivates	Leo's	action	cannot	be	a	fact,	and, thus,	cannot	be	a	normative	reason.	And	so	he	is	not	motivated	to	do	what	he does	by	a	normative	reason. I	said	that	the	view	that	false-believing	Sam	is	not	acting	on	a	ground	has prima facie-attractiveness, in that it locates her outside the parameters in which the	problem	can	arise.	But if	we locate true-believing	Sam	inside those parameters, we simply cannot locate false-believing Sam outside them. For what puts true-believing Sam inside those parameters is the mere fact that what	she	believes	plays	a	certain	role,	namely,	that	it	plays	the	role	of	a	ground, and the truth-value of what she believes is simply irrelevant for what she believes	being	able	to	play	that	role. 4.	Giving	up	Explanatorism	About	Grounds If	the	considerations	that	motivate	someone	to	do	something	need	not	be	truths (Propositionalism about Grounds), but if only truths can explain actions (Veridicalism about Explanantia), then Explanatorism about Grounds – the 110 view	that	the	grounds	on	which	we	act	are	what	explain	our	actions	–	cannot	be true. So, what I now am going to explore is the possibility of giving up Explanatorism about Grounds, i.e. give up the claim that grounds themselves are	what	explain	actions. It might seem odd to say that what motivates is not what explains. Saying that	what	motivates is	not	what	explains	might	seem like failing to	do justice	to	the	relevance	of	the	perspective	of	the	agent	within	explanations.	In Dancy's terms, it might seem like "subvert[ing] the purpose of explanation, which	is	to	reveal	the	light	in	which	the	agent	came	to	do	what	he	did."	(Dancy, 2002, p. 97) For while motivation is a first-personal phenomenon, and explaining	a	third-personal	phenomenon,	the	difference	between	the	two	must not be overstated. As has often been observed, the kind of third-personal explanation at issue is an explanation that is essentially tied to the firstpersonal	perspective, in that it displays the agent as	motivated	by something she	takes	to	be	a	reason	(Baier,	1969,	p.	153;	Hieronymi	2011,	422;	Raz,	1975, pp.	18–19;	Wallace,	2003,	p.	433).	However,	giving	up the	claim	that	grounds themselves are	what explain actions	does	not amount to saying that grounds play no role at all in explanations. We can (and should) concede that a satisfactory	explanation	of	S's	Φing	must	bring	to	light	that	P	motivated	S	to	Φ. But	saying	that	is	not	the	same	as	saying	that	P	itself	must	be	what	explains	her Φing.	Grounds	can	figure	or	feature	in	explanations,	without	playing	the	role	of the	explanans.	As	Wayne	Davis	puts	it	at	one	point	(calling	grounds	'reasons'): We	need	to	distinguish	the	claim	that	actions	can	be	explained	by	stating the	reasons	for	which	they	are	performed	from	the	claim	that	the	reasons themselves	are	what	explain	the	action.	...	The	statement	that	my	reason for	saving	was	that	my	son	will	need	money	for	college	does	explain	why 111 I	saved.	But	it	does	not	follow,	and	is	not	true,	that	my	reason	explains my	action.	(Davis,	2005,	p.	57) What	I	want	to	do,	in	this	chapter,	is	to	explore	ways	in	which	one	can	give	up the idea that grounds themselves explain actions, without denying that they play	some	kind	of	role	in	explanations. Note	that	grounds	can	play	a	role	in	an	explanation	('feature'	or	'figure' in	an	explanation)	of	S's	Φing	only	in	a	case	in	which	her	Φing	is	in	fact	done	on some ground. If her Φing is not a Φing that is done on some ground, then obviously,	there	is	no	ground	on	which	she	Φed,	and,	thus,	there	is	no	ground (i.e.	no	consideration	that	plays	the	role	of	a	ground)	that	could	play	any	role whatsoever in an explanation of her	Φing. (Though	mistakenly taking it that her	Φing	was	done	on	some	ground,	we	might	of	course	attempt	an	explanation in	which	supposed	grounds	figure.)	So,	what	we	are	looking	for	is	what	explains S's	Φing	not in	any case in	which she is	Φing, but	only in	a	case in	which	her Φing	is	done	on	some	particular	ground. Note also that in a case in which S Φ's on some particular ground, explaining	her	Φing in	terms	of that	ground	would	seem	to	be	but	one	way in which	we	can	cast	some	kind	of	intelligibility	on	her	Φing.	Given,	that	is,	that	S's Φing	on	grounds	of	P is	compatible	with	her	also,	say,	Φing	with	some	end in view, it would seem that we can cast intelligibility on her Φing not only by revealing	on	what	grounds	she	is	Φing,	but	also	by	revealing	with	what	end	in view	she	is	Φing.52	For	instance,	when	Sam	takes	out	her	umbrella	on	her	way out	and	does	so	on	grounds	of	what	she	believes,	e.g.	that	it	is	raining,	it	might 52	Teleological explanations are discussed (in widely differing ways) in e.g. Davis (2005), Sehon (2005), Smith (2000, chap. 4), Thompson (2008, pt. II), and	Vogler	(2002). 112 also	be	true	of	her	that	she	is	taking	her	umbrella	out	in	order	to	stay	dry.	Thus, we	can	give	an	explanation	of	why	she	takes	out	her	umbrella	not	only	in	terms of	her	ground for	doing	so;	we	can	also	give	an	explanation	of	her	conduct in terms	of	her	end.	While	I	am	happy	to	accept	such	pluralism	about	explanation, it	is	not	what	is	at	issue	here.53	Here,	I	am	focusing	exclusively	on	explanations of	S's	Φing,	in	cases	in	which	S	is	Φing	on	some	particular	ground,	that	are	such as	to	render	her	Φing	intelligible	with	the	help	of	that	ground.	(So	when	I	say that such-and-such is	what renders S's	Φing intelligible, I am	not saying that there is	nothing	else that	renders	her	Φing intelligible. I	am just	putting	aside ways	of	rendering	intelligible	in	which	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	does	not figure.) I	will	start	out	by	introducing	three	answers	one	finds	in	the	literature: Psychologism about Explanantia, Motivationalism about Explanantia, and Reasonism	about	Explanantia. I	will then	show that there	are two	complaints that	can	be	made	against	Psychologism	about	Explanantia:	the	Incompleteness Complaint and the Insufficiency Complaint. I will then argue that while Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	avoids	the	Insufficiency	Complaint,	it	can	be targeted by the Incompleteness Complaint, and that while Reasonism about Explanantia avoids the Incompleteness Complaint, it can be targeted by the Insufficiency	Complaint.	Based	on	that, I	will	suggest	an	account	–	Disjunctive Motivationalism about Explanantia – that combines the respective virtues of Motivationalism about Explanantia and Reasonism about Explanantia, while avoiding their respective vices. I will finish by considering some objections against	that	account. 53	For	an	illuminating	account	of	such	plurality,	cf.	Sandis	(2012,	chap.	5). 113 4.1	Three	Accounts In the literature, we find (at least) three accounts of action-explanation that deny Explanatorism about Grounds, while nevertheless allowing grounds to play	a	role	in	explanations. (a) Psychologism	About Explanantia.	Dancy,	we saw,	maintains that the	grounds	on	which someone	acts are	what	explain	her	action.	Pace	Dancy, Hyman	writes: Stating	his	ground	–	the	thing	believed	–	is	a	way	of	explaining	why	he did	it,	and	his	ground	need	not	be	a	fact.	But	when	we	explain	an	act	in this	way,	the	explanans	is	not	the	ground,	the	thing	believed,	but	that	he believed	it	–	and	this,	by	hypothesis,	is	a	fact.	(Hyman,	2015,	p.	149) This is	an	expression	of the first	account	of	explanantia I	want	to introduce.54 According	to	that	view, (Psychologism	about	Explanantia)	what	explains	why	S	Φs, in	a	case	in which	S	Φ's	on	grounds	of	P,	is	the	fact	that	S	believes	that	P. The	idea	is	that	belief-facts	explain	actions	in	that	they	reveal	the	consideration that	played the role	of the	ground	on	which the	agent	performed that action. That is, according to	Psychologism	about	Explanantia, the fact that S	believes that P renders her Φing intelligible in that it reveals what consideration (namely,	P)	played	the	role	of	the	ground	for	which	S	Φed.	As	Raz	put	it	in	one of	his	early	contributions: 54	Hyman	is	a	Psychologist	about	Explanantia	only	in	that	he	takes	it	that	belieffacts	can	explain	actions.	But,	as	we	will	see	below,	he	also	takes	it	that	reasons can explain actions. This suggests a disjunctivist account of sorts about explanantia.	For	this,	see	below. 114 Reasons are those facts by	which behaviour should be guided and	we refer to the agent's belief in reasons in explaining intentional action because its peculiar feature is that it is an attempt, successful or otherwise,	to	be	guided	by	reason.	(Raz,	1978,	p.	4) As I understand him, Raz says here that belief-facts explain actions because they show us what (maybe merely supposed) reason guided, i.e. rationally motivated,	the	agent. Note that Psychologism about Explanantia is not Psychologism about Grounds. The Psychologist about Explanantia is someone who subscribes to Propositionalism	about	Grounds	and	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia,	and,	thus, denies Explanatorism about Grounds. But if one denies Explanatorism about Grounds,	subscribing	to	Psychologism	about	Explanantia	is	not	tantamount	to	a subscribing	to	Psychologism	about	Grounds.55 Also, Psychologism about Explanantia is not the view that belief-facts explain actions in that they reveal the action to be a causal effect of the respective psychological state.56	As we saw above, the view that actions are causal	effects	of	psychological	states	is	a	reductive	view	about	what	it	is	to	act on	a	ground.	But	Psychologism	about	Explanantia	is	a	view	about	what	explains a	particular	action	in	a	way	that	reveals	it	to	be	done	on	some	particular	ground. Psychologism	about	Explanantia	is	compatible	with	giving	a	reductive	account of	acting	on	a	ground,	but	it	is	not	the	same	view.	Moreover,	also	someone	who 55	Dancy	seems	to	take	Psychologism	about	Explanantia	to	fail	because	he	takes Psychologism	about	Grounds	to	be	false.	That	makes	sense	only	if	he	subscribes to	Explanatorism	about	Grounds. 56	Though it	often	goes	hand-in-hand	with	that	view,	cf.	Smith	(2000).	Cf.	also the	remarks	I	made	in	II.2.1. 115 denies that	a	reductive	account	of	acting	on	a	ground is forthcoming	can	be	a Psychologist	about	Explanantia. I will discuss Psychologism about Explanantia as the view that facts about beliefs whose content specifies the agent's ground explain actions, for this is at the heart of Psychologism about Explanantia. Psychologists about Explanantia	can	disagree	among	themselves	about	whether	other	psychological facts	–	like	facts	about	the	agent's	desires	or	normative	beliefs	–	are	also	part	of the explanans. For my purposes, however, I can ignore this additional complication. Psychologism	about	Explanantia, in	one	or	another form, is	adhered to by, e.g., Lenman (2011), Raz (1978), Smith (2000),	Wallace (2003). I do not think that it is too bold to say that Psychologism about Explanantia is something	like	the	standard	view,	to	the	extent	that	there	is	such	a	thing.	As	I said above (II.2.3), Psychologism about Explanantia, together with the assumption that	motivators	are	explanantia,	generates the	Psychologistic	side of	the	Psychologism-Debate	about	so-called	motivating	reasons. (b) Motivationalism About Explanantia. Distinct from	Psychologism about	Explanantia	is	the	view	that (Motivationalism	about	Explanantia)	what	explains	why	S	Φs, in	a	case in which S Φs on grounds of P, is the fact that P plays the role of a ground	on	which	S	Φs. Motivationalism about Explanantia and	Psychologism about Explanantia both hold	that	the	explanans	is	a	fact	about	the	agent.	But	the	former	is	distinct	from the latter, in that it holds that the relevant agential fact is not	merely a fact about the agent having the relevant consideration in	mind, but rather, a fact 116 about,	as	one	might	put	it,	the	agent's	motivational	economy,	specifically,	a	fact about the relevant consideration being motivationally operative; hence, the name	I	give	the	view. Here is another way of putting the difference: We can conceive of motivation in terms of a three-place relation whose relata are an agent, a consideration,	and	an	action.	For	when	an	agent is	motivated, there is	always something that she is motivated to do (an action), and there is always something that motivates her (a consideration). Now, according to Psychologism	about	Explanantia,	what	figures	in	the	explanans	are	two	of	those relata:	the	agent	and	the	relevant	consideration,	the	latter	as	being	believed	by the former. But according to Motivationalism about Explanantia, it is the relation as a whole that comprises the explanans. The explanans, that is, is conceived of as the fact that the agent is motivated to perform a particular action	by	a	particular	consideration. Some	such	view	can	be	found	in	Hieronymi	(2011),	Sandis	(2012,	2013),	and	– in a notable shift away from his previously-held view – in Dancy (2014). At least,	this	is	the	view	I	glean	from	the	following	quotations:57 We can say that what explains the action is that it was done for the reason	that	p.	(Dancy,	2014,	p.	90;	my	emphasis) We explain actions by citing one or more agential reasons ... But the explanation	is	not	done	by	the	reason	cited.	What	is	stated	(implicitly	or explicitly)	is	not	the	thing	that	the	agent	believed,	rather,	the	purported fact	that	the	person	acted	upon	that	belief.	...	[W]hat	does	the	explaining 57	According	to	the	terminological	conventions	introduced	in	part	II,	we	should, in the following three quotations, read 'reason' as 'ground'. For when our authors	are	talking	about	'reasons',	what	they	are	talking	about	are	grounds. 117 is [...] the implied truth that they acted upon the belief (Sandis 2012, 107–108).58 I	propose	...	that	we	explain	an	event	that	is	an	action	done	for	reasons by appealing to the fact that the agent took certain considerations to settle	the	question	of	whether	to	act	in	some	way,	therein	intended	so	to act,	and	successfully	executed	that	intention	in	action.	I	suggest	that	this complex fact ... explains the action by giving the agent's reason for acting.	(Hieronymi,	2011,	p.	421) Note	that	I	neither	seek	to	show	that	those	three	authors	are	defending	one	and the	same	claim,	nor	that	that	claim	is	nothing	other	than	Motivationalism	about Explanantia. I take their respective remarks to be inspirational for Motivationalism	about	Explanantia,	without	committing	myself	to	the	view	that Motivationalism about Explanantia is a completely	accurate representation of their	views. (c) Reasonism About Explanantia. Both Motivationalism about Explanantia and Psychologism about Explanantia hold that the notion of a ground is distinct from the	notion of the explanans.	The third view I	want to consider	agrees.	But	other	than	the	first	two	views,	it	is	the	view	that	while	the respective	notions	are	distinct,	there	can	be	conditions	under	which	instances	of the former	notion can be identical	with instances of the latter notion, that is, that	there	can	be	conditions	under	which	what	explains	the	action	is identical with	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	Specifically,	it	is	the	view	that	under	the 58	'Belief'	is	to	be	understood	in	the	object-sense,	not	in	the	state-sense.	That	is, when Sandis talks about someone "acting upon a belief", he is talking about someone	acting	upon	what	she	believes,	and	not	about	someone	acting	upon	her so	believing. 118 condition that in Φing on grounds of P, S is Φing for a normative reason constituted	by	the	fact	that	P,	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	(which	in	such	a case is	a	normative	reason	constituted	by the fact that	P) is	what	explains	S's Φing.59	Here	is	Heuer: [W]hen	an	agent	acts	for	a	(specific)	reason	that	very	reason	is	also	the explanation	(or	at	least	part	of	the	explanation)	of	why	she	did	what	she did.	Normative	or	justificatory	reasons	and	explanatory	reasons	are	the same reasons in such a case, and not different kinds of reasons altogether.	(Heuer,	2004,	p.	45) As this is the view that under a certain condition, normative reasons themselves	can	explain,	I	call	it	'Reasonism	about	Explanantia': (Reasonism	about	Explanatia)	In	a	case	in	which	S's	Φing	on	grounds	of consideration	P	constitutes	a	Φing	in	appreciation	of	a	reason	for	her	to Φ,	what	explains	her	Φing	is	that	very	reason. Reasonists about Explanantia include Alvarez (2010), Bittner (2001), Heuer (2004),	Hyman	(2015),	Raz	(2011d),	Stout	(2009),	Stoutland	(2007). As	such,	Reasonism	about	Explanantia is	much	narrower in	scope	than Psychologism about Explanantia and	Motivationalism about Explanantia. The latter	two	talk	about	all	cases	in	which	S	Φs	on	grounds	of	a	consideration,	the former	restricts	itself	to	cases	in	which	S's	Φing	on	grounds	of	a	consideration constitutes	a	case	in	which	she	is	Φing	in	appreciation	of	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ. So,	to	compete	with	the	former	two	views,	the	Reasonist	about	Explanantia	has 59	In	II.1.1,	I	said	that	I	will	have	to	leave	it	open	what	the	conditions	are	under which	S's	Φing	on	grounds	of	P	counts	as	her	Φing	in	response	to	a	normative reason	constituted	by	the	fact	that	P.	A	plausible	necessary	condition,	however, is	that	S	knows	that	P	(cf.	Hornsby,	2008;	Littlejohn,	2012,	chap.	4.5;	McDowell, 2013). 119 to be able to say something about the other kinds of cases too, the kinds of cases	in	which	S's	Φing	on	grounds	of	a	consideration	is	just	that,	and	nothing more. Reasonism is, thus, naturally aligned with a disjunctive account of explanatia, according to which what plays the role of the explanans differs, depending on the truth-value of the relevant consideration. Specifically, Reasonism about Explanatia is naturally aligned with the view that Psychologism	about	Explanantia is the correct	view for the cases that it itself does	not	cover.60	As	for	instance	Alvarez	puts	it,	there	are,	on	the	one	hand, explanations	whose	explanantia	are	the	agent's	reasons	for	acting,61 and,	on	the	other	hand, explanations	whose	explanantia	are	psychological	facts	about	the	agent ...	which,	to	repeat,	are	not	the	agent's	reason	for	acting	(Alvarez,	2010, p.	168;	cf.	also	Hyman,	2015,	chap.	6) This	gives	us	the	view	that (Disjunctivism	about	Explanantia)	what	explains	why	S	Φs, in	a	case	in which S Φ's on grounds of P, is either P, or that S believes that P; depending on	whether S's Φing on grounds of P constitutes a case in which	S	Φs	in	appreciation	of	a	normative	reason	or	not. 60	I	merely	say	"naturally	aligned",	as	not	all	Reasonists	would	agree	that	that	is the correct thing to say. Some (in keeping with one understanding of Disjunctivism) would simply refuse to say anything positive about the 'bad' cases,	cf.	e.g.	Bittner	(2001,	p.	117). 61	Remember,	for	Alvarez,	someone	acts	for	a	reason	only	if	what	motivates	her is	a	reason, i.e.	a fact	that	favors	(see	II.2.1	and	III.3.2).	Often,	I	had	to	ask	the reader to read 'reason' as 'ground', as	many	use the term 'reason'	when they talk about grounds. But Alvarez uses the term 'reason' only when she talks about reasons. When she talks about grounds, she calls them 'apparent reasons',	as	they	are	not	reasons,	but	to	the	agent	appear	to	be	reasons. 120 Note	that	a	Disjunctivist	about	Explanantia	is	not	a	Disjunctivist	about	Grounds. According to the Disjunctivist about Explanantia, what plays the role of a ground	in	the	good	and	the	bad	case	is	the	same	consideration;	it	is	just	that	in the	good	case,	but	not	in	the	bad	case,	it	is	the	same	thing	that	plays	the	role	of	a ground	and	the	role	of	an	explanans.	In	what	follows,	I	will	focus,	first,	just	on Reasonism about Explanantia. I will return to a disjunctive conception of explanantia	in	III.4.4. 4.2	Problems	for	Psychologism	About	Explanantia Psychologism	about	Explanantia	takes	it	that	psychological	facts	render	actions intelligible as done on a ground, insofar as they bring to light the relevant consideration,	i.e.	the	consideration	that	motivated	S	to	Φ	because	she	took	it	to be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ;	or	the	consideration	that	rationally	motivated	her,	as	I also put it. However, Psychologism about Explanantia suffers from two problems,	or	shortcomings.	First,	belief-facts	can	indeed	be	such	as	to	bring	to light	the	relevant	consideration	that	rationally	motivated	S	to	Φ.	But	when	they do,	they	do	not	bring	the	relevant	consideration	to	light	as	a	rational	motivator, i.e.	as	the	consideration	that	played	the	role	of	a	ground;	they	merely	bring	it	to light	as	the	content	of	a	belief.	So,	such	facts	fail	to	be	able	to	display	the	agent as	acting on grounds	of the consideration they	bring to light, they	only show that	it	is	possible	that	that	consideration	was	the	one	she	acted	on.	Secondly,	the idea	of	a	believed	consideration	motivating	an	agent	to	act	is	dependent	on	the idea of a reason motivating an agent to act. But the Psychologist about Explanantia	does	not	have	in	view	the	idea	that	reasons	themselves	can	figure	in 121 explanantia. I will discuss these two problems for Psychologism about Explanantia	in	reverse	order. (a) The Incompleteness Complaint. According to the Psychologist about	Explanantia,	when	S	Φ's	on	grounds	of	P,	what	explains	her	Φing	is	the fact	that	S	believes	that	P.	For	the	fact	that	S	believes	that	P	brings	to	light	that	S had	P	in	mind,	and	P	is	the	consideration	that	played	the	role	of	a	ground.	So, according to the Psychologist about Explanantia (and pace Dancy), believed considerations are not themselves explanantia. Rather, according to the Psychologist	about	Explanantia,	believed	considerations	figure	in	explanantia. Now,	in	part	II,	I	said	that	believed	considerations	can	motivate	an	agent to act only if, and because, she takes	what she believes to be a fact that is a reason for her to so act. This has an interesting consequence: For if believed considerations	motivate	only	if,	and	because,	they	are	taken	to	be	facts	that	are reasons, it follows that	whatever	motivational power	believed considerations have is dependent on the motivational power of reasons. For given that believed considerations motivate only if, and because, they are taken to be reasons, it follows that if reasons could not motivate, then believed considerations	taken	to	be	reasons	could	not	motivate	either.	As	Raz	nicely	puts it: [B]eliefs in the existence of reasons can ... motivate .... But the motivating	power	of	these	beliefs	exists	in	the	shadow	of	the	motivating power	of reasons. (Raz, 2011d, pp. 33–34; cf. also	Hornsby, 2008, and McDowell,	2013) If	believed	considerations	can	motivate	only if reasons	can	motivate, then	the idea	of	believed	considerations	motivating	agents	is	not	a	self-standing	idea,	but 122 dependent	on	the	idea	of	reasons	motivating	agents.	And,	thus, it	seems	that	a theory	of	explanantia	that	focuses	exclusively	on	believed	considerations	–	like Psychologism	about	Explanantia	–	misses	out	on	something	it	should	not	miss out	on. First, if reasons themselves	can	motivate, then	reasons themselves	can figure in	explanantia	(Heuer,	2004;	Raz,	2011d;	Williams,	1980).	According	to Psychologism	about	Explanantia,	however,	what	figures	in	explanantia	are	only ever	believed	considerations.	And	although	believed	considerations, if they	are true,	can	be	reasons,	they	do	not	figure	in	the	Psychologist	about	Explanantia's explanations	as	reasons.	So	the	Psychologist	about	Explanantia	seems	to	fail	to have	an	existing	type	of	explanantia	in	view. Secondly, if	believed	considerations	can	motivate	only	because	reasons can	motivate, then the idea	of an explanans in	which	believed considerations figure is	dependent	on	an	understanding	of the idea	of	an	explanans in	which reasons themselves figure.	Psychologism	about	Explanantia,	however, focuses exclusively	on	the	idea	of	an	explanans	in	which	believed	considerations	figure. And	so	the	Psychologist	about	Explanantia	seems	to	not	only	fail	to	have	a	type of	explanantia	in	view.	She	seems	to	fail	to	have	the	type	of	explanantia	in	view on	which the type	of explanantia that she	does	have in	view is	dependent on. For these two reasons, Psychologism about Explanantia seems to be an incomplete	account	of	explanantia. (b) The Insufficiency Complaint. According to Psychologism about Explanantia, facts about the agent's beliefs explain her actions, in that those facts	bring to light the consideration that	played the role of a ground. If, say, Peter	kept	to	the	edge	of	the	pond	on	grounds	of	the	consideration	that	the	ice 123 in the middle was too thin to support his weight, then – so holds the Psychologist about Explanantia – the fact that he believes that the ice in the middle is too thin explains his keeping to the edge, in that it reveals the consideration	that	played	the	role	of	a	ground. Yet do belief-facts really manage to explain actions? Consider the following situation: Sam picks up her umbrella on her way out. You are wondering	why	she	is	doing	that.	And	a	passing	Psychologist	about	Explanantia, in an attempt to explain to you	why	Sam	picks	up	her	umbrella, informs	you that	Sam	believes	that	it	is	raining.	It	might	very	well	seem	that	you	now	know why Sam	picked	up	her umbrella. For it is not unusual for people to pick up their	umbrellas	on	grounds	of	considerations	to	the	effect	that	it	is	raining.	And so,	you	might think, that is	exactly	why	Sam	is	picking	up	her	umbrella.	Now, however, a second Psychologist about Explanantia arrives on the scene, informing	you	that	Sam	believes	that	Peter	is	out	to	steal	her	precious	umbrella. That	should	make	you	hesitate.	For	it	is	true	that	it	is	not	unusual	for	people	to pick up their umbrellas on grounds of considerations to the effect that it is raining.	But	it	is	also	true	that	it	is	not	unusual	for	people	to	take	those	of	their belongings	with	them	which	they	fear	would	otherwise	be	stolen.	So,	given	that Sam	not only believes that it is raining, but also believes that Peter is out to steal	her	precious	umbrella, it	might just	as	well	be	that	the	ground	on	which she picks up her umbrella on her way out is that Peter is out to steal her precious	umbrella,	as	it	might	be	that	she	picks	up	her	umbrella	on	the	grounds that	it	is	raining.	Which	belief-fact	explains	why	Sam	takes	out	her	umbrella?	Is it	the	fact	that	Sam	believes	that	it	is	raining?	Or	the	fact	that	Sam	believes	that Peter	is	out	to	steal	her	precious	umbrella?	Let	us	stipulate	that	Sam's	ground for	picking	up	her	umbrella	is	(for	once!)	not	that	it	is	raining,	but	rather,	that 124 Peter is out to steal	her	precious	umbrella.	Does that	make the fact that Sam believes that Peter is out to steal her precious umbrella any better as explanans?	No,	it	does	not.	For	coming	to	see	that	Sam	believes	that	Peter	is	out to steal her precious umbrella is not coming to see that Sam's ground for picking up her umbrella is that Peter is out to steal her umbrella. It is only coming to see that that could be Sam's ground (a similar point is made by Sandis,	2012,	pp.	48–50).62 This little story, I believe, brings out a problem for the Psychologist about Explanantia. But wherein exactly does the problem lie? In part II, I distinguished	between	(i)	the	role	of	a	ground,	and	(ii)	what	plays	the	role	of	a ground.	It	is	with	the	help	of	that	distinction	that	we	can	pinpoint	the	problem that	our	little	story	brings	out.	I	stipulated	that	Sam's	ground	for	picking	up	her umbrella is that	Peter is	out to steal	her	precious	umbrella.	Nevertheless, the fact	that	Sam	believes	that	Peter	is	out	to	steal	her	precious	umbrella	does	not explain	why	Sam	picked	up	her	umbrella.	Why	not?	The	fact	that	Sam	believes that	Peter	is	out	to	steal	her	umbrella	brings	into	focus	the	consideration	that	in fact played the role of a ground. But it does not bring it into view as consideration that played the role of a ground. Rather, it brings it into view merely	as	believed	consideration.	That	is	why,	upon	learning	that	Sam	believes that Peter is out to steal her umbrella, you merely learn that Sam was in a 62	Above, I said that explanations are such as to render actions intelligible. Sandis	however	would	say that	belief-facts	do	not	explain	actions,	but	merely render them intelligible. But he is employing a different sense of the term 'intelligible'.	To	render	an	action	intelligible,	in	his	usage	of	the	term,	is	to	show that, as the agent saw it, there is a reason to	do	what she	does, and, thus, to show	that	and	why it	would	make	sense for the	agent to	perform	that	action, but it is	not to say that that supposed reason	was	her	ground, i.e. it is	not to explain	her	action. 125 position	to	act	on	that	consideration,	that	is,	that	she	might	have	acted	upon	that consideration,	but	not	whether that	consideration	was the	one	she	did in fact act	upon.	Even if the consideration that the	belief-fact	brings into	view is the one	that	the	agent	in	fact	acted	on,	as	the	belief-fact	does	not	present	it	as	such, the	belief-fact	will	only	ever	inform	you	about	what	the	agent's	ground	could	be, but	not	about	what	it	is	–	even	if	what	it	informs	you	about	happens	to	be	her ground. I	will	call	this	the	Problem	of	Insufficiency,	as	the	problem	is	that	the	fact that	S	believes	that	P	is	insufficient	for	casting	on	her	Φing	the	intelligibility	of being	done	on	the	ground	that	P. 4.3	Moving	Beyond	Psychologism	About	Explanantia I have just argued that there are two complaints that can be made against Psychologism	about	Explanantia:	what I called the Incompleteness	Complaint and	the	Insufficiency	Complaint. The Incompleteness Complaint is the complaint that the Psychologist about	Explanantia	fails	to	take	into	account	that	facts	that	constitute	normative reasons can play a role in action-explanations, namely, in cases in	which the action is done in appreciation of a normative reason to so act. Now, the Reasonist about Explanantia holds that under a certain condition, the considerations on grounds of which the agent acts are suited to explain her action,	namely,	under	the	condition	that	they	are	facts	that	she	appreciates	as normative reasons. Thereby, she makes room for the idea that facts that constitute	normative	reasons	can	play	a	role	in	action-explanations,	and,	thus, avoids the first complaint.	However, in holding that under the condition that 126 the considerations on grounds of which someone acts are facts that she appreciates	as	normative reasons, those	facts	themselves are	what	explain	her action, she does not avoid the second complaint. Remember, the second complaint	was that the fact that S believes that P is not suited to explain S's Φing	in	a	case	in	which	she	Φ's	on	grounds	of	P,	because	while	it	specifies	what consideration played the role of her ground, it does not specify that consideration	as	playing	the	role	of	a	ground,	and	thereby	merely	displays	S	as being in	a	position to act on grounds of P, but does not display her as in fact acting	on	grounds	of	P.	The	suggestion	that	under	certain	conditions,	facts	that constitute normative reasons can explain actions fails on the same count. Merely specifying a reason there is for S to Φ shows us that things were normatively	speaking	such	that	S	could	act	for	that	reason,	but	does	not	display S	as in fact	acting in	response to,	or in	appreciation	of, that	reason.	Even in	a case	in	which	S	Φs	in	response	to	a	normative	reason,	what	explains	her	Φing	is not the	normative reason, but the fact that that normative reason	played the role	of	a	ground	in	S's	motivational	economy.	So,	Reasonism	about	Explanantia avoids the Incompleteness Complaint that plagues Psychologism about Explanantia, but like Psychologism about Explanantia, it is a target of the Insufficiency	Complaint. The converse is true of Motivationalism about Explanantia. The Motivationalist about Explanantia takes seriously the idea that the facts that explain	are	not	just	facts	that	specify	what	the	relevant	consideration	was,	but facts about those considerations playing the role of a ground. But like the Psychologist about Explanantia, the	Motivationalist about Explanantia fails to make	room	for	the	idea	that	reasons	themselves	can	figure	in	the	explanantia. So,	while the	Motivationalist about Explanantia avoids the second complaint, 127 the first complaint can be directed against her, just as much as it can be directed	against	the	Psychologist	about	Explanantia. The upshot is that while both	Motivationalism about Explanantia and Reasonism about Explanantia are in better shape than Psychologism about Explanantia,	neither	of	them	is	completely	satisfactory. 4.4	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	About	Explanantia So,	both	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	and	Reasonism	about	Explanantia are	in	a	better	shape	than	Psychologism	about	Explanantia,	but	neither	of	them are	completely	satisfactory.	Luckily,	there	is	a	solution	at	hand:	We	can	modify Motivationalism about Explanantia in a way that avoids the Incompleteness Complaint;	or,	what	in	the	end	amounts	to	the	same,	we	can	modify	Reasonism about	Explanantia	in	a	way	that	avoids	the	Insufficiency	Complaint. Call cases in	which S's Φing on grounds of P is a case of her	Φing in appreciation	of	a	normative	reason	for	her	to	Φ	that	is	constituted	by	the	fact that	P	'good	cases';	and	call	cases	in	which	S's	Φing	on	grounds	of	P	is	merely	a case of her	Φing on grounds of the consideration that P, 'bad cases'.	We can modify Motivationalism about Explanantia in a way that avoids the Incompleteness Complaint by going Disjunctivist. According to the Motivationalist about	Explanantia, good cases and	bad cases are explained in terms	of	the	same	kind	of	motivation-fact,	namely,	in	terms	of	the	fact	that	what the	agent	believed,	i.e.	P,	was	what	played	the	role	of	her	ground.	In	saying	that, the	Motivationalist	about	Explanantia	does	not	make	room	for	the	idea	that	as the	good	case	differs from	the	bad	case, in that in the	good	case,	what	played the	role	of the	agent's	ground	was	a	normative	reason, this	normative	reason 128 itself	can	figure	in	the	explanation.	Giving	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	a disjunctive rendering amounts to saying that there is	more than one kind of motivation-fact. Specifically, it amounts to saying that we should distinguish between (a) the	motivation-fact that something the agent believed was what played	the	role	of	her	ground	(call	that	an	'epistemic	motivation-fact'),	and	(b) the motivation-fact that a normative reason was what played the role of a ground (call that	a 'normative	motivation-fact').	Note that (b) implies (a),	but not vice versa. That is, also the good case can be explained in terms of an epistemic	motivation-fact. It is just that it can	also	be	explained in terms	of	a normative	motivation-fact.	By introducing	normative	motivation-facts,	we	can make	room	for	the	idea	that	as	the	good	case	differs	from	the	bad	case,	in	that in the	good	case,	what	played the	role	of the	agent's	ground	was	a	normative reason,	this	normative	reason	itself	can	figure	in	the	explanation. Now, saying that in good cases, the fact that explains is the fact that a certain normative reason plays the role of a ground (i.e. that the fact that explains is a normative motivation-fact) is just what the Reasonist about Explanantia	should	say, if she takes the Insufficiency	Complaint seriously	and revises her account accordingly. Remember, Reasonism about Explanantia is the	view	that	in	good	cases,	what	explains	actions	are	normative	reasons.	This view is problematic, I said, because merely pointing out that there is a normative reason for the	agent to	do	what she	does is	not sufficient to show that in acting as she did, she responded to that reason. But we can modify Reasonism about Explanantia in a way that avoids the second complaint by saying	that	what	explains	S's	Φing, in	a	good	case, is	not	that	reason	itself,	but the fact that that reason played the role of a ground for S (i.e. a normative motivation-fact). We can put it like this: the truth in Reasonism about 129 Explanantia is that in good cases, normative reasons can play a role in explanations. That truth is occluded, however, if one understands that as meaning	that	reasons	themselves	are	what	explain	the	action.	According	to	the suggested	revision,	what	explains	the	action,	in	good	cases, is	the	fact	that	the reason	in	appreciation	of	which	the	agent	acts	plays	the	role	of	a	ground. I	will	call	the	variant	of	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	that	respects the truth in Reasonism about Explanantia, i.e. that respects that normative reasons can play a role in explanations, 'Disjunctive Motivationalism about Explanantia': (Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia)	what	explains	S's	Φing, in	a	case	in	which	she	Φs	on	grounds	of	P,	is	either	(in	both	the	good	and the bad case) an epistemic motivation-fact, or (in the good case) a normative	motivation-fact. Take	Sam.	On	her	way	out,	she	picks	up	an	umbrella.	What	motivates	her	to	do so	is	what	she	believes,	namely,	that	it	is	raining.	Now,	according	to	Disjunctive Motivationalism	about	Explanantia,	regardless	of	whether	what	she	believes	is	a fact	that	is	a	reason	for	her	to	pick	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out,	the	fact	that renders	her	picking	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out intelligible is	the	fact	that what she believes, namely, that it is raining, plays the role of her ground. However,	if	what	she	relevantly	believes	is	a	fact	that	is	a	reason	for	her	to	pick up an umbrella on her way out, then we can also render her picking up an umbrella	on	her	way	out intelligible in terms	of the fact that the	reason there was	for	her	to	pick	up	an	umbrella	played	the	role	of	her	ground,	and	thereby portray	her	not	only	as	acting	in	a	way	that	is	rationally	motivated,	but	also	as rationally	motivated	by	reasons. 130 Disjunctive Motivationalism about Explanantia is superior to Psychologism about Explanantia in that it avoids both the Incompleteness Complaint and Insufficiency Complaint. It is superior to (unrevised) Motivationalism about Explanantia, in that it avoids the Incompleteness Complaint.	It	is	also	superior	to	Reasonism	about	Explanantia	in	that	it	avoids the Insufficiency Complaint. Thus, I suggest that Disjunctive Motivationalism about	Explanantia	is	the	theory	that	one	should	hold	if	one	wants	to	hold	onto both	Non-Factivism	about	Grounds	and	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia. 4.5	Replies	to	Some	Objections I	want	to	finish	by	discussing	and	dismissing	some	objections	and	worries.	The first three worries are directed against the Motivationalistic aspect of Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	(a-c).	The	fourth	one	is	directed against the Reasonist aspect (d). I will finish by considering whether the objections I formulated against some other disjunctivist theories considered above	can	be	used	against	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	(e). (a) The first objection I want to discuss is directed against the Motivationalist aspect	of	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia.	Take the	case	in	which	Sam	takes	out	an	umbrella	on	grounds	of	what	she	believes, namely,	that	it	is	raining.	According	to	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia,	what explains	Sam's taking	out	an	umbrella is the	motivation-fact that the	believed consideration	'that	it	is	raining'	played	the	role	of	a	ground. But	saying	that	what	explains	why	Sam	takes	out	an	umbrella	is	that	the consideration	'that	it	is	raining'	played	the	role	of	a	ground	seems	to	amount	to 131 saying that	what	explains	her taking	out	an	umbrella is that she takes	out	an umbrella	on	grounds	of the	consideration 'that it is raining',	or schematically, that (1) what	explains	S's	Φing	is	the	fact	that	S	is	Φing	on	grounds	of	P. Here is a first	worry about (1). Above (II.1.5), I said that that, at least under certain	conditions, (2) S	is	Φing	on	grounds	of	P is	tantamount	to (3) S	is	Φing	because	P. But	surely, (4) Y	is	what	explains	X is	also	tantamount	to (5) X	because	Y. So,	it	would	seem	that	another	way	of	putting	(1)	is	the	paradoxical-looking: (6) S	is	Φing	because	(S	is	Φing	because	P) However,	we	get	this	result	only	if	the	first	'because'	(the	one	that	also	figures in 5) and the second 'because' (the one that also figures in 3) are to be interpreted in the same way. But I have already established that grounds cannot	be	explanantia.	And	so,	the	propositional	component	in	(2)	specifies	the ground on which S Φ's, or what it is that motivates S to Φ, and not the explanans	of	her	Φing.	But if (3) is tantamount	to	(2), then it follows	that the 'because'	in	(3)	is	not	to	be	understood	as	a	'because'	of	explanation	of	the	kind that	figures	in	(5).	It	is	to	be	understood	as	a	'because'	of	motivation.	That	is,	(2) tells	us	that	P	was	what	rationally	motivated	S	to	Φ.	It	does	not	tell	us	that	P	is what	explains	S's	Φing.	And	if	(3)	is	tantamount	to	(2),	then	the	'because'	in	(3) relates S's Φing and P as	what	motivates and	what is	motivated, and not as 132 explanans and explanandum. Therefore, (6) is to be understood as the nonparadoxial (7) S	is	Φing	becauseexplanantion	(S	is	Φing	becausemotivation	P). Let me note, however, that (7) is an analysis of action-explanations. For of course, in everyday discourse, we do not express ourselves in such a circumspect	manner.	In	everyday	discourse,	we	can	say	things	like (8) "Sam	is	taking	out	her	umbrella	because	it	is	raining" in	an	explanatory	spirit.	Of	course,	we	do	not	have	to	say (9) "Sam is taking out her umbrella becauseexplanantion she is taking out her	umbrella	becausemotivation	it	is	raining" when we attempt to explain why Sam is taking out an umbrella. But the Motivationalist about Explanantia does not insist otherwise. All she holds is that	(9)	captures	the	underlying	structure	of	(8). (b)	Despite	this	first	clarification,	there	might	still	be	worries	about	the view	that	what	explains	S's	Φing	is	the	fact	that	S	is	Φing	on	grounds	of	P,	e.g. that (1) what explains why Sam buys some potatoes is that Sam buys some potatoes	on	the	ground	that	they	are	on	special	offer. At	one	point,	for	instance,	Dancy	writes	that	he	considered	"[the]	possibility	... that	the	explanans	of	his	Φ-ing	is	'his	reason	for	Φ-ing	was	that	p'."	(Remember that	according	to	our	convention, 'reason'	must	here	be	read	as 'ground'.)	But he	says	that	'his	reason	for	Φ-ing	was	that	p' cannot	be	the	explanans,	because	it	contains	the	explanandum,	his	Φ-ing. After	all, 'his	reason for	Φ-ing	was that	p' is	equivalent to 'he	Φ-ed for 133 the	reason	that	p',	which	contains	his	Φ-ing	as	a	part.	(Dancy,	2003b,	pp. 480–1) The	worry, that is, is that (1) is circular, in that	what is to be explained also figures in	what explains, and thus remains unexplained. To see the problem, consider	the	following	putative	explanation: (2) What explains why Sam buys some potatoes is that she buys some potatoes	and	the	moon	is	made	of	cheese. (2)	is	clearly	problematic.	For	contrary	to	what	it	purports,	(2)	does	not	explain why	Sam	buys	some	potatoes. It simply	repeats that she	buys	some	potatoes. But	is	(1)	really	like	(2)?	It	is	true	that	in	(1),	just	like	in	(2),	Sam's	buying	some potatoes	figures	both	in	the	explanans	and	the	explanandum.	But	the	problem with (2)	does	not seem to	be the	mere fact that Sam's	buying some	potatoes figures both in the explanans and the explanandum. The problem with (2) seems	to	be	that	the	explanans	has	the	form	of	a	conjunction,	that	is,	that	what additionally	figures	in	the	explanans,	besides	Sam's	buying	some	potatoes,	is	in no	way	related	to	Sam's	buying	some	potatoes.	In	general,	we	cannot	explain	P by	stating	some	conjunction	in	which	P	figures.	In	(1),	however,	the	explanans has the form not of a conjunction, but of a relation; specifically, a relation between	action-motivator	and	motivated	action,	or	between	ground	and	action done	on that	ground.	So, the	explanans is such	as to	reveal the	action to	be	a relata	of	some	determinate	motivation-relation.	And	so,	other	than	(2),	(1)	does explain	why Sam buys some potatoes, namely, in that it displays her buying some	potatoes	as	motivated	by	something	she	believes. (c)	It is	plausible	that	when	someone	does	something	on	a	ground,	she has some sort of knowledge or awareness of her doing	what she is doing on 134 grounds of whatever grounds she is doing it for, at least in normal cases. (Moreover, it is	plausible	that	that	knowledge	or	awareness is, in	some	sense, constitutive of her acting on grounds of whatever it is that she is acting on grounds	of.	Cf.	Anscombe,	2000.)	One	might	worry	that	Motivationalism	about Explananatia	does	not	do	justice	to	this	phenomenon.	For	one	might	worry	that Motivationalism about Explananatia displays the agent as systematically mistaken	about	why	she	does	what	she	does.	Consider	the	following	objection: When	S	Φ's	on	grounds	of	P,	and	you	ask	her	why	she	is	Φing,	she	will	be able	to	tell	you	that	she	is	Φing	because	P,	at	least	in	normal	cases.	But	if Motivationalism about Grounds were correct, she would not be Φing because	P,	but	because	P	plays the	role	of	her	ground.	And that	would imply	that	agents	are	systematically	mistaken	about	why	they	do	what they	do:	when	they	Φ	on	grounds	of	P,	they	think	that	they	Φ	because	P, but	actually,	they	Φ	because	P	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	But	it	is	absurd to	think	that	we	are	systematically	mistaken	about	why	we	do	what	we do.	Therefore,	Motivationalism	about	Grounds	cannot	be	correct. This	objection	trades	on	the	ambiguity	of	'because'	that	was	brought	to	light	in discussion	of the first	objection.	When	S tells	you that she is	Φing	because	P, what	she	is	saying	is	that	P	motivated	her	to	Φ,	i.e.	what	she	is	saying	is	of	the form: I	am	Φing	becausemotivation	P. But	when	the	Motivationalist	about	Grounds	says	that	S	is	Φing	because	P	plays the	role	of	her	ground,	she	is	saying	that	what	explains	S's	Φing	is	the	fact	that	P plays	the	role	of	S's	ground,	i.e.	what	she	says	is	of	the	form: S	is	Φing	becauseexplanation	P	plays	the	role	of	S's	ground. 135 Thus, the Motivationalist about Grounds says nothing that challenges S's knowledge	or	awareness	of	what	motivates	her	to	what	she	does. (d) I	said	above that the truth in	Reasonism	is the idea that	normative reasons	can	play	a	role in	explanations. I	now	want	to	discuss	and	dismiss	an objection	that	is	directed	against	that	idea.	For	one	might	think	that	despite	all that	was	said	above,	reasons	themselves	have	no	place	in	explanantia	after	all. Consider	the	following	case:	Peter	believes	that	the	ice	in	the	middle	of the	pond	is	too	thin	to	support	his	weight,	and	on	grounds	of	what	he	believes, he	keeps	to the	edge	whilst	skating	on	the	pond.	Now,	as I	said, this	might	or might	not	be	a	case	in	which	Peter	is	acting	for	a	normative	reason.	It	might	be a	case	in	which	Peter	is	acting	for	a	normative	reason	(call	that	the	good	case): For it might be that the ice in the middle of the pond really is too thin to support	his	weight,	that	that	fact	is	a	reason	for	Peter	to	keep	to	the	edge,	and that	Peter's	believing	what	he	does,	and	taking	what	he	believes	to	be	a	reason for	him	to	do	what	he	does,	satisfies	whatever	requirements	must	be	satisfied for his acting on grounds of what he believes to count as an acting for a normative reason (see II.1.1).	On the other	hand, it	might be a case in	which Peter's	acting	on	grounds	of	what	he	believes	is	no	more	than	that	(call	that	the bad	case):	as,	for	instance,	what	Peter	believes	may	be	false.	Does	it	make	any difference	whether	Peter's case is a good case	or a	bad case?	Does	he	not	do exactly	the	same	thing	–	keep	to	the	edge	of	the	pond	–	regardless	of	whether he	is	in	the	good	case	or	the	bad	case?	And	if	he	does	the	exact	same	thing	in	the bad	case	and	in	the	good	case,	do	we	not	have	to	conclude	that	the	normative reason,	which is	present in the	good	case,	but	not in the	bad	case,	should	not figure	in	the	explanation	of	what	he	does	in	the	good	case?	As	Dancy	puts	it: 136 [T]hat	the	ice	in	the	middle	was	(in	fact)	thin	does	nothing	to	explain	his action.	He	would	have	acted	in	the	same	way	had	the	ice	not	been	thin. So that the ice	was thin does not contribute to the explanation of his action	(Dancy,	2014,	p.	91) Now,	it is	true	that	both	in	the	good	case	and	the	bad	case,	Peter	keeps	to	the edge	of	the	pond.	So	there	is	a	sense	in	which	he	does	the	exact	same	thing	both in	the	good	case	and	the	bad	case.	That	alone,	however,	should	not lead	us	to think	that	in	the	good	case,	any	mention	of	the	reason	Peter	is	responding	to	is explanatorily	speaking	superfluous.	Consider the	case in	which	Peter	believes that	the	ice	in	the	middle	is	too	thin,	and	keeps	to	the	edge	of	the	pond,	but	does not	do	so	on	grounds	of	his	belief	about	the	thinness	of	the	ice.	Let	us	say	that Peter	also	believes	that if	he	keeps	to	the	edge,	Sam	will	see	what	a	good	iceskater	he	is,	and	that	he	keeps	to	the	edge	on	that	ground.	Here,	there	is	a	sense in	which	Peter	does	the	exact	same	thing	as	he	does	when	he	keeps	to	the	edge on	the	ground	that	the	ice	in	the	middle	is	thin.	We	can	even	say	that	had	Peter not	believed	as	he	believed,	namely, that if	he	keeps	to	the	edge,	Sam	will	see what	a	good	ice-skater	he	is,	he	would	nevertheless	have	kept	to	the	edge.	For then,	surely,	he	would	not	disregard	what	he	also	believes,	namely,	that	the	ice in	the	middle	of	the	pond	is	too	thin.	Although	there	is	a	sense	in	which	he	does the	exact	same	thing	in	these	two	cases,	it	obviously	does	not	mean	that	those two	cases	are	to	be	explained	in	the	same	way.	The	cases	are	different	in	that Peter's grounds are different. And this difference is explanatorily speaking relevant.	That	we	can	construct	the	case	so	that	"[h]e	would	have	acted	in	the same	way"	is	neither	here	nor	there. Now,	in	our	original	two	cases	–	the	good	case	and	the	bad	case	–	Peter's grounds	are the	same.	More	precisely, they	are the	same	with	regard to their 137 content.	So	there	is	a	sense	in	which	we	can	say	about	the	good	case	that	Peter "would	have	acted	in	the	same	way	had	the	ice	not	been	thin".	Had	the	ice	not been thin, but had Peter nevertheless believed that it was thin, his ground would have been no different. But in the good case, Peter's ground is a normative reason. In the bad case, it is a mere consideration. Consequently, while	there	is	no	difference	in	content	between	the	good	case	and	the	bad	case, there	is	a	difference	in	status.	Had	the	ice	not	been	thin,	Peter	would	have	acted in the	same	way.	But	what	he	would then	have	done	would	not	have	had the same	status	as	what	he	in	fact	does.	The	absence	of	the	reason	would	not	have changed how Peter behaved, though his behavior would have counted as something	else;	it	would	not	have	counted	as	action	for	a	reason,	but	merely	as action	done	on	a	ground. From	Reasonism about Explanantia, Disjunctive	Motivationalism takes the insistence	that	reasons	are	explanatorily-speaking	relevant.	The	mere fact that there is a sense in which she who responds to a reason would act no differently, were the reason she responds to merely apparent, does not dislodge	the	fact	that	reasons	are	explanatorily-speaking	relevant. (e) Let me finish by considering whether the objections I formulated against some other disjunctivist theories considered above (see III.3) can be used	against	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia. I considered two ways in	which	one	might	seek	to	deal	with	error-cases	by	way	of	giving	them special treatment. I considered the option that in error-cases, grounds are considerations	about	one's	own	mind (Disjunctivism	about	Grounds), and the option that in	error-cases, agents	do	not	act	on	grounds (Disjunctivism	about Ground-Taking).	I	also	showed	why	neither	of	those	options	will	do.	Disjunctive 138 Motivationalism	about	Explanantia is	also	a	theory	that	holds	that	error-cases need	different	treatment	than	veridical	cases.	In	what	respect	is	it	different? Disjunctivism about Grounds fails because it gives an implausible account	of	what	kinds	of	considerations	play	the	role	of	a	ground	in	error-cases. But	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	is	not	a	disjunctive	theory	of grounds.	It	does	not	hold	that	we	need	a	special	treatment	of	grounds	in	errorcases.	According to the	Disjunctive	Motivationalist about	Explanantia, both in good	cases	and	in	bad	cases	it	is	the	same	thing	that	plays	the	role	of	a	ground, namely,	a	proposition.	Indeed,	with	regard	to	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground, the	good	case	and	the	bad	case	are	on	a	par.	The	good	case	and	the	bad	case	are different,	however,	in	that	in	the	good	case,	but	not	in	the	bad	case,	what	plays the role of a ground has the status of a reason, and accordingly, the agent's acting on grounds of whatever it is that she is acting on grounds of has the status of a response to a reason. So, unlike Disjunctivism about Grounds, Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	cannot	be faulted	for	giving	an implausible	account	of	what	kinds	of	considerations	play	the	role	of	a	ground	in error-cases. Disjunctivism about Ground-Taking fails because given that believed considerations play the role of a ground just in case, and because, they are taken	to	be	normative	reasons	and	motivate	the	agent	on	that	account,	there	is simply no basis for disallowing false considerations to play that role. Nevertheless,	as	I	explained,	it	is	true	that	there	is	a	sense	in	which	those	that act	on	grounds	of	false	considerations	are	not	acting	for	reasons;	for	contrary	to what	they	think,	what	they	are	doing	is	not	a	response	to	a	reason.	Disjunctive Motivationalism about Explanantia caters for the difference between those cases in	which	someone's	acting	on	a	ground	amounts to	her	responding to	a 139 reason,	and	those	cases	in	which	someone's	acting	on	a	ground	is	no	more	than that.	However,	unlike	Disjunctivism	about	Ground-Taking, it	does	not fall into the	trap	of	conflating	reasons	and	grounds. 5.	Summary It	is	widely	agreed	upon	that	error-cases,	i.e.	cases	in	which	the	agent's	relevant belief is false, pose a problem for the Non-Psychologist. I showed that such cases	pose	a	problem	for	the	Non-Psychologist	only	to	the	extent	that	grounds are taken	to	be	explanantia.	Thus,	we	can	avoid	the	problem	by	giving	up	the presupposition that grounds are explanantia. If grounds are not explanantia, what	explains	actions	that	are	done	on	grounds?	What	explains	actions	done	on grounds are motivation-facts, i.e. facts to the effect that the action was motivated by	whatever it is that it	was	motivated by, or done on grounds of whatever	it	was	done	on	grounds	of.	As	things	that	play	the	role	of	a	ground	can either	be	normative	reasons	themselves,	or	considerations	merely	taken	to	be normative	reasons,	it	follows	that	motivation-facts	come	in	two	kinds:	there	are those	that	include	normative	reasons,	and	there	are	those	that	do	not. 140 Summary I	started	out	by	asking:	When	someone	does	something	for	a	reason,	what	are the	reasons	for	which	she	does	what	she	does?	What	is	her	'motivating	reason', as it is	sometimes	put?	The	simple	answer	is: it	depends	on	what is	meant	by 'motivating reason'.	Non-Psychologists	hold that	motivating reasons	are	what the agent believes. I have shown that given that we understand 'motivating reasons'	as	grounds,	this	is	quite	correct,	as	what	we	believe	is	what	plays	the role	of a	ground.	However,	we	have to	be careful	not to confuse the role	of a ground	and	the	role	of	an	explanans.	For	the	conflation	of	those	two	roles	can occlude the truth in Non-Psychologism. What the Non-Psychologist about Grounds	should	say	is	that	what	plays	the	role	of	an	explanans,	when	someone acts	on	a ground, is a	motivation-fact. She should	also say that there are two kinds	of	motivation-facts:	those	that	include	normative	reasons	and	those	that do	not.	Let	me	summarize	how	I	arrived	at	that	result. What	we	seek to take into	account in	deliberation	and	advice	–	what I called reasons – are facts (which I said we should understand as true propositions)	that	favor	actions.	For	the	most	part,	facts	that	favor	actions	are not facts about	one's own	mind, e.g. about	beliefs or	desires	one	has (cf. I.5). Rather,	at	least	for	the	most	part,	they	are	ordinary	empirical	facts,	like	the	fact that	it	is	raining,	or	that	the	house	is	on	fire,	or	that	it	is	your	mother's	birthday today	(cf.	I.4).	Notably,	however,	such	ordinary	empirical	facts	are	the	reasons they are only in certain circumstances; in other circumstances, they can be reasons	to	perform	quite	different	actions,	or	no	reasons	at	all	(cf.	I.1).	I	argued that in saying only so	much, one can keep an open	mind about	what	makes reason-claims	of	the	form	'P, in	C, is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ'	true.	That	is,	one	can 141 keep	on	open	mind	about	whether	such	claims	simply	are	primitive	truths,	or whether they are true because of primitive truths about, say, the value or goodness	of	Φing,	or	whether	such	claims	are	true	because	an	idealized	alterego	of	S	would	treat	P	as	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ	(cf. I.3).	I	also	argued	that	one can	keep	an	open	mind	about	whether	a	certain	fact's	being	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ is dependent, in some way or another, on S's conative and/or cognitive situation.	For	instance,	it	might	be	that	the	fact	that	a	certain	drug	will	cure	the patient's	illness	is	a	reason	for	you	to	give	that	patient	said	drug	only	if	there	is some	way	in	which	you	can	come	to	know	that	it	cures	her	illness,	or	it	might	be that it is a reason regardless	of	whether there is some	way in	which	you	can come to	know	that it cures	her illness.	And it	might	be that, say, the fact that your	friend	is in	trouble	is	a	reason	for	you	to	help	her	out	only	given	certain facts about your desires or interests, or it	might be a reason no	matter your conative	condition. I	said	that	one	can	keep	on	open	mind	on	such issues.	We can	do	that,	because	we	can	understand	those	options	as	differing	views	about what	the	relevant	circumstances	are	in	which	a	certain	fact	is	the	reason	that	it is	(cf.	I.2). I employed this account of normative reasons in an argument to the effect that rational	motivators, i.e. things that play	what I called the role of a ground, are (believed) propositions, and, for the	most part, not propositions about	one's	own	mind.	Something	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	in	S's	Φing,	I	said, just	in	case	(a)	S	takes	it	to	speak	in	favor	of	Φing,	(b)	S	is	motivated	by	it	to	Φ, where	(a)	and	(b)	are	related	in	that	(c)	S	is	motivated	by	it	to	Φ	because	she takes	it	to	speak	in	favor	of	Φing	(cf.	II.1).	Given	that	what	we	take	to	be	reasons are	true	propositions	or	facts,	I	argued	that	it	follows	that	what	plays	the	role	of a	ground	can	be	a	true	proposition,	but	that	the	truth-value	of	a	proposition	is 142 not	essential	to	its	being	able	to	play	the	role	of	a	ground	(cf.	II.3).	Moreover,	I argued	that	while	there	are	cases	in	which	we	take	propositions	about	our	own mind	to	be	reasons,	these	cases	are	rare.	In	normal	cases,	the	propositions	we take	to	be	reasons	are	propositions	about	the	world	around	us	(cf.	II.4,	I.5).	So, what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	Non-Psychologistic	in	two	senses:	it	is	not	a psychological	state,	but	a	proposition,	and	the	propositions	that	play	the	role	of a	ground	are	not	restricted	to	propositions	about	psychological	states. In recent time, there has been much debate about whether so-called motivating reasons are to be conceived of as Psychologistically, i.e. as psychological states, or propositions about such states, or NonPsychologistically, i.e. as propositions that are not constrained to a psychological matter (cf. II.2). But contributions to the Psychologism-Debate (as I called it) often lack proper clarification of the notion (or better: the notions) of a 'motivating reason'. I argued that when Non-Psychologists talk about 'motivating reasons', they are talking either about (i) grounds ('motivating reason' is then to be understood as 'motivator that motivates because	it	is	taken	to	be	a	reason'),	or	about	(ii)	those	grounds	that	are	reasons ('motivating reason' is then to be understood as 'reason that	motivates'). As grounds	are	propositions,	and,	for	the	most	part,	not	propositions	about	one's own mind, Non-Psychologism about motivating reasons (where motivating reasons are understood as grounds) is correct.	However,	when	Psychologists talk about 'motivating reasons', they usually are neither talking about motivators that motivate because they taken to be a reasons, nor about normative reasons that motivate. Rather, they are talking about (iii) what explains	actions	(i.e.	explanantia),	in	the	sense	of	what	'makes	sense'	of	actions. Or	they	are	offering	a	reductive	account	of	acting	on	a	ground,	and	what	they 143 call 'motivating reasons' are (iv) psychological states that, according to their account, play some role in the production of behavior that counts as action done	on	a	ground	(cf.	II.2.1,	II.2.2). Now,	this	clarification	does	not	render	the	Psychologism-Debate	merely verbal. For it is often presupposed that motivating reasons, understood as grounds,	are	explanantia.	And	if	one's	view	is	that	something	plays	the	role	of S's	motivating	reason	just	in	case	(a)	S	takes	it	to	speak	in	favor	of	Φing,	(b)	is motivated	by	it	to	Φ,	(c)	is	motivated	by	it	to	Φ	because	she	takes	it	to	speak	in favor	of	Φing,	and	(d)	it	explains	why	S	Φs,	and	one	holds	that	what	plays	that role	is	a	non-psychological	proposition,	then	one	has	a	real	issue	with	someone who	holds	that	what	explains	actions	are	psychological	states	(cf.	II.2.2-3). However, there are good reasons for distinguishing between grounds and explanantia. It is often said that Non-Psychologists cannot properly deal with	error-cases	(cf.	III.1).	For	the	Non-Psychologist	will	say	things	like	that	in taking	out	her	umbrella,	Sam	acted	on	grounds	of	what	she	believed,	which	is, say,	that it is	raining.	But	if	Sam's	belief	that it is	raining	is	false, it is	thought, the	Non-Psychologist	will	have	to	implausibly	say	that	the	falsehood	'that it is raining'	is	what	explains	why	Sam	takes	out	her	umbrella.	And	while	that	bullet has	been	bitten	(cf.	III.2),	doing	so	is	certainly	something	that	we	should	seek	to avoid. As I put it, the problem at issue can be conceived of in terms of the following	inconsistent	triad	(cf.	III.1.2): (1) what	plays the role	of a ground	are	propositions (Propositionalism about	Grounds) (2) what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	also	plays	the	role	of	an	explanantia (Explanatorism	about	Grounds) (3) falsehoods	cannot	explain	(Veridicalism	about	Explanantia) 144 As	(1)	is	true	(cf.	II.1.3),	and	(3)	is	true	(cf.	III.1,	III.2),	(2)	must	be	false,	that	is, we	should	hold	grounds	and	explanantia	apart. However,	if	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	not	what	plays	the	role	of an explanantia, then what does play that role? I argued that when S Φs on grounds	of	P,	what	explains	her	Φing	is	the	fact	that	she	is	Φing	on	grounds	of P. To put it differently: that which plays the role of the explanans in an explanation	of	her	Φing	is	not	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground,	i.e.	P,	but	rather, a	fact	to	the	effect	that	P	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	(a	motivation-fact,	as	I	put it).	Furthermore,	the	considerations	that	play	the	role	of	a	ground	can	have	the status	of	a	reason,	but	they	can	also	have	the	status	of	a	mere	consideration.	So, while	actions	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	facts	to	the	effect	that	those	actions were done on grounds of a certain consideration, quite regardless of what status that consideration	has, in cases in	which the consideration that	played the	role	of	a	ground	has	the	status	of	a	reason, the	action	can	be	explained in terms	of	a	fact	to	the	effect	that	that	reason	played	the	role	of	a	ground.	That	is to say, motivation-facts come in two sorts: there are those that involve and those that do not involve reasons, and those two kinds of motivation-facts differ	in	their	explanatory	power	(cf.	III.4.2,	III.4.4-5). So,	to	recapitulate,	I	have	argued	that	what	speaks	in	favor	of	someone's performing	some	particular	course	of	action	can	be	what	rationally	motivates her	to	so	act,	but	that	not	all	rational	motivators	are	reasons.	For	something	to be	a	rational	motivator, it	suffices that it is taken	to	be	a	normative	reason, it need not in fact be one. Further, I have argued that one should distinguish motivation and explanation: motivators are not explanantia. Rather, explanantia are facts about motivators. On the one hand, this amounts to a defense of Non-Psychologism about motivating reasons, at least as long as 145 motivating reasons are understood as rational motivators, i.e. grounds. For explanantia are truths, while what rationally motivates someone can be a falsehood. On the other hand, however, it transpired that the PsychologismDebate rests on the false assumption that grounds are explanantia, and that Non-Psychologism about motivating reasons lacks a satisfactory theory of action-explanation.	I	hope	to	have	shown	what	such	a	theory	must	look	like. 146 Acknowledgements This thesis was written as part of the SNSF-funded project 'The Normative Mind'. Before I was	working	within that project, I received financial support from the Janggen-Pöhn-Stiftung and from the Freie	Akademische	Gesellschaft Basel. I would like to thank all three institutions for financially enabling	my work. I	would	like	to	especially	and	warmly	thank	my	supervisor,	Fabian	Dorsch,	for encouragement, advice,	many	enormously	helpful comments	and suggestions, and for	getting	me to finally	bring	some	of	my ideas into	shape.	His	untimely death fills me with deep sadness. His generosity both in personal and in philosophical	matters	will	not	be	forgotten. I would also like to thank Gianfranco Soldati for agreeing to be my second supervisor.	He	has	shown	continuous	interest	in	my	work	and	I	am	happy	to	be able	to	submit	it	to	his	judgment.	With	Constantine	Sandis,	an	expert	in	the	field in	which	I	but	tinkered	agreed	to	read	and	judge	my	work	and	I	am	glad	about that. A thanks is	due to	Davor	Bodrožić for	countless invaluable	discussions over the last few years – and for some last minute proofreading of this manuscript. Also, I	would like to thank Sebastian	Rödl for getting	me started with	my	thesis	(which	has	since	taken	a	very	different	track);	Peter	Schulthess for	enabling	me	to	spend	an	enjoyable	year	as	his	assistant	at	the	University	of Zurich; Candace	Vogler for her kind invitation to Chicago,	where I spent two thrilling (and quite chilly) quartals as Visiting Scholar; the members of the 147 EXRE-crowd	in	Fribourg,	who	have	heard	maybe	more	than	they	ever	wanted to hear about reasons; Josephine Frei for additional proofreading; and	Anton Ford,	Rebekka	Gersbach,	Christian	Kietzmann,	Matthias	Haase,	Dominik	Renner and	especially	Jonas	Held	for	stimulating	discussions	–	some	of	them	have	been going	on	for	years,	some	of	them	(sadly)	were	a	one-time	event,	some	of	them were way back in the past, others were just yesterday. I would also like to thank	audiences	at	workshops	and	conferences in	Barcelona,	Basel,	Budapest, Fribourg,	Chicago,	Poznan,	and	Zurich	at	which	I	had	the	opportunity	to	present earlier	stages	of	this	work. I	would	like	to	thank	my	parents,	Josephine	and	André	Frei,	for	constant support	and	interest. Most	importantly,	I	would	like	to	thank	Corinne	Weber	and	Filippa	Frei. Without	your	love	and	laughter	this	would	all	make	not	half	as	much	sense. 148 Bibliography Alvarez, M. (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford	University	Press. Alvarez, M. (2016). Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality. Synthese,	1–18. Anscombe,	G.	E.	M.	(1989).	Von	Wright	on	Practical	Inference.	In	The	Philosophy of	Georg	Henrik	von	Wright	(pp.	377–404).	Open	Court. Anscombe,	G.	E.	M.	(2000).	Intention	(2nd	ed).	Harvard	University	Press. Baier, K. (1969). The moral point of view: A rational basis of ethics. Cornell University	Press. Bittner,	R.	(2001).	Doing	Things	for	Reasons.	Oxford	University	Press. Blackburn,	S.	(1998).	Ruling	passions.	Oxford	University	Press. Boyle, M., & Lavin, D. (2010). Goodness and Desire. In S. Tenenbaum (Ed.), Desire,	Practical	Reason,	and	the	Good (pp.	161-201).	Oxford	University Press Broome, J. (2004). Reasons. In R. J. Wallace (Ed.),	Reason and Value: Themes From	the	Moral	Philosophy	of	Joseph	Raz	(pp.	204–28).	Oxford	University Press. Cuneo,	T. (2007).	The	Normative	Web:	An	Argument	for	Moral	Realism.	Oxford University	Press. Dancy,	J.	(2002).	Practical	Reality.	Oxford	University	Press. Dancy, J. (2003a).	Précis	of	Practical	Reality.	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological Research,	67	(2),	423–428. Dancy, J. (2003b). Replies.	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research,	67 (2), 468–490. 149 Dancy,	J.	(2004a).	Ethics	Without	Principles.	Oxford	University	Press. Dancy,	J.	(2004b).	Two	Ways	of	Explaining	Actions.	Royal	Institute	of	Philosophy Supplement,	55	(1),	25–42. Dancy,	J.	(2008).	On	How	to	Act :	Disjunctively.	In	A.	Haddock	&	F.	Macpherson (Eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (pp. 262–282). Oxford	University	Press. Dancy, J. (2014). On	Knowing	One's Reason. In C. Littlejohn	& J. Turri (Eds.), Epistemic	Norms	(pp.	80–96).	Oxford	University	Press. Darwall, S. (2003). Desires, Reasons, and Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological	Research,	67	(2),	436–443. Darwall,	S.	L.	(1983).	Impartial	reason.	Cornell	University	Press. Davidson,	D.	(1980).	Actions,	Reasons,	and	Causes	(1963).	In	Essays	on	Actions and	Events	(pp.	3–19).	Clarendon	Press. Davis,	W. A. (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes.	Philosophical Studies, 122	(1),	51–101. Everson,	S.	(2009).	What	Are	Reasons	for	Action?	In	C.	Sandis	(Ed.),	New	Essays on	the	Explanation	of	Action.	Palgrave	Macmillan. Finlay,	S.	(2010).	Recent	Work	on	Normativity.	Analysis,	70	(2),	331–346. Finlay, Stephen. (2009). The Obscurity of Internal Reasons. Philosophers' Imprint,	9	(7),	1–22. Foot,	P.	(2001).	Natural	Goodness.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press. Frege, G. (2003). Der Gedanke. In G. Patzig (Ed.), Logische Untersuchungen. Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht. Garrard, E., & McNaughton, D. (1998). Mapping Moral Motivation. Ethical Theory	and	Moral	Practice,	1	(1),	45–59. 150 Gibbons, J. (2010). Things That Make Things Reasonable. Philosophy and Phenomenological	Research,	81	(2),	335–361. Gregory,	A.	(2013).	The	Guise	of	Reasons.	American	Philosophical	Quarterly,	50 (1),	63–72. Hacker,	P.	(2009).	Agential	Reasons	and	the	Explanation	of	Human	Behaviour. In C. Sandis (Ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. Haddock,	A.,	&	Macpherson,	F.	(2008).	Introduction:	Varieties	of	Disjunctivism. In	A.	Haddock	&	F.	Macpherson	(Eds.),	Disjunctivism:	Perception,	Action, Knowledge.	Oxford	University	Press. Heuer, U. (2004). Reasons for Actions and Desires.	Philosophical Studies, 121 (1),	43–63. Heuer,	Ulrike.	(2006).	Explaining	Reasons:	Where	Does	the	Buck	Stop?	Journal of	Ethics	and	Social	Philosophy,	1	(3),	1–25. Hieronymi,	P.	(2011).	Reasons	for	Action.	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society, 111	(3pt3),	407–427. Hornsby, J. (2008). A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons. In A. Haddock & F. Macpherson (Eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge	(pp.	244-261).	Oxford	University	Press. Hyman, J. (1999). How Knowledge Works. Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (197), 433–451. Hyman,	J.	(2015).	Action,	Knowledge,	and	Will.	Oxford	University	Press. Jackson, F. (1991). Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the	Nearest and Dearest	Objection.	Ethics,	101	(3),	461–482. Kant, I. (1998). Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University	Press. 151 Kearns,	S.,	&	Star,	D.	(2009).	Reasons	as	Evidence.	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics, 4,	215–42. Kiesewetter, B. (forthcoming). How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence. In C. McHugh, J. Way, & D. Whiting (Eds.), Normativity: Epistemic	and	Practical.	Oxford	University	Press. Korsgaard, C. M. (1986). Skepticism about Practical Reason. The Journal of Philosophy,	LXXXIII	(1),	5–25. Korsgaard, C. M. (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University	Press. Lavin, D. (2011). Problems of Intellectualism: Raz on	Reason and Its	Objects. Jurisprudence	2	(2):	367-378 Lenman, J. (2011). Reasons for Action: Justification vs. Explanation. In E. N. Zalta	(Ed.),	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Winter	2011). Littlejohn, C. (2012). Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge University	Press. Lord, E. (2008). Dancy on Acting for the Right Reason. Journal of Ethics and Social	Philosophy,	(3),	1–7. Mantel,	S.	(2014).	No	Reason	for	Identity:	On	the	Relation	Between	Motivating and	Normative	Reasons.	Philosophical	Explorations,	17	(1),	49–62. Mantel, S. (2015). Worldly Reasons: An Ontological Inquiry Into Motivating Considerations and	Normative	Reasons.	Pacific	Philosophical	Quarterly, 96	(4). Mantel, S. (2016). How to Be Psychologistic about Motivating but not about Normative	Reasons.	Grazer	Philosophische	Studien,	93,	80–105 Mayr,	E.	(2011).	Understanding	Human	Agency.	Oxford	University	Press. McDowell,	J.	H.	(1994).	Mind	and	World.	Harvard	University	Press. 152 McDowell, J. (1982).	Criteria,	Defeasibility, and	Knowledge.	Proceedings	of	the British	Academy,	68,	455–79. McDowell, J. (1986). Singular Thought and the Extent of "Inner Space." In J. McDowell & P. Pettit (Eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context. Clarendon Press. McDowell, J. (1995).	Might	There	Be	External	Reasons? In J. E. J.	Altham	&	R. Harrison	(Eds.),	World,	Mind	and	Ethics:	Essays	on	the	Ethical	Philosophy of	Bernard	Williams.	Cambridge	University	Press. McDowell, J. (2013). Acting in the Light of a Fact. Thinking About Reasons: Themes	From	the	Philosophy	of	Jonathan	Dancy,	13–28. Mele,	A.	(2007).	Reasonology	and	False	Beliefs.	Philosophical	Papers,	36	(1),	91– 118. Miller,	C.	(2008).	Motivation	in	Agents.	Noûs,	4	2(2),	222–266. Nagel,	T.	(1986).	The	View	From	Nowhere.	Oxford	University	Press. O'Brien,	L.	(2015).	Beyond	Psychologism	and	Anti-Psychologism.	Ethical	Theory and	Moral	Practice,	18	(2),	281–295. Parfit,	D.	(2011).	On	What	Matters.	Oxford	University	Press. Pettit,	P.,	&	Smith,	M.	(1997).	Parfit's	P.	In	J.	Dancy	(Ed.),	Reading	Parfit	(pp.	71– 95).	Blackwell. Pryor, J. (2007). Reasons and That-Clauses. Philosophical Issues, 17 (1), 217– 244. Raz,	J.	(1975).	Practical	Reason	and	Norms.	Oxford	University	Press. Raz,	J.	(1978).	Practical	Reasoning.	Oxford	University	Press. Raz, J. (1999). Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford University	Press. 153 Raz,	J.	(2001).	Incommensurability	and	Agency.	In	Engaging	Reason	(pp.	46-66). Oxford	University	Press. Raz, J. (2011a). Epistemic Modulations. In From	Normativity to Responsibility (pp.	107–128).	Oxford	University	Press. Raz,	J.	(2011b).	From	Normativity	to	Responsibility.	Oxford	University	Press. Raz,	J.	(2011c).	On	the	Guise	of	the	Good.	In	From	Normativity	to	Responsibility (pp.	59-84).	Oxford	University	Press. Raz, J. (2011d). Reasons: Explanatory and	Normative. In	From	Normativity to Responsibility	(pp.	13–35).	Oxford	University	Press. Roessler, J. (2014). Reason Explanation and the Second-Person Perspective. Philosophical	Explorations,	17	(3),	346–357. Sandis,	C.	(2012).	The	Things	We	Do	and	Why	We	Do	Them.	Palgrave	Macmillan. Sandis, C. (2013). Can Action Explanations Ever Be Non-Factive? In	Thinking About	Reasons:	Themes	From	the	Philosophy	of Jonathan	Dancy (pp. 2946).	Oxford	University	Press. Scanlon,	T.	(1998).	What	We	Owe	to	Each	Other.	The	Belknap	Press. Scanlon,	T.	(2014).	Being	Realistic	About	Reasons.	Oxford	University	Press. Schroeder,	M.	A.	(2007).	Slaves	of	the	Passions.	Oxford	University	Press. Sehon, S. R. (2005).	Teleological Realism:	Mind, Agency, and	Explanation. MIT Press. Setiya,	K. (2011).	Reasons	and	Causes.	European	Journal	of	Philosophy,	19	(1), 129–157. Setiya,	K.	(2007).	Reasons	Without	Rationalism.	Princeton	University	Press. Setiya,	K.	(2010).	Sympathy	for	the	Devil.	In	Tenenbaum	(Ed.),	Desire,	Practical Reason,	and	the	Good	(pp.	82-110).	Oxford	University	Press. 154 Setiya,	K.	(2014).	What	is	a	Reason	to	Act?	Philosophical	Studies,	167	(2),	221– 235. Setiya,	K,	&	Paakkunainen,	H.	(2012).	Internal	Reasons:	Contemporary	Readings. MIT	Press. Skorupski,	J.	(2010).	The	Domain	of	Reasons.	Oxford	University	Press. Smith, M. A. (1995). Internal Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,	55	(1),	109–131. Smith, M. A. (2003). Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story. Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research,	67	(2),	460–467. Smith,	M.	A. (1998).	The	Possibility	of	Philosophy	of	Action. In	Human	Action, Deliberation	and	Causation.	Kluwer	Academic	Publishers. Smith,	M.	A.	(2000).	The	Moral	Problem.	Wiley-Blackwell. Stout, R. (2009). Was Sally's Reason for Running From the Bear That She Thought It Was Chasing Her? In C. Sandis (Ed.), New Essays on the Explanation	of	Action	(pp.	48-61).	Palgrave	Macmillan. Stoutland, F. (2007). Reasons for Action and Psychological States. In A. Leist (Ed.),	Action	in	Context	(pp.	75-94).	Walter	de	Gruyter. Strawson,	P.	F.	(1949).	Truth.	Analysis,	9	(6),	83–97. Thompson, M. (2008). Life and Action : Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical	Thought.	Harvard	University	Press. Thomson,	J.	J.	(2003).	Goodness	and	Advice.	Princeton	University	Press. Thomson,	J.	J.	(2008).	Normativity.	Open	Court. Turri,	J.	(2009).	The	Ontology	of	Epistemic	Reasons.	Noûs,	43	(3),	490–512. Velleman, J. D. (2000). The possibility of practical reason. Oxford University Press. Velleman,	J.	D.	(1992).	The	Guise	of	the	Good.	Noûs,	26	(1),	3-26. 155 Vogler,	C.	A.	(2002).	Reasonably	Vicious.	Harvard	University	Press. Wallace, R. J. (2003). Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological	Research,	67	(2),	429–435. Wedgwood,	R.	(2009). Intrinsic	Values	and	Reasons	for	Action.	In	E.	Sosa	&	E. Villanueva	(Eds.),	Metaethics	(Vol.	19,	pp.	342–363).	Wiley. Whiting,	D.	(2014).	Keep	Things	in	Perspective:	Reasons,	Rationality,	and	the	A Priori.	Journal	of	Ethics	and	Social	Philosophy,	8,	1–22. Wiland,	E.	(2003).	Psychologism,	Practical	Reason	and	the	Possibility	of	Error. Philosophical	Quarterly,	53	(210),	68–78. Wiland,	E.	(2012).	Reasons.	Continuum. Williams, B. (1980). Internal and External Reasons. In	Moral Luck (pp. 101– 113).	Cambridge	University	Press. Zimmerman, M. J. (2008). Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance.	Cambridge	University	Press.